Dismiss Notice
Welcome to IDF- Indian Defence Forum , register for free to join this friendly community of defence enthusiastic from around the world. Make your opinion heard and appreciated.

Chinese CPU , IC and Operational Systems

Discussion in 'China & Asia Pacific' started by RMLOVER, Aug 30, 2017.

  1. RMFAN

    RMFAN Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

    Joined:
    Sep 2, 2017
    Messages:
    443
    Likes Received:
    89
    Country Flag:
    South Africa

    Chips All In: Investing in China’s Semiconductor Industry
    Posted on March 2, 2016 by China Briefing

    http://www.china-briefing.com/news/...vesting-in-chinas-semiconductor-industry.html
    [​IMG]

    By Alexander Chipman Koty

    Over the next decade, China plans to invest up to RMB 1 trillion (US$161 billion) into its domestic semiconductor industry as it seeks to become a global power in the sector. In recent years, Beijing has repeatedly stated that developing its own integrated circuit (IC) industry is of integral national strategic concern. This aligns with government goals to become stronger in areas such as high-tech, research and development, and intellectual property (IP), as outlined in China’s 13th Five Year Plan covering the years 2016-2020.

    China’s overtures in this sector offer potential rewards for investors and producers of semiconductors, but considerable risks and obstacles as well. The necessity for large scale production and advanced research and development to compete and earn profits in this capital-intensive industry is a considerable hurdle to break through. Additionally, concerns over IP protection and cyber espionage add another layer of risk to the industry. A clear understanding of the industry and the government’s incentive structure is therefore essential for success.


    Snapshot of China’s Semiconductor Industry
    China is the world’s largest purchaser of semiconductors, accounting for 56.6 percent of global consumption in 2014. Its consumption market grew at an 18.8 percent compound annual growth rate from 2003 to 2014, compared to 6.6 percent worldwide. This is due in large part to its position as the world’s largest exporter of electronics, where the use of semiconductors is essential. However, over 90 percent of the semiconductors that China purchases are imported from foreign countries such as the United States, South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan. As a result, China spends more money importing semiconductors than it does oil.


    In order to shrink its sizable trade deficit, the Chinese government has set forth ambitious goals to reduce its reliance on foreign technology and to eventually become self-sufficient. Through its support of the domestic semiconductor industry, Beijing envisions 40 percent self-sufficiency by 2020 and 70 percent by 2025. This is part of China’s wider ‘Made in China 2025 Policy’, which aims to not only produce goods in China, but to transform the reputation of its products from cheap, unreliable, and unimaginative to precise, high quality, and innovative. Ultimately, the Chinese government aspires for its home-grown companies to be tier-1 industry leaders by 2030.

    [​IMG]RELATED: Pre-Investment and Entry Strategy Advisory from Dezan Shira & Associates
    Government Incentives

    The semiconductor industry in China was fundamentally transformed in 2000 as part of the government’s 10th Five Year Plan. Semiconductor companies – which were entirely state-owned – were privatized and the sector was classified as an encouraged industry for foreign investment. State Council Rule 18 introduced several tax incentives to spur growth in the industry in June 2000. While the industry grew over the following decade, its development failed to meet lofty government expectations. Foreign companies’ concerns over China’s lack of IP protection, combined with government support spread too thinly across multiple industries, contributed to the less-than-expected results.

    The policies of State Council Rule 18 were revised and built upon in State Council Rule 4, released in February 2011 and valid through 2017. Notable points include:

    • Continuation of preferential value-added tax for software products;
    • Business tax exemption for qualified software makers and IC design firms when engaging in software development and testing, information system integration, IC design, consulting, and operation and maintenance;
    • Two-year exemption and three-year half exemption or five-year exemption and five-year half exemption on enterprise income tax for IC manufacturers who meet particular design and/or investment targets;
    • Two-year enterprise income tax exemption followed by three-year half exemption for new IC design firms and qualified software enterprises launching in China;
    • Reduced 15 percent and 25 percent tax rates for IC manufacturers who meet particular design and/or investment targets; and
    • Preferential enterprise income tax for qualified companies engaging in IC packaging, testing or manufacturing of special materials, and manufacturers of special IC equipment.
    The policies found in State Council Rule 4 differ from previous incentives in several ways. Firstly, tax incentives extend to backend testing, assembly, packaging, and specialized material and equipment companies. Secondly, there is greater emphasis on rewarding profit-making firms. By doing so, the government encourages mergers and acquisitions for successful companies to consolidate and grow by purchasing smaller and less profitable ones. Thirdly, there is a clear effort to encourage high-tech research and development. The government offers greater benefits to companies that meet high technological standards, incentivizing domestic innovation and making products more globally competitive.

    There is a notable lack of support for discrete semiconductors in favor of more complex ICs as the former sector is seen as low-tech. Finally, Beijing is adopting a more market-based approach by having government investments in the industry managed by private equity firms and overseen by investors rather than run directly by the government itself.

    Mergers, Acquisitions, and Partnerships
    Mergers, acquisitions, and partnerships have been on the rise globally in an environment of slowing growth and rising costs for semiconductors, and Chinese companies have been particularly aggressive. In 2013, Tsinghua Unigroup, a government-affiliated private equity firm, purchased the Chinese mobile chipmaker Spreadtrum and RDA Microelectronics for a combined US $2.7 billion. Intel later bought a 20 percent stake in the two companies for US $1.5 billion, and is poised to invest another US $5.5 billion in manufacturing semiconductors in China. Other chipmakers, such as Qualcomm and NXP, have established joint ventures with Chinese companies, and the former also established a China investment fund.

    While China is dependent on foreign companies for its semiconductors, foreign companies are also dependent on China to provide a market. For instance, about half of Qualcomm and NXP’s revenue and 20 percent of Intel’s comes from China. As a result, many foreign companies are sharing technology and forming partnerships with Chinese companies to avoid being left out of the Chinese market. Through partnerships, joint ventures, and mergers and acquisitions, Beijing envisions its domestic companies acquiring the technology and expertise they need to become dominant global players.

    This strategy has raised the suspicions of the U.S. government, however. In February 2016, Tsinghua Unisplendour, an affiliate of Tsinghua Unigroup, dropped a US $3.8 billion agreement to buy 15 percent of the American company Western Digital after the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) opted to investigate the deal. CFIUS has the power to block international deals deemed detrimental to American security interests. This surprised many observers, who did not expect any interference with a minority deal in a relatively low-tech company. Earlier that month, Fairchild Semiconductor, which holds multiple U.S. government contracts, rejected a US $2.46 billion Chinese bid in favor of a lower offer from an American company, likely due to concerns over CFIUS. Similarly, dynamic random access memory chip manufacturer Micron Technology, whose chips are used in U.S. weapons systems, rejected an informal US $23 billion offer from Tsinghua Unigroup on the presumption that it would be blocked by CFIUS due to national security concerns.

    These failed deals highlight the difficulties that Chinese companies may experience with foreign governments unwilling to share technology essential for national security, and holding concerns over Chinese cyber espionage, to go along with longstanding skepticism over IP protection in China.

    Key Takeaways
    The Chinese government appears committed to developing its domestic semiconductor industry, offering significant capital and various tax incentives to IC producers. In the long term, discerning investors may reap the benefits of Beijing’s support as it strives to become a global power in the industry. Meanwhile, existing producers can continue to see China as an affluent market for its goods, though increasingly at the cost of technology and licensing. However, the capital-intensive nature of the semiconductor industry, its emphasis on costly research and development, and the necessity for increased IP protection, are significant obstacles for China. Combined with the potential for the industry to become highly politicized, there is no guarantee that Beijing will achieve its ambitious goals.
     
  2. RMFAN

    RMFAN Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

    Joined:
    Sep 2, 2017
    Messages:
    443
    Likes Received:
    89
    Country Flag:
    South Africa
    China Unveils Memory Plans

    https://semiengineering.com/china-unveils-memory-plans/
    Government and industry are investing tens of billions of dollars, but so far results are mixed.

    JANUARY 19TH, 2017 - BY: MARK LAPEDUS
    [​IMG]
    Backed by billions of dollars in government funding, China in 2014 launched a major initiative to advance its domestic semiconductor, IC-packaging and other electronic sectors. So far, though, the results are mixed.

    China is making progress in IC-packaging, but the nation’s efforts to advance its domestic logic and memory sectors are still a work in progress. In fact, China has yet to achieve its goal of closing the technology and trade gap with foreign chipmakers.

    The government isn’t throwing in the towel, however. On the contrary, it continues to invest in the semiconductor sector, and now it appears to be putting its emphasis on one area in particular—memory.

    The nation’s memory efforts are being expanded on two fronts. On one front, three multinational companies—Intel, Samsung and SK Hynix—are expanding their memory production in fabs within China. On a second front, China hopes to get its own domestic memory sector off the ground, and for good reason. It must obtain or import the vast majority of its chips from foreign suppliers, creating an enormous trade gap in the arena.

    To help jumpstart its domestic memory efforts, China has attempted to acquire multinational memory makers or to form technology alliances with them. So far, most of the multinationals have balked, citing national security and intellectual-property concerns, or their governments have stepped in to stop the deal. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) has been active in blocking Chinese investments, according to numerous industry sources.

    While China continues to look for partnerships, several domestic memory makers have emerged. Here’s the latest activity in China:

    • In December, China unveiled a $24 billion memory project in Wuhan, the capital of the Hubei province in central China. Yangtze River Storage Technology (YRST), which is spearheading the project, hopes to build 3D NAND fabs. YRST itself is backed by China’s Tsinghua Unigroup, a state-run company.
    • Tsinghua Unigroup has a separate DRAM and 3D NAND fab project in Nanjing. The total investment is over $30 billion in that project, making its total investment in the memory segment at a whopping $54 billion, at least for now. In addition, Tsinghua Unigroup also recently acquired a memory design house in China.
    • China’s Jinhua Integrated Circuit Co. (JHICC) recently broke ground on a new DRAM fab. JHICC obtained its DRAM technology from Taiwan’s UMC.
    • GigaDevice, a Chinese flash design house, is trying to get a memory fab venture off the ground.

    Not all projects will become a reality, though. Sino King Technology, which is led by the former chief executive of Elpida, has suspended its efforts to start a memory company in China.

    All told, in memory, China is starting from nearly scratch. Consequently, it won’t be easy to get a domestic memory industry off the ground. “It won’t happen in the short term,” said Risto Puhakka, president of VLSI Research. “China has the capital, but they lack the skill level and IP.”

    Still, China is moving full speed ahead in both memory and logic. In fact, semiconductor technology and manufacturing are playing a big role in one of the nation’s major initiatives, dubbed “Made in China 2025.” Launched in 2015, the goal of this effort is to upgrade and increase the domestic content of components in key industries.

    “China is becoming a leading consumer of electronics, but they’re not yet producing much of the semiconductor components for those electronics systems,” said David Fried, chief technology officer at Coventor. “It just makes sense for them to bring that semiconductor production inside to satisfy consumer demand. So they’re going to invest a lot in logic and memory to bring up advanced technology nodes. And they are going to try to do it fast.”

    Playing catch-up
    China’s IC efforts are fueling a wave of fab activity in the nation, creating a boom in the equipment industry. In total, wafer fab equipment (WFE) sales in China are expected to reach $7 billion in 2017, compared to $6.7 billion in 2016 and $3.4 billion in 2013, according to SEMI. In total, the worldwide WFE market is projected to reach $43.4 billion in 2017, up 9.3% over 2016, according to SEMI.

    [​IMG]
    Fig. 1: Semiconductor equipment sales. Source: SEMI

    Amazingly, China’s WFE market hasn’t reached its peak. “Right now, it looks like 2017 fab equipment spending in China is going to be roughly the same as 2016, but it’s up a pretty significant amount from where it was a couple of years ago,” said Arthur Sherman, vice president of marketing and business development at Applied Materials. “We think 2018 spending could be meaningfully up above the 2017 forecast.”

    Others agreed. “As best we can tell, there are up to 20 active projects that we are focused on tracking in China,” said Martin Anstice, president and chief executive with Lam Research, in a recent conference call. “The spending or at least the significant spending is more likely to be a calendar 2018 statement than calendar 2017.”

    Although China’s domestic IC sector is moving at a fast pace, the Chinese government has been grappling with the same problem for years. It is behind in semiconductor technology. This is a complex subject, but one of the causes is export controls. Multinational companies sell products into China, but they must follow various export control policies. Originally hatched during the Cold War period in the 1950s, export controls were established to limit technologies that could have potential military use.

    As part of those controls, multinational fab equipment makers for years were prevented from shipping advanced tools into China (and other nations) that were capable of processing chips at 0.25 microns and below. On top of that, China also lacked IC know-how, so it fell behind in semiconductor technology.

    Today, there are still export controls in China, although the regulations have been eased in some but not all areas. Generally, equipment makers can now ship more advanced tools into China. But it’s hard to play catch-up in semiconductors. So over the years, China has unveiled several initiatives to advance its IC industry. The country has made some progress, but every plan has fallen short of expectations.

    Then, in 2014, China launched an initiative called the “National Guideline for Development of the IC Industry.” The goal is to accelerate China’s efforts in 14nm finFETs, advanced packaging, MEMS and memory.

    At the time, China created a $19.3 billion fund, which would be used to invest in its domestic IC firms. And over the next decade, it could spend $100 billion across China’s IC sector.

    China launched these efforts for various reasons. First, it hopes to close the technology gap with foreign chipmakers. Second, China consumed 44.2% of the world’s chips in 2016, according to Gartner. Yet, its chipmakers produce only a small fraction of the world’s ICs.

    Finally, China produces an inordinate amount of the world’s electronic products. “But right now, China must import 80% to 90% of its chips from other countries,” said Linyong “Leo” Pang, chief product officer and executive vice president at D2S. “From the Chinese government point of view, it’s a very simple solution. ‘Let’s make those chips in China so we don’t have to import them.’”

    Over time, China has been ramping up its fab capacity, as the nation consumes more of the world’s chips. “China is becoming a big market,” said Gary Patton, chief technology officer at GlobalFoundries. “You can see there is a move to get more production inside China.”

    In total, China produced 7.8% of the world’s IC in 2009, but that figure grew to 12.7% in 2015, according to IC Insights. By 2020, China is expected to make 20.9% of the world’s chips, according to IC Insights.


    All told, China’s new strategy is much different than past efforts. “The Chinese government is actively attempting to reshape the domestic semiconductor market with significant capital from both government and private sources and to assist local companies in becoming key players in the global semiconductor market,” said Joey Tun, principal marketing development manager at National Instruments (NI).

    “Although this is not the first time the Chinese government has taken on propping up the domestic semiconductor industry, though with limited success in previous times, both the scale and breath of this effort points to significant opportunities and long-term implications for multinational companies,” Tun said.

    So what is China’s strategy? Basically, China hopes to develop its own technology. If it doesn’t have the know-how, it will simply acquire a company to obtain the technology.

    One of China’s first big moves was in IC packaging. In 2014, JCET, China’s largest IC packaging company, acquired Singapore’s STATS ChipPAC, a move that put China in the upper echelon in the arena.

    Then, China focused on logic. The nation boasts a sizable number of fabless design houses. But for leading-edge chips, China’s design houses must rely on the multinational foundries. China itself has a number of foundry vendors, but the most advanced process among the local companies is 28nm planar.

    Hoping to advance its logic technology, SMIC, Huawei, Imec and Qualcomm in 2015 formed a joint R&D venture in China. The venture plans to develop 14nm finFET technology by 2020.

    Not all of the action is at the leading edge, however. For example, SMIC, China’s largest foundry vendor, recently raised its capital spending, primarily due to strong demand for more mature processes like 65nm and 55nm.

    The demand is fueled by several chip applications in the China market, such as digital TVs, set-top boxes and RF. “We’re seeing companies in China trying to position themselves to play in the IoT space,” said Walter Ng, vice president of business management at UMC.

    Seeking to get a piece of the action, GlobalFoundries, TSMC and UMC are building new fabs in China. For example, UMC recently opened a 300mm joint venture fab in Xiamen, China. Initially, the fab will produce 55nm and 40nm chips.

    “We are seeing good demand for 40nm,” Ng said. “The initial volumes in that fab are going to be taken by existing customers due to demand. Over time, a good part of that capacity will be taken up by some of the more well-known domestic players.”

    Meanwhile, China also is ramping up its memory capacity. The nation’s memory business is divided into two categories—the multinationals and the domestic players.

    In 2006, SK Hynix was one of the early multinationals to build a memory fab in China. Today, SK Hynix’ Wuxi-based fab represents about half of its total DRAM output. The company plans to expand that fab with an investment of $808 million.

    Then, in 2014, Samsung began ramping up its new 300mm fab in Xi’an, China. This fab, which is producing 3D NAND, recently expanded from 20,000 to 30,000 wafer starts per month, according to Pacific Crest Securities.

    Samsung is also expanding its 3D NAND production in fabs within Korea. “For NAND, overall demand will increase due to content growth in all applications,” said Chun Sewon, senior vice president of memory marketing at Samsung, during a recent conference call.

    Intel, meanwhile, converted its China fab from 65nm chipsets to 3D NAND in 2015. Today, Intel is shipping 3D NAND from its Dalian-based fab.

    [​IMG]
    Fig. 2: China’s manufacturing spending is on the rise. Source: SEMI

    Who is YRST?
    Still, the multinationals can only produce a tiny percentage of China’s memory needs, prompting the government to jumpstart its own 3D NAND and DRAM efforts.

    For this, China needs technology and expertise. To obtain the know-how, Tsinghua Unigroup and other Chinese firms are recruiting former chip executives from Taiwan and elsewhere. “The challenge is that everything is new. You need new facilities, processes and technology,” said Greg Wong, an analyst with Forward Insights. “This is why they are trying to attract some experienced people.”

    Ganming Zhao, chief technology officer for Applied Materials’ China unit, added: “Memory suppliers face challenges, including ensuring they have advanced technology knowledge, experienced technical talent and leading technology partnerships. Current heavy IC investment in China should make funding less of a concern.”

    China started the ball rolling with Wuhan Xinxin Semiconductor Manufacturing Corp. (XMC). Founded in 2006, Wuhan-based XMC is a NOR flash foundry vendor. In addition, XMC has been developing 3D NAND as part of an alliance with Spansion, now part of Cypress.

    Last year, Tsinghua Unigroup acquired a majority stake in XMC. Then, XMC was moved under a new group called YRST. Tsinghua Unigroup owns roughly 50% of YRST. The other portion is owned by China’s National Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund.

    Under its new parent, XMC will continue to focus on the NOR foundry business, according to company officials, but XMC will no longer pursue 3D NAND.

    Instead, YRST will develop 3D NAND. As part of that plan, the government recently announced a new $24 billion memory project in Wuhan. Led by YRST, the entity hopes to build at least three 3D NAND fabs.

    China is focusing on 3D NAND for good reason. Today’s planar NAND is nearing its physical limit, thereby requiring a new technology—3D NAND. That technology resembles a vertical skyscraper. It consists of multiple layers, which are stacked and then connected using tiny vertical channels.

    But 3D NAND is a difficult to make. YRST is working on its own 32-layer 3D NAND device, according to sources, but the yields are low. It’s unclear if it is still developing the 3D NAND technology from Cypress/Spansion.

    Regardless, China will struggle in 3D NAND. “Looking at the struggles that the current NAND players have had in developing their 3D NAND, it may take longer than expected (for YRST to make 3D NAND),” Forward Insights’ Wong said.

    Besides the 3D NAND effort, Tsinghua Unigroup has a separate fab project in Nanjing, the capital of China’s eastern Jiangsu province. The goal is to build 3D NAND and DRAM fabs. The details of this project are sketchy.

    Tsinghua Unigroup has a separate subsidiary, dubbed Unigroup Guoxin. Last year, meanwhile, Unigroup Guoxin acquired a controlling interest in Xi’an UniIC Semiconductors, an IC memory design house.

    But will Tsinghua Unigroup succeed in its efforts to make 3D NAND and DRAM? “They have the capital, but they lack the infrastructure and most of the IP know-how,” said Alan Niebel, president of Web-Feet Research. “Their main hope is to enter into a joint venture with Intel/Micron, where they could utilize some of the process IP and production know-how. If they can get the right IP through a JV, acquisition or other means, they might have a chance. But this is a five-year play or longer. Otherwise, they will try to build chips (on their own). This will take more time and more use of knowledgeable people and partners.”

    JHICC and Hefei ChanGxin
    There are other memory efforts in China, such as JHICC. The DRAM hopeful is based in Jinjiang City in the Fujian province in southern China. Its investors include Fujian Electronics & Information and Jinjiang Energy Investment.

    JHICC plans to invest $5.65 billion to build a new 300mm fab. Initially, it will develop DRAMs at the 3xnm node. It obtained the technology from a licensing and R&D alliance with UMC. UMC isn’t involved with JHICC’s fab operations, however.

    “JHICC may have more of a chance for success, because they will focus on specialty DRAM production and the niche DRAM market,” said Alex Yang, an analyst with the Market Intelligence & Consulting Institute (MIC), a market research firm in Taiwan. “JHICC hopes to avoid the competition from the leading memory companies, such as Samsung, SK Hynix and Micron.”

    Meanwhile, details are sketchy about another memory hopeful—Hefei ChanGxin. This company is a joint venture between GigaDevice and the Hefei City Government. The plan, according to MIC’s Yang, is to build a memory fab in Hefei, the capital of the Anhui province in eastern China.

    In another twist, GigaDevice plans to acquire Integrated Silicon Solution Inc. (ISSI) from China’s Uphill Investment, sources said. In 2015, Uphill acquired ISSI, a U.S.-based specialty DRAM maker. ISSI declined to comment.
     
  3. RMFAN

    RMFAN Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

    Joined:
    Sep 2, 2017
    Messages:
    443
    Likes Received:
    89
    Country Flag:
    South Africa
    http://www.advancedmp.com/china-semiconductor-industry/


    In the global semiconductor market, China has been viewed as a customer-rich end market and the “world’s factory” for a long time. In 2013, China’s semiconductor consumption market grew by 10.1% to reach a new record of 55.6% of the global market.



    2013, China’s semiconductor consumption market grew by 10.1% to reach a new record of 55.6% of the global market.

    It is said that today China spends about $37 billion to import ICs, which is the same amount they spend on crude oil. The exceptional growth of the semiconductor industry in China is likely to continue for the next decade. However, the landscape of China’s semiconductor industry is expected to change considerably, which will bring opportunities to the global semiconductor industry. Some of the changes are:

    Change No.1 Market-driven Policy:
    In China, The National IC Industry Investment Fund is a new approach to attract private investors to support different segments in the IC industry such as design, manufacture, and packaging. The fund will be managed based on a market-driven approach. Investors who demand tangible results and real returns on investment will oversee the funds to invest in fables, foundries, and/or research institutes within China. The central government of China has budgeted about $48.3 million to set up this fund and local governments are expected to follow this trend to form smaller funds in their region to support the specialized area of the IC industry. The abundant resources in China and the strong determination of policy makers to develop an extensive IC industry in China shows that China is planning to be more than just the “world’s factory”.

    Change No.2 International Cooperation in R&D:
    Recognizing that partnership with global technology companies is a great way to advance technology and the talent pool for local Chinese companies. A recent example is SMIC (Semiconductor Manufacturing International Corporation), Huawai, imec and Qualcomm have joint investment on SMIC’s new company focuses on research and development. This new company will help to facilitate a closer cooperation between upstream and downstream companies, leading edge R&D, and other synergies in the industry’s global eco-system. The goal of the partnership is to develop 14 nanometer CMOS technology for mass production and it is expected to facilitate the mass production of 16/14nm ICs by 2020.

    Change No.3 Merger and Acquisition:
    Another area where the investments from China are likely to impact the global IC industry is in mergers and acquisitions, especially international deals. Not long ago, Uphill, a Chinese investment firm, which specialized in the IC industry, bought ISSI after a long battle with Cypress. In addition, the rumor of Tsinghua Unigroup, a state-owned high-tech company of China, is proposing to buy Micron with $23 billion was on many news sites earlier this week. If the deal goes through, it would be the largest Chinese takeover of a U.S. company. For semiconductor technologies, which require a lot of investment, it would be very difficult for Chinese players to build a complete and competitive industry within the value chain. With all the ongoing mergers in the global semiconductor industry, it would not be a surprise to see more players with Chinese names.

    The size of the Chinese market is too large to ignore. Any changes, even a minor one, will cause a chain reaction on a global scale. In the semiconductor industry, the changes that are happening in China are definitely going to impact the industry on a broader level.

    For investors, with the government-backed investment plan into China’s major semiconductor industries, there are a lot of potential opportunities for potential investors to capital on. For OEMs, there will be more options on chips to use. For EMS companies, closer distances between the manufacture and chip companies allows for a possible savings in operation, taxes and shorter lead-times. For distributors, the opportunity comes with the distribution of chips that are manufactured in China globally.

    With the size and multiple layers of the Chinese semiconductor market, it is hard to generalize a strategy that will fit all stakeholders’ needs and visions. At Advanced MP Technology, our already established offices and warehouse in Shanghai and Shenzhen, our global distribution network, and our extensive industry connection allows us to be ready to support customers and suppliers in the greater China region with the valuable service.
     
  4. RMFAN

    RMFAN Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

    Joined:
    Sep 2, 2017
    Messages:
    443
    Likes Received:
    89
    Country Flag:
    South Africa
    Computer-Chip Testing Firm Urges Blocking Sale of Rival to China Fund -- Update

    http://www.foxbusiness.com/features...blocking-sale-rival-to-china-fund-update.html
    By Kate O'Keeffe and Eva Dou Published August 15, 2017 Features Dow Jones Newswires

    The battle between the U.S. and China over computer-chip makers has expanded to a new front: the companies that test the technology.
    Citing national-security concerns, a U.S. semiconductor-testing company, Cohu Inc., is mounting a quiet campaign to derail the planned $580 million sale of an American rival, Xcerra Corp., to a Chinese state-backed group, according to documents reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.

    The U.S. government has previously shot down attempts by Chinese interests to buy makers of the chip technology used in mobile phones, military equipment and other systems. The deal for Xcerra, which provides equipment to test chips but doesn't actually make them, could test how far the Trump administration is willing to go to shut China out of the sensitive sector at the heart of a trade battle.

    The U.S.'s cutting-edge semiconductor technology powers the industries that make the country the world's most formidable superpower, including the military, Silicon Valley and Wall Street. As China continues its rapid development, it, too needs a top-notch chip industry, and it has announced plans to spend $150 billion to get it.

    The effort by Cohu is aimed at blocking one deal in which its competitor could gain a financial advantage through an influx of Chinese money. But on a larger scale, it provides a window into the myriad economic and national security considerations the U.S. is juggling as it confronts a powerful new rival in the global chip market.

    Chinese officials and executives say the national security concerns their U.S. counterparts raise are a pretext and that the U.S. is simply trying to stave off competition.

    Poway, Calif.,-based Cohu recently sent its analysis of the risks associated with the proposed sale of Norwood, Mass.-based Xcerra to the Chinese to the Committee on Foreign Investment in the U.S., a multiagency panel that vets deals for national-security concerns, according to the correspondence reviewed by the Journal. The committee, known as CFIUS and led by the Treasury Department, can approve the acquisition or recommend the president block it.

    The deal, announced in April, could give China access to intellectual property that could accelerate its efforts to become a serious player in the industry, Cohu alleges in a six-page white paper it sent to a Treasury official handling CFIUS matters.

    "If Xcerra becomes a Chinese state-owned enterprise and obtains top-tier semiconductor companies like Qualcomm, Broadcom and Texas Instruments as customers, it is reasonable to expect transfer of this critical information to Chinese semiconductor companies," the document says.

    Xcerra, in a statement, said: "The allegations Cohu make are false, as Xcerra does not possess critical [intellectual property] from any customer." Both parties in the deal intend to cooperate fully with CFIUS "to address any potential national security interests," Xcerra said.

    Cohu didn't respond to requests for comment.

    A Treasury spokesman said the agency doesn't comment on whether any particular transaction is being reviewed by CFIUS.

    The deal's primary financier is a $20 billion Chinese government-controlled fund called the China Integrated Circuit Industry Investment Fund Co., known locally as "the Big Fund." A representative declined to comment.

    Cohu's June 2 paper also says a sale of Xcerra could disrupt the semiconductor supply chain and lead to U.S. job losses if the company uses subsidies from its new owner to improperly undercut U.S. rivals.

    Some U.S. officials warn that, for example, China could use state subsidies to drive U.S. chip firms out of business and eventually dominate the industry, leaving the U.S. and its military reliant on Chinese chips. Others, though, say it is critical for CFIUS to focus solely on traditional national-security matters, and that taking economic concerns into account would be wrongly protectionist. President Donald Trump has ramped up trade pressure on China, directing aides on Monday to begin a study of whether to launch a formal investigation into whether Beijing is unfairly acquiring patents and licenses from U.S. firms.

    U.S. scrutiny of China's chip ambitions and Chinese deals generally has been building. In December, after a CFIUS investigation, then-President Barack Obama blocked a Chinese investment fund's purchase of German semiconductor-equipment supplier Aixtron SE, which has U.S. assets. In January, an Obama administration advisory panel warned of economic and military dangers posed by China's 10-year, $150 billion effort to build a cutting-edge semiconductor sector.

    During the Trump administration, CFIUS has thrown a number of high-profile takeover bids by Chinese firms into question, and lawmakers and the Treasury are weighing changes that could make the review process even tougher.

    Some say the fight has become overly politicized. Ray Bingham, a partner at Canyon Bridge Capital Partners Inc., a Palo Alto, Calif.-registered private-equity firm funded by the Chinese government, said in a recent interview that politics "more than anything" was behind CFIUS's scrutiny of his firm's $1.3 billion attempt to buy Lattice Semiconductor Corp., a U.S. firm. Canyon Bridge's structure raised red flags with a bipartisan group of 22 House lawmakers led by Rep. Robert Pittenger (R., N.C.), who accused the firm of initially trying to obscure its state backing, which it has denied.

    Cohu, in a follow-up letter dated Aug. 8, urged CFIUS to scrutinize the Chinese financing behind Xcerra's deal following Xcerra's Aug. 7 disclosure to the Securities and Exchange Commission that it had changed.

    Under the new deal structure, local government funds from China's Fujian and Hubei provinces also will help finance the purchase, Chinese corporate records show.

    Xcerra said in its statement that, according to the terms of the deal, its buyer had a right to syndicate its financing. "This change had nothing to do with filing with the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States," it said.
     
  5. RMFAN

    RMFAN Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

    Joined:
    Sep 2, 2017
    Messages:
    443
    Likes Received:
    89
    Country Flag:
    South Africa
    China building world’s biggest quantum research facility

    Centre could boost military’s code-breaking ability and navigation of stealth submarines

    http://www.scmp.com/news/china/soci...ding-worlds-biggest-quantum-research-facility
    PUBLISHED : Monday, 11 September, 2017, 8:46am
    UPDATED : Monday, 11 September, 2017, 1:38pm

    COMMENTS: 4


    [​IMG]







    The National Laboratory for Quantum Information Science will be located on a 37-hectare site next to a small lake in Hefei, Anhui province. Some time this month developers will be invited to bid for a contract to construct the site, according to an article in Hefei Evening News, a daily newspaper run by the city government on Thursday.

    Pan Jianwei, China’s lead quantum scientist who was playing a key role in the project, told local officials at a briefing in May that technology developed in the facility would be of immediate use to the armed forces, according to Anhui Business Daily newspaper.

    Quantum metrology, which measures small variations in physical parameters such as gravity with unprecedented accuracy, could significantly improve submarines’ stealth operations.

    A submarine with a quantum navigation system could operate underwater for more than three months without the need to surface for positioning satellite signals.

    Chinese city to launch ‘unhackable’ quantum network

    After operating for 100 days underwater the captain would still be able to pinpoint the vessel’s position in the Pacific Ocean with a margin of error of just a few hundred metres according to Pan, who could not be immediately reached for comment.

    [​IMG]





    Another key mission of the laboratory is to build the nation’s first quantum computer that could break an encrypted message in seconds.

    “Our plan is that by 2020, or maybe as soon as next year, to achieve ‘quantum supremacy’ with calculation power one million times to all existing computers around the world combined,” Pan was quoted as saying by Anhui Business Daily, which is run by the provincial government.

    It was unclear whether the computer could be used for code-breaking.

    Construction work is expected to finish in 2 ½ years with a budget of 76 billion yuan (HK$91.6 billion).

    Chinese satellite makes breakthrough in quantum communication

    Ground-clearing work started with approval from the central government in February, according to the website of the Chinese Academy of Sciences, the owner of the new facility.

    Guo Guoping, a quantum information researcher at the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Hefei, said a general-purpose quantum computer could take many more years or even decades of effort.

    Building a large facility with centralised resources could accelerate this process by pulling together the talents of scientists from all over the nation with knowledge and experience of multiple scientific disciplines to overcome a wide range of technical and engineering hurdles, he said.

    Guo stressed that in the national laboratory, researchers’ performance should not be evaluated by the scientific papers they published but by their contribution to specific project targets, such as building a general-purpose quantum computer.

    “This may sound a bit old-fashioned, even Soviet-style, but it can give China a chance to win the race,” he added.

    China moved a step ahead with the launch of a quantum satellite last year and conducted a series of cutting edge experiments such as quantum entanglement and teleportation in space.

    Last month the world’s longest and most sophisticated quantum key distribution network for ultra-secure communication between Beijing and Shanghai was successfully tested and deemed ready for official deployment in the military, government and financial sectors.

    Guo said the field had advanced rapidly, but the delivery of a code-breaking machine by 2020 was “highly unlikely”.

    Over the next few years, researchers from around the globe may be able to develop primitive quantum computers to deal with some specific tasks.

    They could, for example, simulate the movement of particles at a subatomic level to solve some physical problems that might help develop new materials or drugs.

    But these are not general-purpose computers capable of code-breaking, Guo added.

    Some scientists have questioned the government’s enormous bet on quantum technology. Critics have warned that spending more taxpayers’ money on quantum research will only result in less funding for other disciplines.

    A professor at Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications, a major information technology research institute, said some computer scientists and cyber security researchers were worrying about their jobs.

    “I have known some researchers whose funding applications were turned down because their study was unrelated to quantum. I have also met officials who knew nothing about quantum physics but took the bait on quantum computers and networks as offering a solution to all problems,” said the professor on condition of anonymity.

    “They chose to ignore the fact that a quantum network can also transmit viruses, and a quantum computer today is slower than a hand-held calculator.”

    Yang Changli, a quantum technology researcher at the Institute of Physics at the Chinese Academy of Sciences in Beijing, said he had heard of the project in Hefei but would not consider moving there.

    “I have a family. They don’t like the idea of reallocation,” he said.

    Yang also ruled out the possibility of splitting his time between two cities. “I am a scientist, not business executive. My time should be spent in a laboratory not a jet plane,” he said.
     
  6. RMFAN

    RMFAN Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

    Joined:
    Sep 2, 2017
    Messages:
    443
    Likes Received:
    89
    Country Flag:
    South Africa
    The Third Generation Beidou Chip Released

    http://war.163.com/17/0917/10/CUHEG1AT000181KT.html

    This is a domestic baseband and RF integration chip with fully independent intellectual property rights. developed by China Big Dipper Technology Co., Ltd. from Shenzhen. According to experts, this ultra-low power third-generation Beidou chip can reach sub-meter level positioning accuracy and achieve chip-level security encryption. In the future, the chip can be widely used in vehicle management, car navigation, wearable equipment, ship navigation, GIS data collection, precision agriculture, intelligent logistics, unmanned driving, exploration and survey.

    As a national strategic space infrastructure, China's Beidou satellite navigation system is not only of great significance to national defense security but also in the field of precision applications . According to statistics, 2016 satellite navigation and location services industry output value reached RMB 211.8 billion yuan, an increase of about 22.06% over 2015. Beidou contribution to the core industrial output value has reached 70%.

    On September 16th, the staff demonstrated a high-precision navigation and positioning chip that supported the new generation of Beidou III signal system. Xinhua News Agency (China Satellite Navigation and Orientation Association for map)

    [​IMG]
     
  7. RMFAN

    RMFAN Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

    Joined:
    Sep 2, 2017
    Messages:
    443
    Likes Received:
    89
    Country Flag:
    South Africa
    http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/china/2017-09-30/doc-ifymkwwk7213195.shtml

    Huarui 1 with 65nm CMOS process, the work frequency is 550MHz, processing capacity of 32GFMACS, power consumption of 10W. In terms of technical indicators, Hua Rui 1 DSP performance is significantly better than Freescale's MPC8640D, ADI's TS201 and the United States Texas Instruments C6701. According to the research of Nanjing Institute of Electronic Technology, Huarui 1 has better performance than domestic and foreign counterparts, and is suitable for radar signal processing and electronic countermeasure with high real-time requirements.

    It is because of the excellent performance of Hua Rui 1, this DSP has been successfully applied to more than fourteen types of radar products, to create a domestic multi-core DSP chip product application of the "three of the most": radar equipment application models up, The largest number of single sets of applications and the largest number of applications.


    After the success of Hua Rui 1, China Electronics 14th institute made persistent efforts to successfully develop the Huarui 2, Hua Rui 2 is in the realization of the basic functions of Hua Rui 1 under the premise of further improved the special instructions and vector operations Unit, while adding a reconfigurable computing core, more efficient for the field of specific computing, on the basis of a more general emphasis on the combination of special.

    [​IMG]
     
  8. RMFAN

    RMFAN Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

    Joined:
    Sep 2, 2017
    Messages:
    443
    Likes Received:
    89
    Country Flag:
    South Africa
    China Targets World Leadership in Microchips

    http://www.prosperousamerica.org/china_targets_world_leadership_in_microchips

    March 10, 2017
    Jeff Ferry, Research Director, CPA

    The decision last month by microchip manufacturer GlobalFoundries to build a chipmaking plant in China reinforced fears in the U.S. technology industry over China’s ambitious plans to become a major player in the world semiconductor industry.

    While GlobalFoundries is a second-tier chipmaker and the technology destined for the China plant is not world-class, the decision is nevertheless an illustration of the growing clout China exerts across the entire technology industry as it grows inexorably towards becoming a self-sufficient technology leader and exporter. China’s strategy for reaching this goal includes conventional tactics like huge investment dollars but also unconventional, even illegal, tactics (under WTO rules) like forced technology transfer and theft of intellectual property.

    GlobalFoundries is investing some $10 billion to build a fab (as chip fabrication facilities are known) in the central Chinese city of Chengdu. GF is getting support from the Chengdu municipal government, but has not revealed the level of Chinese government support. GlobalFoundries also operates two chip fabs in upstate New York (acquired from IBM) that provide chips for customers including the U.S. military.

    China has made the semiconductor industry a strategic priority in its 13th Five Year Plan and its longer-term “Made in China 2025” plan. The Obama White House was sufficiently worried about China’s semiconductor plans that it published a detailed report on China’s semiconductor strategy in January. The report was surprisingly outspoken, coming from an Administration that was usually a flag-waver for free trade and international cooperation. The report charged that: “Chinese policies are distorting markets in ways that undermine innovation, subtract from U.S. market share, and put U.S. national security at risk.”

    The scale of China’s semiconductor ambition is breathtaking. The January report, written by the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), said China expects to spend $150 billion of government money over the next ten years to build up a world-class chip industry. According to press reports, some 20 new chip fabs are today under construction in China. Although the U.S. has 76 chip fabs, most are older technology. A new one is under construction in Utah and Intel recently committed to investing $7 billion to complete its state-of-the-art fab in Chandler, Arizona, but that’s about it for U.S. investment. Not a single silicon-based chip fab has been built in Silicon Valley this century. The PCAST committee includes former CEOs of Intel, Qualcomm, GlobalFoundries, and Applied Materials, as well as Google chairman Eric Schmidt, and several respected academic technologists.

    Semiconductors are a strategic industry for a number of reasons. First, they are used in millions of devices, not just the obvious ones like smartphones and computers, but hundreds of consumer and industrial products. Today’s cars contain several dozen chips each, and the number of chips used in the world is only expected to increase. Secondly, chips are an industry where the U.S. leads the world, with companies like Intel, Qualcomm, and Broadcom each leading the world in its sector of the industry. U.S.-based chipmakers hold 50% of a global market worth $339 billion in revenue last year and they accounted for U.S. exports of an estimated $40 billion last year, making it one of America’s strongest export industries. Thirdly, the chip industry provides good jobs for 370,000 Americans, with average annual earnings of $70,660, according to BLS data. Fourthly, and most importantly, semiconductors are the enabling technology for much of the rest of the technology world. The popular catchphrase in the current cycle of venture capital is “software is eating the world,” but software is only eating the world because the speed and power of the each new generation of chip hardware makes more and better software possible. They key insight that made Google possible was (back in 1998) that the power of the then-latest generation of server chips made it possible to index the entire Internet quickly enough to turn Google-style search into a practical consumer service. Google, Facebook, Amazon, the smartphone, and thousands of other applications are only practical because of the power of today’s chips.

    The key to successful software design in the constantly-changing tech industry is to design products that take advantage of the upcoming opportunities of semiconductors. It’s the Wayne Gretzky principle: when you sit down to design software, or a smartphone, or indeed an autonomous car, you don’t skate to where the puck is today, you skate to where it’s going. This is why the PCAST committee is so concerned about the Chinese industry. “Chinese industrial policies in this sector, as they are unfolding in practice pose real threats to semiconductor innovation and U.S. national security,” says the report. That’s an understatement. The concern is that not just semiconductors, but the entire U.S. software industry and development of the Internet itself could be hampered if China grabs a dominant position in semiconductors.

    It would be one thing if China were winning share in a free market. But that’s not what’s happening. Today, China imports an estimated $100 billion worth of semiconductors a year. One of its objectives it to eliminate that dependence on suppliers that it considers unreliable—like any supplier based in the U.S. The PCAST report details four specific practices Chinese government bodies or companies are using to support their objective. Quoting directly from the report, they are:

    • Forcing or encouraging domestic customers to buy only from Chinese semiconductor suppliers;
    • Forcing transfer of technology in exchange for access to the Chinese market;
    • Theft of intellectual property;
    • Collusion. (referring to alleged collusion to lower the price of acquisition targets in the west, to aid Chinese efforts to buy western companies.)
    The U.S.-China Commission (USCC), a bipartisan body established by Congress to monitor Chinese economic activities, said in its 2016 Annual Report that another Chinese tactic is trying to buy up western chip companies, to acquire the expertise necessary to succeed in an industry where the microscopic manufacturing techniques are very challenging. “Since 2014, China-headquartered firms have proposed or finalized more than 30 mergers and acquisition deals in the semiconductor industry, totaling nearly $20 billion,” said the USCC report. Some of those deals, like the acquisition of OmniVision and a stake in Marvell Technologies, have been successful. Others, like bids for Micron, Atmel, and Fairchild, failed, either because the U.S. government blocked them on national security grounds or a U.S.-based bidder emerged (probably with the tacit support of the U.S. national security community).

    Lattice Semiconductor is a case in point. In 2012, the FBI indicted two Chinese men for trying to buy Lattice chips for illegal export to China. Lattice chips can withstand the high temperatures on spacecraft and export is controlled. Yet in 2016, China’s flagship semiconductor company, Tsinghua Unigroup, was permitted to take an 8.65% stake in Lattice. In another case, in 2014 IBM was permitted to license the technology for its Power8 processor to a little-known Chinese company, Suzhou Technology. Power8 has uses in data centers and supercomputers, and it has potential military applications. Power8’s complexity is clear from the Wikipedia description of its largest version as a chip that consists of 4.2 billion transistors, each 22 nanometers wide, fabricated with 15 metal layers, all on a one inch square substrate.

    Game of Risk

    The problem is scale—not the size of the chips, which are small, but the size of the production facilities, which are huge. Modern chip fabs cost between $5 billion and $10 billion each. Only large companies can finance that sum of money. With the help of aggressive government support, Taiwan and Korea took large shares in the merchant chip manufacture business, i.e. manufacturing chips for other chip design companies. Intel and Micron are two of the very few companies left that manufacture all or most of their own chips. Companies like Broadcom and Qualcomm rely on merchant fabs to produce their chips. Today’s chip industry is like a five-player game of Risk. There are two major players, the U.S. and China. The next three minor players, Taiwan, Korea, and Japan, will tilt towards wherever the prevailing market winds are blowing. If one player—China—is determined to be a world leader, and will favor doing business with companies that manufacture only or primarily on its own territory, what will companies in all five countries do?

    Intel provided the answer when its vice president, Stacy Smith, told the New York Times last month: “China is the largest market for us on the planet…it makes sense to locate some production in China.” In addition to building a fab, Intel took a 20% stake in Tsinghua Unigroup. Intel won’t talk publicly about what was involved in such a deal, but doubtless the Chinese government is determined to get as much of Intel’s world-leading technology into China as possible. In this game of Risk, it seems inevitable that more and more production gravitates to China. What does that mean for the U.S.? Well today, Intel is the last man standing, the only company left willing and able to finance chip fabs in the U.S. on its own. The company is not growing as quickly as other major chip companies and on Wall Street its strategy is looking a bit questionable.

    Put simply, this is a trade war in which China has a winning strategy. If the U.S. can be said to have a strategy at all, it looks like a losing strategy. Cynics argue the Chinese have been trying, and failing, for at least two decades to gain significant positions in the chip industry. But the Chinese are nothing if not persistent. Each year, the Chinese economy gets larger and its world influence grows. According to the Semiconductor Industry Association, last year, Chinese consumption of chips grew by 9.2%, while consumption in North and South America fell by 4.7%. Figure 1 shows that Chinese high-tech production is rapidly approaching the level of the U.S.—and will surpass us before long.

    An instructive example is networking: the Chinese government decided two decades ago to free itself from dependence on America’s Cisco Systems for networking technology. China Brief says the policy is known within China as “de-Ciscoification.” Today, China’s networking giant, Huawei, is larger than Cisco. Now, the Chinese government wants Huawei and other electronics companies to be free of what China Brief calls “a dangerous over-reliance” on western semiconductors. China will make many mistakes but with a budget that starts at $150 billion, it can afford some huge mistakes and still come out successful. (For comparison, Intel’s annual capex budget is $12 billion.)

    In the 1980s, the U.S. lost, and then regained, chip industry leadership from Japan. Since then, the U.S. has lost chip production leadership to Taiwan and Korea., Although American-headquartered companies today account for half the chip market, only 13% of the world’s chips are actually produced in the U.S. But the trend is for the industry to move away from the U.S. Research and development tends to follow manufacturing. Broadcom was an early leader in outsourcing the production of chips. Once based entirely in Irvine, California, Broadcom does R&D around the globe today. Figure 2, from a recent Broadcom presentation, shows that the company’s strong growth in R&D overseas, especially in Asia.

    The chip industry is highly profitable. Last year, Intel showed an operating profit of $4.9 billion on revenue of $59 billion; for Qualcomm, the figures were $6.5 billion on $23.6 billion. Yet like every publicly traded company, chipmakers must focus on short-term growth. They cannot justify large capital projects in the U.S. when investors demand higher earnings—and when Asian nations incentivize, and in the case of China insist on, production on their territory. Intel estimates it costs 20% more to build a fab in the U.S. Is there room for a multi-polar chip industry? It would seem not. Today 55% of the world’s production is in Taiwan. As it happens, China’s long-term goals include not only being dominant in chips, but also annexing the island of Taiwan. If Taiwan loses leadership in chip manufacturing, its own citizens as well as the U.S. government may become less interested in preserving its independence.

    In the view of many technology executives, forced technology transfer is the worst of China’s unfair practices, because it deprives a company of its “crown jewels,” the unique intellectual property that differentiate it in the marketplace. If I said to you I wanted to pay you $100,000 a year to have dinner with you and your wife at your home every Saturday night for the next three years, you might agree. But if I told you that at the end of three years, I would seize your home, your car, and your wife, and kick you out into the street, you would probably grab me by the scruff of the neck and throw me out of your house. Yet that’s what “forced technology transfer” is. It is a death sentence for companies that agree to it, yet most major American technology companies are doing it today, through gritted teeth.

    When Intel CEO Brian Krzanich appeared recently with President Trump to celebrate the decision to spend $7 billion on Intel’s Arizona fab, political commentators looked at the event as a PR victory for the President. I saw the event instead through Krzanich’s eyes. Intel is the outstanding corporate citizen of Silicon Valley. It wants to do the right thing...for its employees, its customers, and America. But it needs the U.S. government to set the conditions that compel it to do the right thing. Privately, I believe Krzanich would thank the U.S. government for such decisions.

    The PCAST report proposes that the U.S. launch large government-funded R&D projects in the mold of the Apollo space program of the 1960s. That’s a great idea. I’m sure the money can be found. But it doesn’t go far enough. We need:

    • Tougher controls on technology that can be exported to China
    • An end to forced technology transfer.
    • Tougher controls on companies that can be acquired, based not only on defense considerations but on the importance of those companies and industries to the U.S. economy and taking into account the intentions of the acquiring company and its home country
    • To explore ways to provide long-term finance to profitable companies in strategic industries
    • A commitment to restore a significant portion of chip manufacturing to the U.S.
    • To look at the entire electronics supply chain with a view to establishing the critical mass necessary to keep enough of the industry in the U.S. for it to continue to grow and invest of its own accord.


    [​IMG]



    Figure 1. Chinese high-tech manufacturing output rapidly approaching US output. (Source: National Science Foundation Science and Engineering Indicators 2014)



    [​IMG]

    Figure 2. US chipmaker Broadcom has as many design (R&D) sites in Asia as in North America. (Source: Broadcom)
     
  9. RMFAN

    RMFAN Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

    Joined:
    Sep 2, 2017
    Messages:
    443
    Likes Received:
    89
    Country Flag:
    South Africa
    In the view of many technology executives, forced technology transfer is the worst of China’s unfair practices, because it deprives a company of its “crown jewels,” the unique intellectual property that differentiate it in the marketplace. If I said to you I wanted to pay you $100,000 a year to have dinner with you and your wife at your home every Saturday night for the next three years, you might agree. But if I told you that at the end of three years, I would seize your home, your car, and your wife, and kick you out into the street, you would probably grab me by the scruff of the neck and throw me out of your house. Yet that’s what “forced technology transfer” is. It is a death sentence for companies that agree to it, yet most major American technology companies are doing it today, through gritted teeth.
    -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    It is the right tactics that China become the world leader in microchips.

    In fact, all the computer chip makers have no choice but had to accept this suspended death penalty by China, since China owns 60% chips consuming market in the world.

    When China dominates in the world microchips market, it makes sure the other players having no way to go but bankrupt.
     
    Last edited: Nov 7, 2017
  10. BMD

    BMD Colonel ELITE MEMBER

    Joined:
    Nov 20, 2012
    Messages:
    10,788
    Likes Received:
    3,008
    Country Flag:
    United Kingdom
    They're talking 65nm tech, so 'no'.
     
  11. An Indian

    An Indian 2nd Lieutant FULL MEMBER

    Joined:
    Dec 11, 2015
    Messages:
    236
    Likes Received:
    195
    Country Flag:
    India
    :) I actually find this thread pretty (read that as VERY) interesting. Gives me a very good idea of how the Chinese think (and perchance dream)...
     
  12. BMD

    BMD Colonel ELITE MEMBER

    Joined:
    Nov 20, 2012
    Messages:
    10,788
    Likes Received:
    3,008
    Country Flag:
    United Kingdom
    Intel is currently down at 10nm and working towards 7nm.
     
  13. RMFAN

    RMFAN Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

    Joined:
    Sep 2, 2017
    Messages:
    443
    Likes Received:
    89
    Country Flag:
    South Africa
    China AI unicorn Cambricon to launch smart chips using TSMC 16nm process

    https://www.digitimes.com/news/a20171109PD205.html


    Jean Chu, Taipei; Willis Ke, DIGITIMES [Thursday 9 November 2017]

    China AI chip unicorn Cambricon Technologies plans to launch MLU machine learning series processor chips for cloud-based applications within the next 18 months, with the chips to be fabricated with 16nm process of Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC), the firm's co-founder and CEO Chen Tianshi has announced.

    Announcing the plan at his firm's recent product presentation conference in Beijing, Chen said that Cambricon will debut MLU100 AI chips to support inference for application to datacenters and small- to medium-size servers, and MLU200 chips to support training for application to AI R&D centers of enterprises.

    While these two AI chips will be manufactured with TSMC 16nm process, the company will not rule out using 7nm to 5nm process nodes for the fabrication of its other AI chips in the future, according to Chen.

    Chen stressed that Cambricon will manage to occupy 30% of the China market for high-performance smart chips and embed one billion smart terminal devices worldwide with the firm's chips in the next three years.

    At the conference, Chen introduced three new AI processor models: the Cambricon-1H8 for low-power consumption computer vision application; the higher-end Cambricon-1H16 for more general-purpose applications; and the Cambricon-1M autonomous driving applications.

    Of the three, the Cambricon-1M has yet to hit the market, Chen said, adding that in terms of computing performance, this new processor is 10 times faster than its first AI processor Cambricon-1A designed especially for mobile devices.

    Chen also revealed that Huawei's newly-launched Kirin 970 chip is equipped with the Cambricon-1A processor (neural processing unit, NPU). The Kirin 970 chip installed on Huawei Mate 10 has a HiAI mobile computing architecture comprised of four parts: CPU, GPU, ISP/DSP and NPU.
     
  14. RMFAN

    RMFAN Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

    Joined:
    Sep 2, 2017
    Messages:
    443
    Likes Received:
    89
    Country Flag:
    South Africa
    China IC industry outlook

    http://electroiq.com/blog/2017/10/china-ic-industry-outlook/


    SEMI, the global industry association and provider of independent electronics market research, today announced its new China IC Industry Outlook Report, a comprehensive report for the electronics manufacturing supply chain. With an increasing presence in the global semiconductor manufacturing supply chain, the market opportunities in China are expanding dramatically.

    China is the largest consumer of semiconductors in the world, but it currently relies mainly on semiconductor imports to drive its growth. Policies and investment funds are now in place to further advance the progress of indigenous suppliers in China throughout the entire semiconductor supply chain. This shift in policy and related initiatives have created widespread interest in the challenges and opportunities in China.

    With at least 15 new fab projects underway or announced in China since 2017, spending on semiconductor fab equipment is forecast to surge to more than $12 billion, annually, by 2018. As a result, China is projected to be the top spending region in fab equipment by 2019, and is likely to approach record all-time levels for annual spending for a single region.

    [​IMG]
    Figure 1

    This report covers the full spectrum of the China IC industry within the context of the global semiconductor industry. With more than 60 charts, data tables, and industry maps from SEMI sources, the report reveals the history and the latest industry developments in China across vast geographical areas ranging from coastline cities to the less developed though emerging mid-western regions.

    The China IC industry ecosystem outlook covers central and local government policies, public and private funding, the industry value chain from design to manufacturing and equipment to materials suppliers. Key players in each industry sector are highlighted and discussed, along with insights into China domestic companies with respect to their international peers, and potential supply implications from local equipment and material suppliers. The report specifically details semiconductor fab investment in China, as well as the supply chain for domestic equipment and material suppliers.

    [​IMG]
    Figure 2
     
  15. RMFAN

    RMFAN Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

    Joined:
    Sep 2, 2017
    Messages:
    443
    Likes Received:
    89
    Country Flag:
    South Africa
    https://www.pwc.com/gx/en/industrie...dustry/china-semiconductor-manufacturing.html


    China’s wafer fabrication capacity and share of worldwide capacity (2002-2016)

    [​IMG]
    During 2016 China increased its wafer fab capacity in production by more than the increase in total worldwide production capacity. China’s capacity increased by 324,000 8-inch equivalent wafer starts per month (WSpM), while world capacity only increased by 208,000. As a result, China’s share of worldwide wafer fab capacity increased to 14.2% in 2016 up from 12.9% in 2015, 12.0% in 2014 and about 11% in the four proceeding years. The number of wafer fabs in production in China increased from 169 in 2015 to 171 in 2016, while the number of fabs in production worldwide decreased from 1,031 to 1,030.

    During the past ten years (since 2006) China wafer fab capacity has increased from 67 fabs with 1095.4 thousand WSpM to 171 fabs with 2829.6 thousand WSpM, representing an increase of 154% in the number of fabs and 193% in WSpM capacity (thousands of 8-inch equivalent wafer starts per month ramped). By comparison, during the same ten years total worldwide wafer fab capacity only increased from 956 fabs with 13,153 thousand WSpM in 2006 to 1,025 fabs with 19,888 thousand WSpM, an increase of only 7% in number of fabs and 51% in WSpM capacity. During this past decade, China’s increase in the number of wafer fabs in production exceeded the increase in worldwide fabs in production as new fabs started in China displaced older fabs elsewhere.

    By the end of 2016 China ranked third world wide in the number of wafer fabs in production, fourth in total current WSpM capacity, but only fifth in the number of advanced (28nm or less) wafer fabs in production.


    [​IMG]
     

Share This Page