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IAF And Indian Army Asked To Pin-Point Personnel Responsible For Pathankot Airbase, Uri Attacks

Discussion in 'Internal Affairs' started by lca-fan, Apr 8, 2017.

  1. lca-fan

    lca-fan Major SENIOR MEMBER

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    IAF And Indian Army Asked To Pin-Point Personnel Responsible For Pathankot Airbase, Uri Brigade And Nagrota Attacks
    Government wants responsible personnel scalped.
    07/04/2017 8:21 PM IST | Updated 07/04/2017 9:20 PM IST
    Sudhi Ranjan SenDeputy Editor (News)
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    HINDUSTAN TIMES VIA GETTY IMAGES


    The Indian Air Force (IAF) is resubmitting its Court-of-Inquiry findings into the Pathankot Airbase terror-attack. It will now pin-point officers and their lapses. And, the Indian Army too has been asked to point lapses of officers in the probe on Uri Brigade and Nagrota terror - attack, top sources have told Huffington Post India.


    This comes after Manohar Parrikar, who recently quit as Defence Minister, asked the Army and the IAF to point at specifics, top government sources have told Huffington Post India.

    "Very rarely" does the government send such advice, former Vice-Chief of the Indian Air Force, Air Marshal P K Barbora said.
    "Very rarely" does the government send such advice, former Vice-Chief of the Indian Air Force, Air Marshal P K Barbora said. Findings of the forces are generally accepted, he said.

    In a first of its kind attack, Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) terrorists entered the Pathankot air base on the 2 January, 2016. The Pathankot airbase is a forward airbase. Fighter jets and attack helicopters are positioned at the base. At least 4 terrorists and 8 soldiers were killed in the operation that ended on 5 January.

    Just a week before this terror-attack, Prime Minister Narendra Modi took a bold step and had visited Lahore on 25 December, 2015 when returning from Kabul. India-Pakistan relations that then showed signs of revival suffered a major blow because of the attack.

    Nine months later, on 18 September, four terrorists stormed the Army's 12th Infantry Brigade located close to the India- Pakistan boundary along the 1972 agreed Line of Control (LoC) in Uri in Jammu and Kashmir. At least 19 soldiers lost their lives, and several others were injured in the attack. In retaliation, Indian commandos crossed the LoC to kill an unknown number of terrorists and Pakistan army soldiers, and destroyed as many as seven terror launch pads and Pakistan army facilities. India –Pakistan relations went into a deep freeze.

    Soon after on 29 November, 2016, three Pakistan based terrorist impersonating as policemen attacked the Nagrota based 166 Field Regiment of the Army. Nine soldiers including two officers were killed in the attack.

    The officer commanding Pathankot airbase during the attack, Air Commodore J S Dhamoon, was removed from command and shifted to Delhi months after the attack. Similarly, Brigadier K Somashankar, commander of the 12th Brigade, too was removed in what appeared to be a damage control exercise. "The officers were removed, but no one was scalped for lapses, and that is what the government is asking for," a top Ministry of Defence Official told Huffington Post India, on conditions of anonymity.

    "The officers were removed, but no was scalped for lapses, and that is what the government is asking for," a top Ministry of Defence Official told Huffington Post India, on conditions of anonymity.
    One of the two commanding officers, for instance, was then cleared for a prestigious course considered necessary for promotion to the next rank – i.e. Air-Vice Marshal or Major General. The Court-of-Inquiry findings into the two attacks, subsequently submitted to the Government, didn't fix responsibility.

    Top sources confirmed that the Western Air Command that supervises the Pathankot air base is sending the Court-of-Inquiry back with a fresh set findings that fixes responsibility.

    The Western Air Command that supervises the Pathankot air base is sending the Court-of -Inquiry back with a fresh set findings that fixes responsibility.
    The Indian Air Force, India Army and Ministry of Defence did not respond to the queries of the Huffington Post India.

    http://www.huffingtonpost.in/2017/0...n-point-personnel-responsible-for_a_22030203/

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  2. randomradio

    randomradio Colonel Technical Analyst

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    I hope my idea of scalped is very different from what the govt's idea is.
     
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  3. Levina

    Levina Colonel on stilettos SENIOR MEMBER

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    I'm happy that the senior officers will finally get to hear some music for the laxity shown at the border and the base. Usually C of I is pretty lenient towards the older men higher up in ranks.
     
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  4. IndiranChandiran

    IndiranChandiran Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

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    Encounters in J&K: Reiteration of the 'Last Mile Philosophy'
    Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain

    Updated: February 24, 2016, 12:22 PM IST
    [​IMG] [​IMG] [​IMG] [​IMG]
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    High intensity encounters between the Security Forces (SF) and the sponsored terrorists from Pakistan continue in the Valley with a degree of regularity, not as frequent as in the past but worrisome nevertheless. It is not the numbers but the quality of standoffs and the casualties that the Army is taking which cause dismay in public perception and rightly so. On one hand the public is fed with information about the improving situation and the strength of the counter terror and counter infiltration grids in J&K, by none other than analysts like me. Then there are frequent reports of glitches at the tactical and sub tactical levels leading to avoidable casualties. I have also gone to the extent of certifying the J&K counter terrorism model as the ideal one with each force and entity knowing where its space exists, its own limitations and strengths and the degree of cooperation it needs to overcome these. During the Pathankot incident I was strongly advocating that Punjab will have to sooner than later adopt this model. I am still convinced about that because the J&K model is inherently strong, based on years of experimentation and experience of some very competent practitioners. So, how do I view these repeated casualties in operations during contacts in the Valley? More importantly, how should the public be viewing this? If people with ground experience at tactical and operational levels cannot suitably convince public perception it is a failure of intellect and communication skills more than anything else; the public is not to be blamed. And, that unfortunately is the problem.

    Almost a year to the date, Archana Masih of Rediff.com carried an interview with me in the online publication. In that I termed the situation in the Valley, 'The Last Mile'. I then went on to explain what exactly this means.

    'The Last Mile' is simply a situation which is a symbolization of the last stages of conflict stabilization in the military domain; quite different from the political, ideological and social domains. The strength of terrorists is at the lowest ever, the LoC is well dominated to prevent easy calibration by the other side. High profile leadership is missing due to inability to infiltrate without the terrorists facing heavy attrition in the march to the hinterland. Even if successfully infiltrated the ability to strike root is difficult due to all round domination by the SF and intelligence agencies. Terror groups avoid contact with SF and attempt only small scale actions and await their day for a larger deliberate operation, like the current one underway in Pampore. The Army, in particular, is used to high octane stuff; big ticket events, large scale contacts and regular contacts with intelligence inputs. It confirms the high energy levels and the desire to do more; no one in the Army has the patience to sit it out and that is how an Army always is. Everyone is out to kill the last terrorist so that the ugly face of terrorists is eliminated. However, the lesser the terrorist presence and more that the Army tries the results will never be commensurate with statistics of the past. Take it from me; there will be casualties on the Army side higher in ratio than at the time when there were a larger number of terrorists.

    [​IMG]

    In the Last Mile the attention of the Army will also be diverted by other issues. Human rights take bulk of the attention as do political and legal correctness and a host of other issues. Among many of these issues is something that commanders, staff and junior ranks never faced before; that is the issue of crowds and flash mobs descending on contact sites and attempting to divert SF attention or assist the terrorists to somehow get away. Hence, the greater urgency to finish operations at the earliest. This has been a phenomenon prevalent in South Kashmir in particular over the last two years or a little more. It instigates the SF and leads to responses where civilians are injured or die and that leads to fresh cycle of violence. Shupiyan and Pulwama districts have been the centers of this. Flash mobs can be unnerving and it is to the credit of the CRPF that it has done its task of crowd control rather well. Given the number of times it does it and the nature of instigation there will be occasions when mistakes will be made leading to loss of lives. This can never be justified but nevertheless will remain a factor among the challenges of the Last Mile.

    How does the Last Mile translate into nature of operations and how exactly should the recent encounter at Pampore be viewed? There are all kinds of commentaries in the air and most compare Pathankot with Pampore; ‘chalk and cheese’ was what I tweeted on these commentaries, implying there can be no comparisons. It is foolish to state that the Special Forces were inefficient in handling the encounter and that given a chance at Pathankot they would have bungled.

    The Pampore encounter is one of its kind; in fact a very rare one. Having witnessed hundreds of these in the Valley, to me it would probably appear as one of the better planned actions by the terrorists. They first targeted the CRPF administrative convoy taking advantage of the weak road protection; inflicted casualties there. They then withdrew either by design or by default to one of the largest buildings in the Pampore built up area. Entrepreneurship Development Institute (EDI) is a five floor building with many people inhabiting it in the late afternoon. The CRPF and 50 RR did well to quickly cordon the building. The CRPF was keen to attempt intervention and this is understandable because it had lost men in the ambush. Its early action forced evacuation and gave little time to the terrorists to attempt any profiling to take hostages or risk eliminating a few of the civilian inmates in the building. In the Valley terrorists do not necessarily focus on taking hostages as it is counterproductive to their cause. Observers may argue that there have been cases of hostage taking in the past and they would be right. However, in almost all cases inmates of buildings, in which terrorists take refuge have invariably been evacuated, without too much trouble, notwithstanding allegations against the Army using human shields.

    The EDI building is not an easy one to assault to carry out an intervention operation. The CRPF was brave in attempting it but after suffering casualties decided to hand over to the Army’s Victor Force which looks after South Kashmir. The Army has a couple of Special Forces teams dedicated to the two RR Force HQ. Given the circumstances, the nature of objective and the fact that it would be a matter of time before flash mobs moved in to upset the Army and CRPF’s equilibrium the Army decided to use the Special Forces teams to carry out intervention operations. I can say with complete assurance that if I was in the position of Major Gen Arvind Datta (GOC Victor Force) my decision would have been the same. I write with the experience of also having been the Colonel General Staff of Victor Force during the heyday of militancy. The Special Forces teams did a professional job of it. Two officer casualties that they suffered, along with a L/Nk, is drawing the ire of many and forcing comparison with Pathankot where the NSG also suffered a fatal officer casualty; to add to this is the death of some Commanding Officers in the last one year. All this has resulted in allegations of lack of professionalism. This is the Last Mile effect playing out on perception. I know it is a clichéd argument but it is worth repeating that the Indian Army’s officer cadre leads from the front, even beyond the professional needs. Not many may know that when Special Forces teams operate in such operations they are officer intensive. A squad may have buddy pairs of officers and JCOs or even two officers. A troop may have as many as five officers for a specific operation where the entire unit is not involved. This is the way Special Forces function in counter terror operations where small teams with high efficiency are formed for specific tasks.

    Coming to the operation itself, there have been many allegations that intervention was unnecessary and that the building should have been brought down using explosives. In the mind’s eye of all those making these allegations, including veterans, there is this usual picture of a typical Kashmiri house made of brick and cement and perhaps even mud, along with an attached cowshed. This wasn’t the case here. To wire up and lay the explosives for bringing down the cement and concrete five floor building would have taken fairly long. In the bargain the flash mobs would have created a major problem. These are the issues impinging on minds of senior officers and their advisers and decisions have then to be taken. The factors are hardly evident to those who may never have had the chance of going through such loops of decision making under stress.

    In the final word, let me state clearly that fatal casualties are most regrettable but they will take place in such operations where Indian Army officers will always lead from the front. That is their ethos; it is a part of their DNA. Citizens of India must empathize with the travails that their warriors undergo in keeping them safe and express concern about casualties just as they have done in this instance. However, they must also be aware that in the peculiar security situation of the Last Mile there will be occasions when the last post will have to be played quite often. Those who have the honor and privilege of donning the Indian Army’s uniform and embellishments are fully aware of it. It is a measure of their patriotism, their energy and their professionalism that they never flinch from their duties to the Nation.

    As a last word I cannot let go a negative comment by a Joint Secretary about the current Army Chief having to repeatedly attend wreath laying ceremonies and funerals of warriors who are martyred in such operations. This gentleman has poked fun at a Chief who is in sync with his men and their sacrifices. He should be put through the exercise of one exposure for just a 48 hour high octane operation in the Valley. I guarantee you he will never return with the seat of his pants in the state it was when he went up there.


    http://www.news18.com/blogs/india/l...f-the-last-mile-philosophy-14405-1207067.html



    __________________________________________________________________________

    Some Evident Lapses in Uri Call for Immediate Remedial Action

    Syed Ata Hasnain
    September 20, 2016, 7:06 pm
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    One of the most professionally satisfying experiences of my life was the two years I spent in command of the Kala Pahar Brigade at Uri. This brigade occupies and defends some crucial areas of our country.

    At first, a few basics for the reader. It was through the Uri salient that the kabalis (tribals) advanced towards Baramulla and Srinagar in 1947, triggering the first Indo-Pak war.



    Pak war. It was here again, in 1965, that Major Ranjit Dayal led the assault on Haji Pir (in PoK) which won him the Mahavir Chakra. Even without wars this is the area where the longest, most intense artillery duels have been fought across the LoC making the then Commander, Brig (later Lt Gen) Jasbir Lidder, coin the famous credo, “when Uri rumbles, Chakothi crumbles”. Chakothi, of course is located on the PoK side of the LoC.

    Also Read: To Pressure Pak, India’s Reaction to Uri Must Be Sober, Not Shrill



    Soldiers guard outside the army base which was attacked by JeM militants in Uri, Jammu and Kashmir, 19 September 2016. (Photo: PTI)

    Importance of the Uri Brigade
    People are surprised when they learn that in midst of today’s paralysis of the Valley, Uri is ‘fully functional’ and its Gujjar and Pahari population remains steadfastly Indian. So, we have the paradox of a loyal border population in a sector, heavily used by Pak-trained terrorists for infiltration. There has been no resident terrorist activity for almost 27 years but there has been much infiltration from the PoK. This brings transitory terror activity in its wake and a few of the hill folk accept money to guide the terrorists to their destinations.

    The Brigade HQ is the permanent institution here while the units come for a maximum of two years. The relationship of the brigade with the people is such that it takes ownership of everyone’s problems. During the 2005 earthquake, it was the brigade which despite its own suffering became the rallying point for rescue and relief operations for all.

    Also Read: No Nation Must Stumble Into War: Lessons from Op Parakram Post Uri


    No Boundary Wall in the Garrison Town
    The sneak attack in the morning of 18 September has not been against expectations. While one can find fault at the tactical level with tactical security drills, the number of sentries and the like, that is hardly significant. The malaise is in the thinking and that includes my own.

    The road to the border cuts through the garrison and is used by all civilian motor and pedestrian traffic, though with strict checking and control.

    Even at the height of sneak terror attacks in 1999-2003, it was not considered a priority to construct a boundary wall for this garrison. The assumption was that terror attacks would take place in the Valley while action at the LoC would be artillery and small arms duels between the two armies. The garrison is 6 kms crow flight from the LoC.
    Uri has never had resident militancy. The brigade prides itself on its conventional war fighting and ‘No War No Peace’ roles on the LoC, the rear has been perceived as less important. Since security is a basic principle of war, operational prudence demands equal focus on the Brigade HQ on the basis that no areas are safe.

    Also Read: Uri Attack: Remember the Names, Faces, the People They Left Behind


    A map of the Uri camp which was attacked by JeM militants on 18 September 2016. (Photo: Aaqib Raza Khan/The Quint)

    the security of garrisons in places like Uri may have diluted to an extent.

    It is good to remember that the prime responsibility lies at the LoC where the maximum strength must be with minimal strength at the bases, the supposedly ‘comfy’ location. The bases should be technologically secured to enable this concept, where the frontline soldier can come and rest.

    Also Read: Uri Attack: We’ll Pick Our Own Time & Place to Respond, Says Army



    India Pays Tribute to the Martyrs of Uri Terror Attack

    Beefing Up Security at Army Bases
    That is where the ‘deficit’ arises. Both in the past and now, there should have been a greater push for technology to enable security but remember, this needs much more money. In budgeting, he who thumps the hardest gets his share fastest. Unfortunately, that is where the institutional error is. These garrisons need security walls, cameras and even minidrones. Surveillance devices needed at the LoC are as much required at the HQ.


    Institutional Failure
    With reference to intelligence, you do not need specific inputs. A study of history, the pattern of activity and the current situation gives adequate deductions: that something spectacular will be aimed by the adversary, it will be in the vicinity of the LoC as deep operations have become difficult, and a lucrative target will be the choice.

    Uri stares at you as a deduction. But circumstances can dictate against a situation and that is exactly what happened on the fateful morning of 18 September 2016. That is why I never blame individuals in-charge today but rather the institutional failing over a period of time.


    Need for Better Deployment
    The question everyone is asking is ‘why were the troops in tents?’ The answer, a new unit had arrived into the garrison in full strength, it would spend two to three days here, before it commenced progressive deployment for on-the-job training.

    The administrative base caters for accommodation for rear elements of the LoC and therefore, the new strength about to be inducted to the LoC stays two to three days in tents. The outgoing unit would similarly do that on its way out. That the tents caught fire and that they were not of fire retardant material is neither for me to answer nor for the current hierarchy of the Uri Brigade.


    (The writer, a former GOC of the army’s 15 Corps, is former commander of the Uri-based Kala Pahar Brigade. He is now associated with Vivekanand International Foundation and Delhi Policy Group. He can be reached at @atahasnain53)




    https://www.thequint.com/india/2016...ion-loc-jaish-e-mohammad-hafiz-saeed-pakistan
     
  5. IndiranChandiran

    IndiranChandiran Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

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    Before we pass judgement on the IA or the IAF , lets pause to read a senior officer's articles on what it is to serve in these areas with the kind of means our men out there have at their disposal .

    If the GoI believes it has provided our servicemen with everything they need and that the men serving there lack any wants , should they go ahead with cashiering those in charge of this fiasco .
     
  6. Levina

    Levina Colonel on stilettos SENIOR MEMBER

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    One body bag everyday is not worrisome? Then what is?
     
  7. layman

    layman Aurignacian STAR MEMBER

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    It is said worrisome...
     
  8. IndiranChandiran

    IndiranChandiran Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

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    I never hinted it's not worrisome .The case in point is whom do you hold responsible for the Uri and Pathankot episodes .I believe thats what the OP was all about .
     
  9. Levina

    Levina Colonel on stilettos SENIOR MEMBER

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    I was responding to the article doc and not to you in particular.
    If I read it right you have indirectly held GoI responsible for the attack. Am I right? This despite the fact that the bases had been alerted by the intel of a possible attack in the region.
    >>>
     
  10. IndiranChandiran

    IndiranChandiran Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

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    Alerting those camps is one part right .What about equipping them with the necessary paraphernalia to minimise the impact of such attacks ?In the absence of which , these alerts serve more as an alibi on behalf of the GoI leaving the onus of the fallout on the services .
     
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  11. The Lockean

    The Lockean 2nd Lieutant FULL MEMBER

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    The list would read from RM to the last soldier down the line. And it will include institutions such as the Supreme Court and Parliament too. Then, it shall slowly include the number of politicians in the system along with, of course, the bureaucracy.
     
  12. Levina

    Levina Colonel on stilettos SENIOR MEMBER

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    I won't deny that our men should have been better equipped.
    But these are huge bases.You need to be atleast 3 to 5 km out so that you know of any movement in advance.Your focus has to be on the outside. Put your ambushes out. Have patrolling there. And if anyone is coming there, you have to knock them off. In a more proactive scenario the attackers would have been killed outside the fence.
    Now this can not be planned and implemented by the RM or FM. I hope I've been able to explain it better this time.
     
  13. IndiranChandiran

    IndiranChandiran Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

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    You're assuming these bases have a 3 - 5 perimeter sanitised zone. I certainly am no security expert to discuss this in depth .But , do tell me , why would the security personnel in Uri let their guard down or be lax knowing full well that terrorists would be hunting them ?Inside their bases if necessary .If you've read Lt.Gen S.A.Hasnain's article (which I've duly posted )on what he thinks could have gone wrong in Uri , perhaps you would have a different view of the incident too .

    Pathankot is a different matter .
     
  14. Levina

    Levina Colonel on stilettos SENIOR MEMBER

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    Isn't that why we have a C of I ?
     
  15. IndiranChandiran

    IndiranChandiran Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

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    Have they declared their judgement ?
     

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