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India Ballistic Missile Defense news and discussions thread

Discussion in 'Indian Military Doctrine' started by CONNAN, Feb 3, 2011.

  1. Vidyanshu

    Vidyanshu Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

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    Just 1 question.

    How efficient are these interceptor in blocking a un-warned missile?
     
  2. ManuSankar

    ManuSankar Major SENIOR MEMBER

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    Missile-interceptor successfully tested

    [​IMG]

    Hyderabad, Feb 10:

    India has joined a select club of nations with capability to build its own operational ballistic missile defence.

    In tests off the Orissa coast today, an air defence missile successfully struck down an incoming ballistic missile at a height of 15 km, according to the Defence Research and Development Organisation.

    A modified Prithvi missile, which mimics the ballistic missile was launched at 10.10 a.m. from the Integrated Test Range at Chandipur. Explaining the event, DRDO scientists said radars located at different points tracked the incoming ballistic missile.

    The interceptor missile, was kept in complete readiness at the Wheeler Island. With the help of guidance computers, the trajectory of the ballistic missile was calculated and the missile launched at the precisely calculated time.

    As the radars, inertial navigation system and the onboard computer working in perfect harmony, the onboard radio frequency seeker identified the target missile and guided the interceptor missile to home-in and hit the incoming missile directly and destroyed it. The warhead also exploded and broke down the target missile into pieces, they described.

    India is the fifth country to have these capabilities. The mission was carried out in the final deliverable user configuration mode said Dr V.K. Saraswat, Director-General, DRDO. The Defence Minister, Mr A.K. Antony has congratulated the scientists for the successful demonstration of the ballistic missile defence.

    Business Line : Industry & Economy / Government & Policy : Missile-interceptor successfully tested
     
  3. ManuSankar

    ManuSankar Major SENIOR MEMBER

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    Last edited by a moderator: Mar 12, 2014
  4. Steel

    Steel Lieutenant SENIOR MEMBER

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    Most advanced MCC deployed

    The Mission Control Centre for the AAD Interceptor trial held on Friday was deployed in Master-Slave configuration at DRDO Hyderabad and Wheeler Island, Orissa to ensure high availability with built-in fault tolerance at each location.

    The MCC of the Indian BMD programme is one of the most advanced, automated net-centric Command and Control systems in the world, a DRDO press release said.

    The master MCC located more than a 1,000 km away at Hyderabad from the missile test range, received the target data in real time from multiple weapon system radars. The complete Air Situation Picture during the BMD trial was provided to the MCC commander using advanced data fusion and target classification techniques.

    After the classification of the target as an enemy ballistic missile, the MCC issued engagement orders to the AAD Launch Centre located at Wheeler Island in Dhamra.

    The complete engagement sequence from target detection to destruction was controlled by MCC in net-centric mode of operation. The trial successfully demonstrated complete functionality in deployment configuration of MCC.

    The Hindu : News / National : Most advanced MCC deployed
     
  5. satya

    satya Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

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    Un-warned? What do you mean by that?
    If you mean that some stray warhead appears out of nowhere and we have to deal with it then time taken to identify it + decision to blow it + command etc will cause some unavoidable delay, so finally probablility of its intercept depends upon time available, otherwise everything else remains same like the radar, the interceptor etc
     
  6. Steel

    Steel Lieutenant SENIOR MEMBER

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    Interceptor fires in wartime

    BALASORE: The DRDO created history by successfully test firing the indigenously built supersonic Advanced Air Defence (AAD) interceptor missile in a war-like situation, for the first time, from the Wheeler Island off the Odisha coast on Friday.
    A scientist involved in the mission told ‘The Express’ that no prior information was given to the AAD system about the launch timing of the target missile, a Prithvi variant, which was a practice during earlier trials.
    “During developmental trials the AAD system is well informed about the ‘launch timing’ of the target missile. After it is fired, the radars track the missile and guidance system gives the interceptor launcher required command to fire the missile. But this time there was no internal communication from the target missile,” he said.
    Even the scientists associated with the AAD project were unaware of the launch timing. The interceptor was put on take off mode and all the tracking systems worked perfectly soon after the target was launched. Radars at various locations tracked the incoming ballistic missile while guidance computers continuously computed its trajectory and launched the interceptor. Then started the work of onboard radio frequency seeker, which identified the target missile and guided the interceptor missile close to it. It was destroyed at an altitude of 15 km.
    �“The enemies will not intimate us the attack timing. We need to strengthen our tracking system, so that the incoming missiles can be easily and quickly detected. During the mission, our radars and tracking systems worked as expected and we demonstrated clinical precision,” said the scientist. �
    Though the DRDO claimed to have achieved a direct hit, reliable sources said the target missile was destroyed when the interceptor homed on it at a ‘missed distance’ of 1.5 metre, which is close to direct hit. �
    A defence release stated that for the first time the DRDO had set up a Mission Control Centre (MCC) in Hyderabad to ensure the successful interception. MCC of the Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) programme is one of the most advanced, automated net-centric command and control system in the world. The MCC, located over 1,200 km from the test range facility at Wheeler Island, received the data about the target missile from multiple radar systems in real time situation and issued commands to the AAD system, the release detailed.

    Interceptor fires in wartime - southindia - Orissa - ibnlive
     
  7. Wrecker1984

    Wrecker1984 FULL MEMBER

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    Congratulations and kudos to DRDO.

    Now, sit and complete the rest of the work asap. :dumbhorse:
     
  8. vikas jat

    vikas jat Captain SENIOR MEMBER

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  9. Nick 779

    Nick 779 Captain SENIOR MEMBER

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    Missile defence system ready for induction, reveals DRDO chief
    Published April 28, 2012 | By admin

    SOURCE: EXPRESS NEWS SERVICE

    [​IMG]
    India’s missile defence system is ready for induction, V K Saraswat, chief of Defence Research & Development Organisation (DRDO), has said.A two-layer shield will be put over the national capital, Saraswat said. He confirmed that the system has already destroyed incoming missiles in four tests.

    “We have identified the advanced air defence (AAD) missile and the PAD which has no acronym and is for exo-atmospheric interception (upwards of 30 km). The AAD is for endo-atmospheric interception. In two layers we intend to put it as part of the Delhi (air) defence,†Saraswat said in an interview to The Indian Express Editor-in-Chief Shekhar Gupta for NDTV 24X7’s ‘Walk the Talk’ programme.

    Saraswat said DRDO had used modified Prithvi missiles as simulated targets and demonstrated the capability of hitting missiles with the range of over 2,000 km. The Indian system is at par with the US Patriot 3 missile defence system, he said.

    Asked when the system would be put in place over the capital, Saraswat said, “This system is now ready for induction.â€

    The nuclear capable Agni V missile which India tested successfully last week has “taken deterrence of the country to a high levelâ€, Saraswat said. The missile will be ready for induction in two years, he said.

    The DRDO chief described Agni V as a 5,000-km plus missile with a maximum range of 5,500-5,800 km.

    He said there was no pressure at any time to understate the range.

    “We have not understated the range. As a missile designer and a person also involved a lot in policy planning, (I can say) we as a nation don’t have to hide anything with respect to our capabilities,†Saraswat said.

    China’s state-run Global Times had reported that India cut Agni V’s range from the original 9,000 km under NATO pressure. The daily also quoted a Chinese military researcher as saying the missile could actually hit targets 8,000 km away.

    Saraswat said the Tatra trucks, which have become controversial following Army Chief Gen V K Singh’s bribery allegations, have been in use since 1986, and DRDO has never had a problem with them. He disclosed that India’s wheel mounted strategic defence too is based on Tatra systems. “For strategic deterrence, we have rail systems and we have wheel based systems. Whereever we have wheeled systems, it is Tatra,†Saraswat said.

    He also revealed that DRDO is working on an improved Armour Piercing Fin Stabilised Discarding Sabot (APFSDS) anti-tank ammunition, of which the Army faces a severe shortage. The scientist said the shortage of ammunition was because imports had not worked out for a higher grade of the system required after Kargil.
     
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  10. Volkan-S

    Volkan-S REGISTERED

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    India Tests First Intercontinental Ballistic Missile

    India tested on Thursday its first long-range intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) able to carry a nuclear warhead deep into China or Europe, bringing Delhi into a small club of nations with intercontinental nuclear capability.

    Defense Minister A K Antony described the missile’s test as an "immaculate success.â€￾

    "The nation stands tall today. We have joined the elite club of nations (possessing ICBM capability)," he told the DRDO head on phone following the launch.
     
  11. ManuSankar

    ManuSankar Major SENIOR MEMBER

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    'The Indian missile shield: nothing to be baffled about' by Mihir Shah

    Last Month, India Today carried a column by Manoj Joshi that was rather critical of the Defence Research and Development Organisation's (DRDO's) ballistic missile defence (BMD) program. Joshi argued that DRDO's claims about the BMD shield being ready after just six tests, in what appear to be controlled conditions, were unrealistic; that a project of such strategic importance lacked proper direction from the outset; and even questioned the need for such a system in the Indian context. Be that as it may I felt that it would be good if a different perspective was brought to the fore that diverged with the opinions expressed in Joshi's piece and furthered the debate on what is by any account a most significant programme for India's strategic security.

    In today's guest post we have Mihir Shah responding to Joshi's assertion and rebutting some of the points expressed by him on DRDO's BMD programme.

    1: That India's missile shield is not ready for deployment

    To be fair, Joshi doesn't state this explicitly, but seems to drive the reader towards this conclusion by questioning the adequacy of the tests the missile shield was subject to. This, in spite of the presence of multiple credible sources in the public domain that attest to the fact that the entire BMD system has been subject to full-up tests, in its "final user configuration". Moreover, although the column's title expresses the belief that the government is 'baffled' over the DRDO chief's claim, Joshi presents scant evidence to show that this is indeed the case. Even the ubiquitous 'unnamed sources' that usually form the basis of such theses are conspicuous by their absence.

    2: That a modified Prithvi missile launched from a distance of 70 km can in no way mimic the flight profile of a 2000 km range missile

    This is incorrect. As long as the inbound reentry-vehicle comes in at the correct angle and terminal velocity, it matters not for a terminal phase BMD system whether it was launched from 2000 km away or 70 km away. And there is no reason a Prithvi's trajectory cannot be modified to mimic that of an intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) in the terminal phase. The day the DRDO builds a Sprint/Spartan type system, there shall be no alternative but to test it against "proper" long-range missiles. But to the best of my knowledge, they aren't building a Sprint/Spartan right now, so why use an expensive Agni as a target when a much cheaper (and convenient) Prithvi will suffice?

    3: With nuclear weapons around, only a shield that will guarantee blocking every single missile is the only one worth having

    This one claim is perhaps the most puzzling of all, and demonstrates a skewed understanding of how ballistic missile defences are supposed to work. Another perspective would point out that If India deploys even a marginally effective BMD system, it will seriously limit an enemy country's nuclear strike options and impose excessive costs on them should they decide to build more warheads and delivery vehicles to neturalise India's advantage.

    Let me explain what I mean, by building a hypothetical scenario. Suppose that the hypothetical continent of Westeros is in the midst of a cold war, with the Starks of Winterfell facing off against the powerful Lannisters of Casterly Rock. The Lannisters are known to possess a limited number (say forty) of nuclear warheads mounted on ballistic missiles. At most, that means they can hit 40 targets, Furthermore suppose Lord Tywin of the Lannister's for some reason demands that each Lannister missile be targeted against a different city. To counter it, the Starks decide to put into operation a BMD shield to cover the North, Riverrun, and the Vale of Arryn. Let us assume that this shield has a rather poor anticipated kill probability of 80 per cent. How do the Lannisters respond? The easy way out would be to assign multiple missiles to a smaller number of targets. They select eight of the most important targets and assign five missiles to each in the hope that at least one of those five will make it through. Almost at once, the Starks' BMD system has protected 32 targets, thousands of lives, and tons of precious resources without having fired a single shot. This is called 'virtual attrition'. The Lannisters may well decide to enlarge their arsenal to 200 warheads and missiles and get back their earlier effectiveness numbers, but there is every chance that this will be either impossible or terribly expensive. And the moment the Starks give their system a minor upgrade to increase its effectiveness to 90 per cent, they (the Lannisters) will be back to square one, requiring another 200 missiles to restore the status quo. The economics of the competition are loaded in favour of the Starks -- an ABM system is expensive to set-up, but it can be expanded and upgraded at a fraction of what it would cost the Lannisters to build more missiles and warheads and then set up the infrastructure for their deployment, maintenance, and upkeep.

    Applying the lessons of this scenario to India tells me that inflicting a bit of this same virtual attrition on Pakistan's nuclear arsenal wouldn't be such a bad thing at all. Several well-meaning analysts consider a nuclear war 'unthinkable' and see a war as 'lost' as soon as the first nuclear warhead goes off. In the process they end up advocating an all-or-nothing approach to national defence which frankly speaking makes very little strategic sense. One expects pragmatic policy-makers to be made up of sterner stuff. It is their job to make the nation as secure as possible, to rationally think about nuclear war, to devise strategies to win it if it happens, and ensure the continued functioning of the state after the dust has settled. And rational thinking dictates that given a choice between losing, say, Delhi alone versus losing Delhi and Jaipur, the correct decision would be to save Jaipur, no matter how much it offends some. Sitting around twiddling thumbs and calling either "unthinkable" is NOT an option.


    4: That none of the DRDO's claims have been verified by third parties, say, any of our armed forces. In contrast, China's January 2010 test was authenticated by the Pentagon

    This is a weak line of argument at best, since it juxtaposes the views of the user of an indigenously developed weapon system with a foreign defence department in the context of evaluating the efficacy of a high security programme under development! The two are hardly equivalent! In any case it can always be argued that we do not know whether the Chinese system was verified 'independently' by their military. As for the Pentagon, its statement only states that American satellites detected an interception. There is little to indicate that it verified the operation of every little component of the system: the search, tracking, and fire control radars, the communications system, the command and control system, and so on. In any case the Indian military and potential users have pretty much been present during various BMD tests. Surely, a user team from the Indian Army, present at Wheeler Island at the time of the test, got to examine the operation of the entire system in more detail than a few foreign satellites observing a Chinese test? In fact given that both Air Marshal Barbora and Maj Gen Saxena were present at this particular test on July 26, 2010, it is quite possible that the shield will be operated by a joint Army-Air Force team under the direct command of the SFC.

    5: That the system will be ready for only "two places", presumably Mumbai and Delhi. But what about Kolkata, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Lucknow and the rest of the country?"

    The deployment in two places is only supposed to be an initial deployment. Every new weapon is deployed in phases, and there is no reason the BMD system should be any different in that regard. In fact, setting it up in several cities at once without it being given a thorough shakedown would be the far riskier option, strategically and economically.

    6: That building a missile shield would force Pakistan to build "field greater numbers of missiles with nuclear weapons", compromising India's interests

    In support of this suggestion, Joshi quotes Air Vice-Marshal (retd) Kapil Kak: "For an unstable and fragile state like Pakistan, India's BMD could indeed be destabilising, as this would substantially reduce the value of Pakistan's nuclear and missile arsenal, tempting it to increase the same." My response to this is, yes, it may be so but why is this "destabilisation" necessarily a bad thing? Pakistan has more than once pronounced its willingness to use nuclear weapons if war breaks out, and hasn't shied away from protecting terrorist entities it actively supports with these weapons. Short of a direct threat of unprovoked nuclear war, the situation is already about as unstable as it could get for India. Now with the Pakistani economy in doldrums, wouldn't it make sense for India to "destabilise" the strategic equation by forcing Pakistan to pour more money and resources into an arms build-up it cannot afford?

    IBNLive : Saurav Jha's Blog : Guest Post 2: 'The Indian missile shield: nothing to be baffled about' by Mihir Shah
     
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  12. Himanshu Pandey

    Himanshu Pandey Don't get mad, get even. STAR MEMBER

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    So he is a Fan of Game of Thorns:lol:
     
  13. brahmos_ii

    brahmos_ii Major SENIOR MEMBER

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    India has tested a two-tier missile defence shield and is getting ready to place it around its two major cities, Delhi and Mumbai. There are three issues that emerge from the deployment of this capability: will it work effectively; how will it alter Pakistan’s nuclear calculus; and will it complicate the India-China military balance?

    While Indian scientists have expressed confidence in the system and claimed it has a 90% accuracy level, impartial observers tend to be more sceptical. The best anti-missile systems tend to have an accuracy rate of 70% and that statistic can also be challenged (Broad and Sanger, 2013). The most common complaint against anti-missile defences is that they cannot distinguish between real missiles and decoys thus, invariably, letting some actual warheads in and causing damage. Moreover, as Brigadier Arun Sahgal has pointed out, the missile shield would require round the clock online connectivity, uninterrupted power supply, and associated systems that even at the best of times, are unreliable in India (Bedi, 2012).

    “But a growing chorus of weapons experts in the United States and in Israel say their studies — based largely on analyses of hits and misses captured on video — suggest that Iron Dome destroyed no more than 40 percent of incoming warheads and perhaps far fewer. Many rockets, they argue, were simply crippled or deflected—failures that often let intact or dying rockets fall on populated areas.” (Broad and Sanger, 2013)

    Further, the costs of such a system have to be taken into account. Israeli sources bring out the high cost of the Iron Dome stating that Jerusalem spent between $25-30 million to shoot down 421 low-tech rockets (Harkham, 2012). When one looks at more sophisticated missiles with countermeasures, the cost-benefit ratio may not justify such an expenditure.

    What is likely, therefore, is a weapons system that can shoot down some missiles but will not be the perfect, or even close to perfect, shield against a nuclear strike. But the fact that it will shoot down some missiles, and in the Pakistani case that would be a huge bonus, does bring some degree of uncertainty into the calculus of Pakistan’s strategic planners about the robustness of their nuclear deterrent. What this does, therefore, is to change Pakistan’s deterrence calculus vis-à-vis India.

    Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, unlike India’s, is a first use doctrine and, therefore, requires the use of a disarming first strike, and a policy of firing all its nuclear-armed missiles in one salvo. Pakistan cannot afford the luxury of firing some missiles to deter say an Indian conventional attack and then to enter into negotiations to deescalate the conflict. For that to happen, Pakistan (and even India) would require an advanced Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence capability that neither country possesses. Thus, for Islamabad, the option becomes use your entire force and cause maximum destruction or use a few weapons, have some shot down by an Indian missile shield, and then face an Indian retaliatory barrage that cripples Pakistan’s conventional and nuclear capabilities. A use it or lose it first strike then becomes Pakistan’s best and only alternative.

    Also, being a cash strapped country and being quite happy to use unconventional tactics, it is a lot cheaper for Pakistan to develop countermeasures in a way that its military’s strengths are best utilised. Inter Services Intelligence has shown that it is quite capable of sending a ship loaded with terrorists from Karachi to Mumbai and that small group wreaked havoc in the city (Woodward, 2010, p.46). Sending a boat with a nuclear warhead on it into Mumbai harbour is not an infeasible scenario and one where the missile shield would be useless.

    Having said that, another Mumbai style attack, especially one with nuclear weapons, would firmly put Pakistan at the top of the list of global terrorism. This is something that would give even the most foolhardy regime in Islamabad room for pause. Pakistani decision makers have to recognise, and Indian decision makers need to stress this in their dialogue with their Pakistani counterparts, that while Jihadi tactics have given Pakistan an unconventional deterrent against India, the use of such forces is risky since they are difficult to control. The ISI’s 2011 attack on the UN compound in Mazhar-i-Sharif was actually meant to be against the US consulate but that was non-operational at the time – leading to the death of four innocent UN employees.

    Moreover, given the level of developmental backwardness in Pakistan, India only has to hit Karachi, Islamabad, and Lahore with nuclear weapons – something that is easily doable – to create unacceptable damage in Pakistan. Consequently, a sneak Pakistani attack might give a temporary advantage to Islamabad, but it still could not prevent nuclear retaliation by India.

    A missile defence shield, however imperfect, does change the diplomatic calculus with Pakistan. When the US decided to move forward with Star Wars, it changed the strategic calculations of the USSR and its leader Mikhail Gorbachev who recognised that the time had come for serious arms control negotiations. The same may well happen in Islamabad as Pakistani decision makers recognise just how expensive and destabilising the countermeasures to a missile shield are. Countermeasures could include more warheads, the creation of manoeuvring warheads (something that is both scientifically difficult and fiscally expensive), a Pakistani missile shield, or the use of nuclear warheads through Jihadi tactics. This is particularly the case if one takes into account the changing Pakistani threat perceptions – especially in a post-US withdrawal from Afghanistan strategic context.

    The US-Pakistan relationship will be “normalised” after US withdrawal from Afghanistan. What I mean by that is that both the State and Defence department will no longer turn a blind eye to contentious issues like the Haqqani Network and safe havens for terrorists in Pakistan. In such circumstances, antagonising India makes very little sense. Further, in its new military doctrine, the Pakistani Army has identified internal threats, quite correctly, as the major challenge to the country’s security – India comes in second. This requires a shift of emphasis both in terms of weapons and tactics. It also means not getting into an expensive nuclear arms race with India. The US has also made it clear that it welcomes the opportunity to work with India on developing a missile shield and this offer has not been made to Pakistan, thus suggesting that American priorities may be shifting towards a stronger alliance with India (Menon, 2012, p.49). All these factors could encourage Pakistan to negotiate with India on nuclear issues.

    China
    For several reasons, China’s reaction to an Indian missile defence shield is not the same as Pakistan’s will be. First, China is building its own missile shield, which consists of an exo-atmospheric defence provided by the Second Artillery of the PLA and an endo-atmospheric defence provided by the Air Force (Zhang, 2013). This is, however, not aimed against, or determined by, any possible Indian innovations. It is meant for the countries that China views as its major strategic challengers – the US and, possibly, Russia. India’s Agni series of missiles are still not deployed in large enough numbers to factor into China’s strategic calculations.

    Second, China’s numerical advantage in nuclear warheads and its advances in anti-satellite weaponry place India at a distinct disadvantage and not, therefore, at the top of China’s threat priorities. China’s 863 anti-satellite Program has been successfully tested and New Delhi, unlike Beijing, does not have a redundancy of military and surveillance satellites that could keep India’s “eyes in the skies” open for a long time. Further, the exo-atmospheric part of the missile shield does depend on some degree of satellite surveillance and warning capability. To suggest that an Indian missile shield can effectively take on a Chinese nuclear assault is probably wishful thinking. It will certainly complicate Chinese strategy but not seriously degrade Beijing’s capability.

    Third, a China-India conflict will be conventional in nature if it is along the border for neither the Indian or Chinese militaries are considering changing the territorial status quo through a use of force. That does not mean, however, that either side will allow the other to take away further territory. What we are likely to see is a conventional war that is at the tactical or operational level to maintain the status quo along the border. If the Chinese had wanted to unilaterally seize Tawang, it would have been attempted a long time ago. Further, tactical nuclear weapons make no sense in the Himalayas given the massive environmental damage that would be caused by the use of such weapons – and a missile shield would be irrelevant if tactical weapons were used since their low altitude, short cruise time, and distance from the missile shield would render Indian defences as a non-factor in the conflict.

    Accidental Launches
    What then, are India’s best political-diplomatic options with a missile defence shield? For India, a missile defence shield has two major selling points. One is its utility in countering accidental or unintentional launches. Indian interceptors could shoot down a rogue warhead, particularly from Pakistan, because the likelihood of rogue Chinese elements seizing control of Chinese missiles and then launching a strike on a secondary threat like India is, in the present Chinese strategic context, rather low. In the Pakistani case, however, the fact that rogue elements may seize control is a reasonable fear, and in that case, shooting down a Pakistani missile and asking for clarification from Islamabad makes a lot of sense.

    Second, for reasons cited above, nuclear arms control with Pakistan becomes a real possibility and should be welcomed in New Delhi. Over the past few years, Pakistan has built up its nuclear capability to the point where western observers conclude that the country has more nuclear warheads than India. This nuclear numerical superiority has not got Pakistan the security blanket it desires, and it continues to worry about the India threat. An Indian missile shield that is only 40-50% effective would still block out enough Pakistani warheads to put Pakistan’s first use nuclear policy into question. Especially since its larger missiles are counter-value systems that are targeted at cities.

    India has carried out a range of nuclear negotiations with Pakistan and it is perhaps time to take them to the next level where the Pakistani arsenal is stabilised and secured. If a missile shield can help achieve that, then it may be worth the price of setting up.

    References
    William J. Broad and David Sanger, “Debate Emerges Over Effectiveness Of Israel’s Antimissile System”, The New York Times, March 21, 2013.

    Rahul Bedi, “India’s missile shield is ready: Top scientist; Analysts call it no more than a ‘technology demonstrator”, The Straits Times, May 12, 2012.

    Ariel Harkham, “Trapped under the Iron Dome: Israel’s siege mentality represents a fundamental strategic failure”, Jerusalem Post, December 2, 2012.

    Ahmed Shuja Pasha, the head of ISI, told American authorities that two former members of ISI had planned Mumbai as a rogue operation, i.e. without the consent of Pakistani authorities. Bob Woodward writes that the CIA subsequently received reliable intelligence that ISI was directly involved in the training for the Mumbai attacks. See Bob Woodward, Obama’s Wars, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010, p.46).

    Jay Menon, “Partnering Possibility,” Aviation Week and Space Technology, August 13, 2012, p.49.

    Interview with Dr. Xiaoming Zhang, Department of Strategy, USAF Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, April 8, 2013.

    Amit Gupta
    Associate Professor, Department of International Security Studies, USAF Air War College, Alabama and Visiting Fellow, IPCS

    India?s Missile Defence ? Analysis | Missile ThreatMissile Threat
     
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  14. Himanshu Pandey

    Himanshu Pandey Don't get mad, get even. STAR MEMBER

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    Indian nuclear forces, 2012

    a interesting read on nuke snd missiles.... its controversial as many things said are against general perception
     
  15. Himanshu Pandey

    Himanshu Pandey Don't get mad, get even. STAR MEMBER

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