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India has 2600 nuclear warheads (sic) says Harvard University

Discussion in 'Indian Military Doctrine' started by Levina, Jun 20, 2017.

  1. randomradio

    randomradio Colonel REGISTERED

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    I was referring to the title which says we already have them.
    "India has 2600 nuclear warheads"
     
  2. Hellfire

    Hellfire Devil's Advocate THINKER

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    Hmmm .... that is an estimate of capability of both safeguarded and unsafe guarded fuel, both processed and unprocessed.

    A figure of 450 is what India needs (I think even this report says this figure).. for both concerns of ours. That has been ensured.

    Oh I edited ... not 490 but 4 to 9 tonnes. Interface in IDF on iPad sucks
     
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  3. randomradio

    randomradio Colonel REGISTERED

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    Less than 500 is plausible. I mean even if NS popped in and says we have 2600 nukes... Nah, I ain't believing that.

    The guy who wrote the report is Islamabad educated, a Mansoor Ahmed.
     
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  4. stephen cohen

    stephen cohen Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

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    We had Ten tonnes of Un safegaurded Plutonium when Indo US Nuclear deal
    was agreed in 2006

    This figure of Ten Tonnes was revealed then by the Media

    Since then We have declared Eight Reactors out of 22 as Military facilities

    So the spent fuel is added to this stockpile

    Add to it BARC ; Mysore( Ratanhalli) and God Knows what is happening in Vishakapatanam
     
  5. mugundhan

    mugundhan 2nd Lieutant FULL MEMBER

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    Pakistan should not worry about the bullshit article. According to their countrymen in PDF, Indian nukes and missiles don't work.
     
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  6. turkish

    turkish Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

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    Hmm! I just dont believe what these Universities say. The other day I read a report from Oxford which said India will disintegrate...
     
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  7. BMD

    BMD Colonel ELITE MEMBER

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    You would need delivery methods for those warheads. I think this is probably based on WGP and HEU stockpile not actual warheads. The UK has enough Plutonium stockpiled to build about 12,000 nuclear warheads but that doesn't mean we have 12,000 nuclear warheads.

    http://climatenewsnetwork.net/uk-tops-global-plutonium-league/
     
  8. stephen cohen

    stephen cohen Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

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    @randomradio @Hellfire


    http://fissilematerials.org/blog/2014/07/india_ratifies_an_additio.html

    International Panel on Fissile Materials
    Fostering initiatives to reduce stocks and end the production and use of highly enriched uranium and plutonium

    IPFM BLOG
    India ratifies an additional protocol and will safeguard two more nuclear power reactors
    • JULY 1, 2014
    India has ratified an Additional Protocol (AP) to its safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In 2006, India had committed to negotiate an AP with the IAEA as part of the US-India nuclear deal.

    The Model Additional Protocol (INFCIRC/540) was developed in the 1990s to strengthen the safeguards system in non-nuclear weapon states under the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Its main goal is to expand the range of information about its peaceful nuclear activities that a state reports to the IAEA. As of May 2014, 123 countries had an AP in force, including all five NPT nuclear-weapon states.

    While non-weapon states subscribe to the original Model Additional Protocol, the NPT nuclear weapon states have negotiated their own AP agreements with the IAEA, which differ widely from each other in reporting obligations and in the degree of access offered to the IAEA for inspections and all are far more restrictive than the Model Additional Protocol. India has accepted even fewer obligations under its AP agreement, committing only to report details about exports to non-weapon states of source materials, uranium and thorium, when they exceed 10 tons per year and 20 tons per year respectively. This undertaking is also found in the APs of other states, but in India's case it seems to be the only new obligation it has accepted. For comparison, the Model Protocol has 30 specific reporting obligations on the "provision of information." As detailed below, a number of facilities with military significance are not included in the scope of the AP.

    Concerns about India's AP agreement were made public courtesy of Wikileaks, with a 2009 cable from Ambassador Gregory L. Schulte (then U.S. Permanent Representative to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the United Nations in Vienna), reporting that India's draft AP text "does not even go as far as the APs for Russia and China, the weakest among NWS, and is viewed in the Safeguards Department and the Office of the Legal Advisor as setting a bad precedent for not only Pakistan, but Brazil".

    In a further development, India has announced it will put two additional pressurized heavy water reactors (PHWRs) under IAEA safeguards by the end of 2014. When the process is completed, India will have a total of ten PHWRs under safeguards, eight of which were offered for safeguards after the Nuclear Suppliers Group waived its restrictions on India in 2008, and will have fulfilled another commitment made as part of the US-India nuclear deal.

    A significant proportion of India's nuclear complex, including PHWRs, will remain outside IAEA safeguards, however, and could have a military role. This was made evident in a 2006 exchange between Indian Atomic Energy Commission Chairman Anil Kakodkar and Pallava Bagla, a science journalist:

    Bagla: "Is your strategic need for plutonium not met by CIRUS and Dhruva? Do you need additional capacity from civilian reactors?" Kakodkar: "Yes, very clearly. Not from civilian reactors, but from power reactors."


    India's unsafeguarded nuclear complex will include eight PHWRs: Tarapur III & IV, Madras I & II, and Kaiga I--IV. Together, these unsafeguarded reactors have 2350 MW of electricity generation capacity and could produce about 1250 kilograms of reactor-grade plutonium every year.

    India also will not accept safeguards on the Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR) and the Fast Breeder Test Reactor (FBTR), both located at Kalpakkam. The former could produce up to 140 kg of weapon-grade plutonium each year, assuming 75% capacity factor.Facilities associated with the nuclear submarine propulsion program would not be offered for safeguards. Reprocessing and enrichment facilities also are to remain outside safeguards - including existing facilities and the new reprocessing and enrichment plants India is now building.

    The two PHWRs to go under safeguards later in 2014 are Narora I & II, sited near New Delhi. In 2009 and 2010, India offered Kakrapar I & II and Rajasthan III--VI reactors for safeguards (see table below). In addition, six imported reactors (Tarapur I and II, Rajasthan I and II, and Koodankulam I and II) are safeguarded.


    India's PHWRs and their IAEA safeguard status

    Reactor Power (MWe) Start-up date Open for safeguards Safeguards type

    Kakrapar-1 220 5/6/1993 2010 INFCIRC/754

    Kakrapar-2 220 9/1/1995 2010 INFCIRC/754

    Narora-1 220 1/1/1991 End of 2014 INFCIRC/754

    Narora-2 220 7/1/1992 End of 2014 INFCIRC/754

    Rajasthan-1 100 12/16/1973 1977 INFCIRC/66 type


    Rajasthan-2 200 4/1/1981 1977 INFCIRC/66 type

    Rajasthan-3 220 6/1/2000 2010 INFCIRC/754

    Rajasthan-4 220 12/23/2000 2010 INFCIRC/754

    Rajasthan-5 220 2/4/2010 2009 INFCIRC/754

    Rajasthan-6 220 3/31/2010 2009 INFCIRC/754

    Tarapur-3 540 8/18/2006 Not safeguarded

    Tarapur-4 540 9/12/2005 Not safeguarded

    Madras-1 170 1/27/1984 Not safeguarded

    Madras-2 220 3/21/1986 Not safeguarded


    Kaiga-1 220 11/16/2000 Not safeguarded

    Kaiga-2 220 3/16/2000 Not safeguarded

    Kaiga-3 220 5/6/2007 Not safeguarded

    Kaiga-4 220 1/20/2011 Not safeguarded
     
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  9. Nilgiri

    Nilgiri Lieutenant IDF NewBie

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    Read the report people!

    Its on page 52:

    [​IMG]

    Theoretically, yes if India went all out and scavenged every Pu atom it had in its reactors, it could (potentially - read further for why) make 2000+ nuclear warheads with the material.

    The problem with that is mentioned in the assumption: reprocessing of the Reactor Grade Pu. Reactor Grade Pu like how banana over-ripens over time has been contaminated with Pu-240.

    Basically weapons grade Pu (i.e near pure Pu-239), you need to "pluck" early while there is very low Pu-240 contamination. Why Pu-240 is produced and is sub-optimal (for nukes) is another long subject (lets say it is very unstable under impulse pressure applied to implosion - also reason why you cannot economically make a gun design for Pu nuke).

    If you want to turn over-ripe banana back to perfectly ripe banana....well you need some fancy separation procedure (standard chemical reprocessing using oxides and other fancy anion introduction in chemically distinct parents.... is not relevant here) which I believe makes the whole thing unfeasible and very expensive (would need a calutron based process - which in itself is very research intensive).

    Best to just eat the over-ripe banana (i.e design and test a RG Pu warhead) and make do with its inherent problems...it can be done, the US apparently did so in a 1962 test with reactor grade plutonium from the UK.

    India I believe in one of the tests in pokhran II did test a linear implosion device that was supposed to be used with reactor grade (or fuel grade which is "better" quality reactor grade) Pu. So the figure regarding "RG Pu separated" could very well be referring to fuel grade Pu which India could use in nuclear devices. I personally would not treat the "RG Pu un-separated" as usable for nuclear devices ...because that definitely would be Reactor grade (more than 19% contamination of Pu-240) and would entail much cost (unless India indeed has a fully validated Reactor Grade Pu design and India is willing to accept the operational/manufacturing drawbacks of such devices compared to producing more WG)

    So I would say overall India has somewhere between 100 - 200 nuclear warheads "proven" and "ready-to use"....and possibly another 500+ it could potentially assemble at short notice provided the material falls in the Pu 240 range tested for in Pokhan II (in the experimental device) and provided that device design was validated in that test (and it helps a lot if its open to further scaling/simulation etc).

    The further 1000+ warheads from fully reactor grade "unseparated" Pu has potential as well, but we simply have little firm evidence to go by on their end-deployed potential esp in manufacturing and storage (past the different weapon design needed and assumed validated)....even less than the separated Pu (given the Pu-240 contamination levels of each.... assuming this separation was done so to achieve a better ratio in line with Shakti-III design)

    This all would of course be highly classified in reality (these are just my best guesses regarding what this report is conveying). Hence why most people prefer to quote the 100 - 200 range for proven nuclear warheads for India (and probably a large portion of them mated to fusion secondaries to produce about 200 kt each).

    Thus India should not be too worried about the prevalence of the 100 - 200 figure (probably does not challenge it on purpose), its best to have everyone stick to the lowest estimate possible. Underestimation by others always works best for oneself in the long run.

    Sources worth reading that go into more depth about the issues I am talking about:

    Using Pu 240 contaminated fuel for making nukes:

    http://www.ccnr.org/plute.html

    Types of Pu and how they arise:

    http://www.world-nuclear.org/information-library/nuclear-fuel-cycle/fuel-recycling/plutonium.aspx

    @anant_s @PARIKRAMA
     
    Last edited: Jun 21, 2017
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  10. bharathp

    bharathp Developers Guild IDF NewBie

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    a few highlights that I found in the report:

    "The only other country besides the United States that has recently used reactor-grade plutonium in manufacturing and testing a nuclear explosive device is India" (page 21)
    "Indian nuclear weapon establishment was quite capable of converting reactor-grade plutonium into weapons. BARC [the Bhabha Atomic Research Center] has experimented with designing weapons from this material for many years.”53 Mahedava Srinivasan, the chief experimental physicist of India’s nuclear weapons program also maintained that, “building a weapon from reactor-grade plutonium was quite possible but was a ‘bit tricky’ with ‘the technology of achieving implosion very rapidly using advanced implosion concepts being known only to the experienced design groups,’” in India’s weapons program " page 22


    … affirm clearly that if India chose to expand its nuclear arsenal in the most realistic way conceivable through the use of its PHWRs, it would be able to do so entirely on the strength of its own resources and without relying on the supposed benefits of fungibility afforded by the Bush-Singh initiative.”128 Adopting such a mode of operations would allow India the option and the capacity to produce 12,135-13,370 kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium during the lifetime of these reactors, which [according to Tellis], “is sufficient to produce between 2,023–2,228 nuclear weapons over and above those already existing in the Indian arsenal.
    page 34
     
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  11. Nilgiri

    Nilgiri Lieutenant IDF NewBie

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    Aye, the base reference modelling for this would have been validated in the Shakti-III test and that was likely used to simulate further designs based on those results.

    If you use an optimised geometry, no reason why you cannot get same (or close) level of yield as weapons grade. I suppose it would involve funneling/expanding the generated neutron flux and potentially also weighted implosion...or combination of both depending on which best achieves Pu-240 neutron burst management (given Pu 240 is 10,000 times more likely than Pu 239 to undergo fission at any given time)
     
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  12. Guynextdoor

    Guynextdoor Lt. Colonel SENIOR MEMBER

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    BS- it'll be about 100. A good mix of Tactical and strategic weapons.
     
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  13. bharathp

    bharathp Developers Guild IDF NewBie

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    bro.. read the report.

    "if India chose to expand its nuclear weapons stockpile, it can do so on its own, over time, and reach the figure of 2500-2600". they never say anything about 2500 weapons NOW.
     
  14. randomradio

    randomradio Colonel REGISTERED

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    Lot of sensationalism over nothing.
     
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  15. randomradio

    randomradio Colonel REGISTERED

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    The point I was making to @BMD and @Hellfire. All this sensationalism from non-Indian or non-neutral sources is aimed at discrediting India's aim of getting into the NSG.

    We need a huge chunk of our fissile material for our upcoming submarines.

    I'll change the thread title to reflect that.
     
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