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Indian Army conducts surgical strikes across LoC

Discussion in 'International Relations' started by vstol jockey, Sep 29, 2016.

  1. MilSpec

    MilSpec Mod Staff Member MODERATOR

    Jun 30, 2011
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    Country Flag:
    We have these?

    Mostly I see the CG's and I am in love with those, especially since Chris Kyle endorsed them. Would love to fire one in this lifetime atleast.
    SrNair, surya kiran and PARIKRAMA like this.
  2. brahmos_ii

    brahmos_ii Major SENIOR MEMBER

    Oct 19, 2012
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    After Surgical Strikes: Demolish Terror Finance System

    The events following the Uri terrorist attacks have witnessed many diplomatic maneuverings by both India and Pakistan at the United Nations that continued at other International forums too and are still on. However, the emerging opinion points to the fact that the conventional superiority notwithstanding, India should not engage militarily with Pakistan beyond destroying the PoK based terrorist camps.

    The post surgical strike, the Indian strategic planning has to move on to a new turf, an all out diplomatic offensives and a complete destruction of terror support system within the country.

    The advantage of ‘escalation dominance’ seemed to have rested with Pakistan so much as that it would scare the world of a nuclear holocaust in the Indian subcontinent in the event of any military action across the LoC.

    However, that perception has now been broken after the surgical strikes on PoK’s terrorist launch pads on 28th Sept 2016 night.

    India later unilaterally announced that its purpose of neutralizing terrorists has been met and it does not want any further escalation and rather called upon Pakistan to join the fight against the terrorism in this part of the world. As a responsible democracy, India would not risk its reputation by going against the generally prevalent opinion of war not being an option to settle the bilateral issues between India and Pakistan.

    The post surgical strike, the Indian strategic planning has to move on to a new turf, an all out diplomatic offensives and a complete destruction of terror support system within the country. This would incorporate the adoption of a state of art technology for border management to check the infiltration and an unforgiving ruthless crackdown on the terror financing. This India can do and it must do so.

    The terror support system mainly includes terror financing and local networking. An actionable intelligence gathering and sharing can take care of networking part, but the flow of terror funds require constant vigil by the enforcement agencies without a blink of eye.

    Vivek Chadha in his book ‘Lifeblood of Terrorism: Countering Terrorism Finance’ writes, “a major part of funding for terrorism from external sources comes through counterfeit currency, drug trafficking, charities, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and finally as a result of state sponsorship by Pakistan. In the case of counterfeit currency and drugs, the funding process starts with production. The initialization is different for NGOs and charities, where it begins with the collection of funds. This can be open and legal as done through zakat, or clandestine and illegal. The next stage sees the transferring of funds into India. Finally, once the transfer has been completed, money is received by terrorist groups and their front organizations.”

    The 9/11 attacks’ cost of US $ 500,000 was funded through bank transfers, cash movements credit/debit cards and the Al-Qaeda was able to mobilize the funds using mostly the legal financial channels posing a serious challenge to enforcement agencies.

    The terrorist activities require funding for a wide range of stores, training, logistics, explosives, arms and ammunitions, surveillance, communication gadgets, setting up training camps, acquisition of inflammatory jihadi materials, day to day and post death payments, travel etc. Besides, the terrorist organization also have to spend on their dedicated websites and social media for the recruitments of new cadres and propaganda.

    The 9/11 attacks’ cost of US $ 500,000 was funded through bank transfers, cash movements credit/debit cards and the Al-Qaeda was able to mobilize the funds using mostly the legal financial channels posing a serious challenge to enforcement agencies. The 1993 Mumbai blast investigation revealed that firms in Dubai at the behest of Dawood Ibrahim channeled the fund meant for the attack through legal NRI account of Yakub Memon in Bandra Mumbai. The terrorist attacks in Mumbai sub urban trains of 2006 got the funds of Rs 1.2 crores from Saudi Arab through hawal chanel using SIMI members. A Muscat based travel agent Abu Harron sent money through hawala channels for 2008 Mumbai attacks

    The terror network can also use Money Transfer Service Scheme (MTSS) like the Western Union to transfer funds. These funds can be drawn in cash, sent to supporters and then channeled for terrorism. In India about 67 % of transactions in retail sector is through cash only. This makes the tracing the money trail all the more difficult.

    Raja Lahrasib Khan a Pakistan born Chicago taxi driver, was arrested in March, 2010 for sending US $ 930 to a contact in Pakistan with further instructions to deliver approximately US $ 300 to Ilias Kashmiri to support terrorist attacks on India. Saudi Arab arrested an Indian Mujahideen financier Fasseh Mahmood in 2012 for sending funds to India for terrorist activities.

    The United Nations have taken some measures in the direction of checking terror finance. The International Convention on Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism (ICSFT) came into force in 2002. It requires each country to criminalize the funding of terrorist activities under its domestic laws, seize terrorists’ funds, and lays down a framework for financial institutions to cooperate with other countries in investigation and follow up on crimes related to such activities. The UN Security Council Resolution 1373 of Sept, 2001 mandated an establishment of a permanent counter-terrorism legal and executive infrastructure and called upon all members to join the ICSFT.

    India has to draft and embark upon a multipronged strategy to counter the terror finance.

    Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an inter-governmental body set up in 1989 whose purpose is the development and promotion of policies at national and international levels, to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. There are 40 FATF’s Recommendations and 09 Special Recommendations that provide the best investigation and intelligence tools to gather financial information. India is a member of FATF but unfortunately most of its recommendations have not been incorporated by the Indian Parliament in the original Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 and even after its amendment in 2005.

    In India, the act of money laundering is not an isolated offence per se. A conviction in the scheduled offence preceding the act is a must to convict anyone under money laundering. On the contrast, the USA has “The Uniting and Strengthening America by providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001” that establishes money laundering as a federal crime; criminalizes the financing of terrorism and requires financial institutions to adopt due diligence procedures.

    The United Kingdom too has a robust anti-money laundering system in ‘Proceeds of Crime Act 2002’ (POCA) which provides for a single set of money laundering offences applicable throughout the UK and it opens up new legal avenues to prosecute those associated with criminal finance.

    The action must begin by Indian authorities, friendly countries and international bodies before the actual commencement of the process associated with terror finance.

    India has to draft and embark upon a multipronged strategy to counter the terror finance. This would incorporate a strong preventive legal regime which can stop, pre-empt, desist or discourage individuals, groups or countries from financing terrorism. The action must begin by Indian authorities, friendly countries and international bodies before the actual commencement of the process associated with terror finance. The second step is to forestall the process. This can be done at the time of collection, transfer, storage or distribution of funds in all its manifestations including cash, goods or electronic transfers. This must aim to neutralize the network that support and aids terrorism.

    Lastly an effective prosecution system must be in place once a case of terror financing is detected, whether before or after the terrorist act. It should go after the money trail, and build a strong case to enable conviction.

    The best scenario would be to have a deterrent statutory regime that guarantees a certain conviction. In any case if a process of terror finance is initiated, the country should be in a position to intercept and bring the perpetrator of crime to justice.
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  3. seiko


    May 5, 2010
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    India's 'surgical strikes' in Kashmir: Truth or illusion?

    India made headlines in late September after carrying out "surgical strikes" on militants across the de-facto border in disputed Kashmir.

    Days earlier insurgents had attacked an army base in Indian-administered Kashmir, killing 18 soldiers. Tensions spiked as India blamed Pakistan.

    Supporters of the Indian government said the army's strikes had taught Pakistan a long-awaited lesson - but Islamabad dismissed the reports as an "illusion". The BBC's M Ilyas Khan visited the border area to find out what actually happened.

    What did Indian troops do?

    Despite the use of the term "surgical strikes", the Indians definitely did not airdrop commandos to hit "launching pads of militants" inside Pakistani-held territory, or conduct ground assaults deep into the Pakistan-administered side. But they did cross the Line of Control (LoC), in some cases by more than a kilometre, to hit nearby Pakistani border posts.

    Police officials on the Pakistani side privately concede that such a ground assault did occur in the Madarpur-Titrinot region of Poonch sector, west of Srinagar, where a Pakistani post was destroyed and one soldier killed.

    In Leepa valley to the north, locals said that the Indians crossed the LoC and set up their guns on ridges directly overlooking the village of Mundakali. A Pakistani border post located at some distance east of the village was hit. Two other posts higher up in the mountains were also hit. At least four Pakistani soldiers were injured in the attack, which lasted from 05:00am until 8:00am, locals said.

    Image captionThe Leepa valley. A route across the centre of the mountain-top shown was previously used by militants to cross into India, until the border was fenced.
    A similar advance by the Indians in the Dudhnial area of Neelum valley further north was beaten back by the Pakistanis. At least one Pakistani soldier was injured - reports of a dead soldier could not be independently verified by the BBC.

    The Pakistani army described the exchanges as nothing more than cross-border firing, albeit in a more co-ordinated fashion and all along the LoC.

    Officials said two soldiers were killed in the attacks - one in Poonch, and one in Bhimber sector, further south. Defence minister Khwaja Asif later said a total of nine soldiers were injured in the assault.

    Indian troops could not have hit a target and returned alive as the climb required was too steep, officials said. Nor could helicopters have been used to drop special forces given the difficult terrain and because Pakistan would have shot down the aircraft.

    There is no conclusive evidence to prove either side's claims - the truth probably lies somewhere in the middle.

    Eyewitness: Ali Akbar, Mundakali village resident, Leepa Valley
    [​IMG]Image copyrightALAMY
    I normally wake up at 4:30am. As usual I did my chores - and just then I heard small arms fire, about 100 rounds. I waited a few minutes and then I heard four bombs [mortars] land near the village. We have been in a state of war for a long time, so I knew that heavy guns meant trouble and that the village might get hit. I was standing there when four more bombs came. Then four more, after a few minutes.

    The first shells had landed in the forest near the village [where a border post is located] and I saw flames and smoke rising. My wife called to me to get in. We have built a bunker in the basement with 24-inch thick walls. She said everybody was inside, and wanted me to get in too.

    By now they had started targeting another one of our posts higher up on the mountaintop in front. Then the next round of shells hit another post further back.

    Small arms fire also continued. This was surprising for me. They had apparently crossed over from the LoC and had set up their guns at the top of the cliff. I could heard the bullets whizzing overhead, through the treetops, snapping twigs and leaves that were falling to the ground.

    The firing continued until about 6am. After that, the heavy guns fell silent but small fire continued. We remained in our basement until 10am. No one had had time to eat or drink that morning.

    Later, we heard that the Indians had crossed the LoC and hit our posts from positions overlooking the valley. I don't understand why they didn't try to reach our post where we have the local company headquarters. They could have done it. It's walkable, and is easier for them because they occupy higher ground. Perhaps our people detected their movement and fired at them which pushed them back.

    This is the first time since the war on the LoC began nearly 30 years ago that they have fired from this position.

    How did the Pakistanis respond?

    In many areas the attack came as a surprise.

    Accounts of villagers gathered in Leepa suggest that Indian soldiers first opened fire in the valley at around 0500, hitting the post near Mundakali village and blowing up a mosque adjacent to it.

    A soldier who was preparing for pre-dawn prayers was hit and injured, they said.

    Image captionThis border post in Mundakali was said to have been hit by Indian fire
    Image captionAn Indian post in Keran-Lawat as seen from the Pakistani side
    Fire was also directed at two other posts higher up in the hills, one of which served as the forward headquarters in Leepa.

    Locals say bunkers at these posts were partly destroyed and their communication system was paralysed for some time. This meant that troops stationed down in the valley and at the brigade headquarters took a while to realise what was going on.

    The soldier who was injured at the Mundakali post was given first aid by villagers, and then transported to the military-run hospital in Leepa on a motorbike. Nearly two dozen villagers helped put out the fire that had engulfed the mosque.

    The Pakistanis did not take long to get their act together and fired back from the remaining bunkers, pushing the Indian guns back from the ridges overlooking the valley.

    In Dudhnial in Neelum valley, the action took place further up in the mountains, away from the village. A few villagers were awakened by gunfire.

    Image captionThe bazaar in Dudhnial village
    An official familiar with what happened that morning said the Indians had advanced well beyond the LoC when their movements were detected.

    "The Pakistani fire sent them scurrying back to their bunkers," he said.

    Down south, in Poonch, Kotli and Bhimber areas, it was more or less the same story: Indians coming forward from their positions on the LoC, taking unsuspecting Pakistani soldiers by surprise both due to the suddenness of the attack and the intensity of the fire and then pulling back once the Pakistanis had a chance to respond.

    Unprepared, and having a numerical disadvantage generally, the Pakistanis made use of their firepower to the fullest, exhausting their ammunition.

    Locals said that in the days following the attack, hundreds of villagers were pressed into service carrying artillery shells and other ammunition to border posts to replenish their supplies.

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  4. seiko


    May 5, 2010
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    Were any militants hit?

    Kashmir-focused militants have had a strong presence in Pakistani-administered Kashmir for years. During the 1990s they crossed the LoC in droves to ambush troops on India's side.

    Their activities became less visible after the 2003 ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan, but their proficiency in suicide raids and other attacks kept them relevant to Pakistan's strategy in its dispute with India, despite denials from Pakistan's military.

    The militants continue to maintain safe houses in bigger cities like Muzaffarabad, located some distance from the border area.

    But they now mostly set up camps near military deployments along the LoC and away from villages where there is a growing sense of fatigue among locals towards the insurgency.

    Image captionSince the 2003 ceasefire, Neelum has raised a generation of college boys and militants have mostly moved out of villages and closer to military camps

    Despite the claims in the Indian media, the BBC could find little evidence that militants had been hit.

    There were no reports of any of the camps in the Samahni area of Bhimber or in the Poonch-Kotli area having been hit. They are mostly located behind ridges that serve as a natural barrier against direct Indian fire.

    In Leepa, some five or six wooden structures housing militants between the villages of Channian and Mundakali had not been targeted. A ridge that runs along the east bank of the nearby stream covers them from military positions on the LoC.

    Likewise, in Neelum, most militant camps - such as the ones at Jhambar, Dosut and in the Gurez valley area further east - are located in the valleys below, at a safe distance from the LoC.

    The BBC also could not confirm an Indian media report that Lashkar-e-Taiba camps in the Khairati Bagh village of Leepa valley and the western end of Dudhnial village in Neelum valley had been hit on 29 September.

    However, in Dudhnial some locals who helped carry military munitions to forward posts the weekend following the Indian strikes said they had seen one or two damaged structures close to a Pakistani post near the border. They thought those structures might have been hit on the morning of 29 September.

    But they were reluctant to discuss whether those structures had been occupied by militants, or whether five or six men had died there, as the Indian media had claimed.

    The BBC asked the Pakistani military about militant activity in the area, but there was no immediate response.

    Image captionHigh in the hills. Nearby, the road descends into the Leepa valley
    What is the mood now?
    Since 29 September there has been no let up in tension in the LoC area.

    Locals in Leepa told the BBC that following the attack, there had been an increased influx of militants in the valley. Are they in the area to help the army in case border skirmishes with the Indians get worse? No one is sure.

    In Neelum, a top official of the district administration called a meeting and advised locals earlier this month to start digging bunkers in or near their houses in case border tensions escalate.

    A local school teacher who was at the meeting said the official was told that removing militants from the area would be a simpler and less costly option to protect villages from Indian shelling.

    The strategy was a confidential matter, the official responded. It would be up to the government to decide.

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