Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II : News & Discussions

Discussion in 'U.S. & Europe' started by Picard, Sep 4, 2012.

  1. Picard
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    Program history

    F35 is designed to be LO interceptor / tactical bomber / ground attack / reconnaissance / air controller and intelligence plane built in CTOL, STOVL, and CATOBAR variants.

    As Chuck Spinney puts it: "The problem was that each service had very different requirements. The Air Force wanted 1,763 cheap bombing trucks to replace F-16s and A-10s; the Navy wanted 480 "first day-of-the-war" deep-strike stealth bombers to compete with the Air Force in strategic bombing; and the Marines, still haunted by the ghosts of Admiral Frank Jack Fletcher and Guadalcanal, wanted to replace aging Harriers and conventional F/A-18s with 609 short takeoff vertical landing (STOVL) JSFs that will operate from big-deck amphibious assault ships if need be."

    For an example of how different requirements can cause trouble, one only has to take a look at requirements for fighters and strike aircraft: while fighter aircraft have to have as low wing loading as possible, so as to increase maneuverability to maximum, low-penetration strike aircraft work better with high wing loading and small wing. That fact alone makes it obvious what F35 is supposed to do.

    Another problem was usage of computer models to settle final design before all issues have been found by flight testing.

    In 2002, order was reduced by 400 planes, from 2853 to 2443 planes, and it is looking at further reduction. If F22 is any indication, US might end up with 713 planes (500 Air Force, 200 USMC), which will then cost 538 million USD per plane (F22s cost 421 million USD per plane as of 2012), and produce 383,6 billion total program expense. However, as with F22, F35 is simply too big to fail.

    YF35 was even more limited than YF22 as technological demonstrator, and winner was determined by a flyoff demonstrating only low-speed handling, STOVL capability, and producibility with at least 70% parts commonality. Competitive prototyping, including working out bugs before large-scale production, was absent in both programmes. LRIP, meanwhile, escalates costs of any changes to design, essentially cementing it as well as allowing contractor to build up powerful political alliances by establishing nation-wide network of subcontractors. When weapon becomes obvious failure on performance and economical goals, it is already impossible to cancel, thus freeing contractor from obligation of having to fulfill its performance and cost promises.

    Developing engine has incurred cost overruns of as much as 850 million USD.

    There are also quite a few issues with the plane as well:
    upper lift fan door actuator problems
    ejection seat and pilot escape system failed tests
    problems with restarting engine if it flames out in flight
    braking on wet runaway is deficient
    four above issues were known in 2011; reported cost to fix them was 30 million USD per plane in lots 2-5
    no protection against cyber attacks
    Also, it is not one airplane for three services; with part commonality of 30%, it is basically three different airplanes, with only looks being similar.

    While some countries – such as South Korea, Japan, Norway, Italy and UK – are considering F35 as option for their air forces, evidence exists that they are only doing so due to heavy political pressure from United States; as discussed in F22 analysis, US Military Industrial Complex has unprecended influence on US Government, to the point that it could be said that Federal Government is owned by MIC. South Korea plans to buy 60 of aircraft. Situation in Korea is similar to 2003 deal in Poland, where Lockheed Martin and US Government exerted heavy political and diplomatic pressure to ensure that Poland will choose it over Eurofighter and BAE deals. United States themselves have a long history of threatening allied nations if they are unwilling to purchase US weaponry. Basically, countries aren't buying US weapons, but alliance with United States. Similarly, United States have refused to upgrade South Korean F16s so as to make F35 only answer – excuse was that they did not want new radar technology to fall into Chinese hands, despite the fact they offered same technology on F35.

    Costs

    Like F22, F35 is more famous for its perpetual increase in costs than for its hyped abilities. There are many reasons for such increase, such as false cost estimates made by Lockheed Martin, reduced orders and problems with aircraft itself. Official numbers are 122 million USD as a flyaway cost, and 150 million USD as unit procurement cost. However, these numbers are outdated.

    Calculation, from data below, gives actual program cost, without accounting for planes themselves, of 235,87 billion USD.

    Unit costs

    In 2011, one F35 of unspecified model had a unit flyaway cost of 207,6 million USD and unit procurement cost of 304,15 million USD, as opposed to official numbers of 122 million and 140-150 million USD, respectively. Developmental costs have increased due to many patch-ups (such as structural strengthening of rear fuselage) and fixes; costs were additionaly increased by abandonment of "fly before you buy" policy – some aircraft were bought before development was finished, and thus had to be brought up to standard later – which is extremely expensive.

    In 2012 flyaway costs were 197 million USD for F35A, 237,7 million USD for F35B, and 236,8 million USD for F35C. Unit procurement costs per aircraft may have been as high as 352,8 million USD per aircraft, if 16% increase in per-unit cost is correct, giving 861,2 billion USD total program cost.

    Maintenance and operating costs

    F35s estimated cost per hour of flight is 35 200 USD in 2012 dollars. And that is for F35A, CTOL variant which, logically, should be easiest to maintain. Also, a leaked Pentagon report estimated that Canada's fleet of 65 aircraft will cost 24 billion USD to maintain over next 30 years.

    Strategical analysis

    Effects of numbers

    Effects of numbers are various. First, fewer planes means that these same planes have to do more tasks and fly more often, therefore accumulating flight ours faster and reaching designed structural life limit faster. Also, smaller force will attrite faster; more flight hours per plane will mean less time available for proper maintenance as well as greater wear and tear put on planes, further reducing already limited numbers.

    In combat, side capable of putting and sustaining greater number of planes in the air will be able to put a larger sustained pressure on the enemy.

    F35s shortcomings – force size and quality

    F35, as it is obvious, is NOT a "low cost, affordable solution". With its flyaway cost of over 200 million USD, it is more expensive than F15, let alone F16 it is supposed to replace. Moreover, its low reliability and high maintenance requirements are going to reduce that number even more.

    Effects of training

    Wars in history – such as Yom Kippur War, Croatian War for Independence or Ottoman invasion of Europe – have proved dangers of overreliance on technology as replacement for doctrine, tactics and training. Whenever technology has been solely relied on, it had failed.

    F35 does not have a double-seat version, therefore harming training further; which is exceptionally noticeable with high training requirements for complicated operations like vertical landings. Simulators, meanwhile, cannot replace training – meaning that lack of training in two-seat STOVL variant will result in preventable accidents.

    Strategic bombing

    Whereas from World War II to modern day, Close Air Support missions carried out by variety of aircraft – perhaps most famous being WW2 German Stuka dive-bomber and modern A10 Close Air Support plane – were very effective at winning the wars, strategic bombing missions were a failure.

    It can be safely said that Germans lost World War 2 due to spending too much on strategic bombers, and too less on Stukas. Despite the fact that one multi-engined bomber cost as much as five Stukas, five times more bombers were produced than Stukas – out of 114 000 aircraft produced by Germany in World War 2, 25 000 were heavy bombers, but only 4 900 were Stukas. If investment in heavy bombers had been transferred to Stukas, 130 000 Stukas would have been produced.

    At Dunkirk, RAF lost 60 aircraft, mostly fighters – Luftwaffe lost 240, mostly heavy bombers. And while British shipping took a fearful beating – 6 destroyers lost, 23 warships damaged, 230 smaller ships and boats were lost – losses were caused primarily by Stukas.

    Meanwhile, Allied strategic bombing failed to do as much as scratch on German war production – while in beginning of 1940, monthly production figure for Me-109 was 125, it was 2 500 in autumn of 1944. If that figure had been reached in 1940, Battle for Britain would have taken completely different course.

    During German attack on Russia, strategic bombers failed to do anything except consuming scarce fuel. Strategic bombers were part of Soviet retaliation on attack – Me-109s shot down 179 of these. Meanwhile, only 300 Stukas were present to cover entire front – utterly understrength when compared to what was required to exploit numerous opportunities for turkey shoots that disorganized Red Army presented during its wild retreat. It is safe to say that Stukas could have won the war in the Eastern Front for Germany – but they were not given enough attention.

    During 1941, Luftwaffe had lost 1798 heavy bombers from the beginning number of 1339. Stuka losses were 366 from the beginning number of 456. Also, during same year, several Stuka raids sank Soviet battleship "Marat". The cost of all 4 900 Stukas produced during 10-year period was cca 25 million USD – about same as the battleship. Meanwhile, British sent 299 heavy bomber attacks against German ships "Gneiseau", "Scharnhorst" and "Prinz Eugen", which were in harbour right over the Channel. 299 attacks and 8 000 sorties later, they accomplished nothing, aside from losing 43 bombers (and no fighters) and 247 men. When ships moved in 1942, British sent heavy bombers to stop them, losing 60 aircraft and 345 airmen. Meanwhile, two highest-scoring Stuka pilots on the Eastern front had a score of 518 and cca 300 tank kills, respectively.

    Similarly, V-1 and V-2 missiles achieved close to nothing – and 6 000 V2s equaled cost of 48 000 tanks (it should also be noted that Germany produced a total of 29 000 tanks during entire war) or 24 000 fighter planes.

    In Great Britain, sir Arthur Harris was convinced that his bombers could kill enough German civilians to force Germany to capitulate. It did not work – not only losses in heavy bombers during 1942 totaled 1402 heavy bombers (while total number of heavy bombers in service during same year never went above 500), but it did not achieve any effect – German war production soared.

    During First Gulf War, high-altitude bombing by B-52s and F-16s against dug-in Iraqi forces was as ineffective as above-discussed strategic bombing campaigns. 300 high-altitude sorties were flown daily by F16s, without effect. On the other hand, two A10s and single AC130 demolished Iraqi convoy moving towards Saudi city of Khafji – 58 out of 71 targets were destroyed.

    In Kosovo, 78-day strategic bombing by NATO against Serbia achieved nothing.

    In Second Gulf War, "Shock and Awe" 10-day strategic bombing campaign achieved nothing. Saddam's regime toppled 21 days after beginning of ground invasion.

    Tactical analysis

    BVR combat

    Since development of first BVR weapons, each new generation of fighters would make someone declare that "dogfighting is a thing of past". Invariably, they have been wrong. In 1960, F4 Phantom was designed without gun – and then Vietnam happened.

    US went into Vietnam relying on a AIM-7 Sparrow radar-guided missile. Pre-war estimated Pk was 0,7 – Pk demonstrated in Vietnam was 0,08. Current AIM-120 has demonstrated Pk of 0,59 in combat do this date, with 17 missiles fired for 10 kills. However, that is misguiding.

    Since advent of BVR missile until 2008, 588 air-to-air kills were claimed by BVR-equipped forces. 24 of these kills were by BVR missile. Before "AMRAAM era", four out of 527 kills were by BVR missile. Since 1991, 20 out of 61 kills may have been done by BVR missile, while US itself has recorded ten AIM-120 kills. However, four were NOT from beyond visual range; Iraqi MiGs were fleeing and non-manouvering, Serb J-21 had no radar, as was the case with Army UH-60 (no radar, did not expect attack), while Serb Mig-29's radars were inoperative; there was no ECM use by any victim, no victim had comparable BVR weapon, and fights involved numerical parity or US numerical superiority – in short, BVR missile Pk was 50% against “soft†targets. Also, 16 BVR missile kills in Desert Storm are far from sure – it says that “sixteen involved missiles that ‘were fired’ BVRâ€, meaning that these could have WVR kills prefaced with BVR shots that missed. Five BVR victories are confirmed, however - one at 16 nm (and at night), one at 8.5 nm (night) and three at 13 nm, which more than doubles number of BVR victories.

    In Vietnam, Pk was 28% for gun, 15% for Sidewinder, 11% for Falcon, 8% for Sparrow, and essentially zero for Phoenix. Cost of expendables per kill was few hundred dollars for gun, 15 000 USD for Sidewinder, 90 000 USD for Falcon, 500 000 USD for Sparrow, and several millions for Phoenix. Overall cost for destroying enemy with BVR missiles – including training, and required ground support – has never been computed.

    In Cold War era conflicts involving BVR missiles – Vietnam, Yom Kipuur, Bekaa Valley – 144 (27%) of kills were guns, 308 (58%) heat-seeking missiles, and 73 (14%) radar-guided missiles. Vast majority of radar-guided missile kills (69 out of 73, or 95%) were initiated and scored within visual range. In true BVR shots, only four out of 61 were successful, for a Pk of 6,6 %.

    In Desert Storm itself, F15s Pk for Sidewinders was 67% as compared to Pk for BVR Sparrow of 34%. However, Iraqi planes did not take evasive actions or use ECM, while there was persistent AWACS availability on Coalition part – none of which can be counted at in any serious war.

    Post-Desert Storm, there were 6 BVR shots fired by US during operation Southern Watch – all missed.

    There are other examples of radar missile engagements being unreliable: USS Vincennes shot down what it thought was attacking enemy fighter, and downed Iranian airliner, while two F14s fired twice at intruding Lybian fighters, missing them at BVR with radar-guided Sparrows and shooting them down in visual range with a Sparrow and Sidewinder.

    BVR combat cannot – for obvious reason – fulfill critical requirement of visual identification. IFF is unreliable – it can be copied by the enemy, and can be tracked; meaning that forces usually shut it down. As such, fighter planes have to close to visual range to visually identify target. Moreover, presence of anti-air anti-radiation missiles, such as Russian R-27P, was shown to be able to force everyone to turn off radars – possibly including AWACS. Radar signal itself can be detected at far greater range than radar can detect target at – even when it is LPI – meaning that enemy has ample time to use countermeasures and/or maneuver away from incoming missile. Uplinks to AWACS can be jammed, and if AWACS is shot down/scared away, it means that some F22s, with far weaker uplinks, will have to act as spotters for other F22s.

    While modern IRST can identify aircraft by using its silhouette, range for such identification is low (~40 km for PIRATE).
    Moreover, F35 is far from stealthy; since shape is far more important than RAM, and F35 is far larger than F16, its RCS will be closer to that of F16 than that of F22.

    WVR combat

    In Desert Storm, US forces fired 48 WVR missiles, achieving 11 kills, for Pk of 0,23. However, historically, Pk for IR missiles was 0,15, and 0,308 for cannon. While F16s fired 36 Sidewinders and scored zero kills, at least 20 of launches were accidental, due to bad joystick ergonomy, which was later modified.
    While missiles have become more reliable, countermeasures have advanced too; as such, while IR missiles may be aircraft’s main weapon, gun kill remains most reliable way of getting rid of enemy.

    Effects of numbers

    In WVR, numbers are usually decisive. F35, even more than F22, relies on a (flawed, as shown above) concept of decisive BVR engagement to compensate for larger numbers of enemy fighter planes it can be expected to engage – especially since it is proving to be anything but low cost counterpart to F22.

    However, even in BVR, numbers do matter. Lanchester square criteria, which holds that qualitative advantage of outnumbered force has to be square of outnumbering force's numerical advantage, is even more applicable for BVR combat than for WVR, due to lack of space constrains. Thus, due to Su-27s costing 30 million USD, as opposed to F22s 250 million, F22s would have to enjoy 70:1 qualitative advantage just to break even – which is extremely unlikely. Historically, 3:1 was usually a limit of when quality could no longer compensate for enemy's quantitative advantage, in both BVR and WVR.

    Superior numbers also saturate enemy with targets, and cause confusion. USAF itself has always depended on superior numbers to win air war.

    F35s shortcomings in air combat

    F35 is overweight and underpowered – with a wing loading of 446 kg/m^2 and thrust-to-weight ratio of 1,07 (at empty weight), it cannot hope to outmaneuver any modern fighter plane – even ancient MiG-21s, with wing loading of 308 kg/m^2 can outmaneuver it. Actually, F35's wing loading is slightly worse than F105 Thunderchief.

    Indeed, many fire safeties had to be removed to save weight.

    Sukhoi fighters, which many countries which are member of the program want it to counter (UK will use far more capable Typhoons in AtA role, instead using F35 as self-defensible tactical bomber, which it is), are far more capable than F35 in air combat.

    Number of different capabilities and electronical systems in airplane necessitates second crew member – luxury that no F35 variant can provide. Task saturation can, and often does, result in "close calls" and mishaps. Place for second crew member was not put in – due to vertical landing requirement. Airborne Air Controller missions also require second crew member – in F/A-18 D/F, that work is done by Weapons and Sensors Operator (WSO) in back seat.

    F35s shortcomings in WVR combat

    F35 is, so much is obvious, designed as tactical bomber with limited capacity of self-defense. Its maximum G load is 7 – 9, depending on version (7 G for F35B, 7,5 for F35C and 9 for F35A), versus 9 which is standard for modern fighter planes. Last time 7 Gs were acceptable was Vietnam war. Its wing loading is high – 526 kg/m^2, worse than the famous F-105 "Lead Sled", and thrust-to-weight ratio is 0,87, at loaded weight. At 50% fuel, with 2 Sidewinder missiles and 4 JAGM, F-35A would weight 17 858 kg, for a wing loading of 418 kg/m2 and thrust-to-weight ratio of 1,09. In same configuration with 100% fuel, it would weight 22 221 kg, for a wing loading of 520 kg/m2 and thrust-to-weight ratio of 0,88.

    Worse, naval version – one rated at 7 Gs – has best turning capability due to lowest wing loading, as long as it doesn't go fast enough that G limit does not limit its turning ability.

    Its high wing and thrust loadings, as shown above, do not allow F35 to achieve maneuverability required for a modern front line fighter. It is double inferior – in both wing and thrust loading – to most modern fighter planes. It also does not have a bubble cockpit; pilot's rearward visibility is literally zero, while its weapons, which require doors to open, do not offer it ability to perform dogfight-critical "snapshots" in order to shoot down enemy aircraft. It's large frontal crossection does not allow it to achieve acceleration comparable to fourth generation aricraft, such as Rafale, Typhoon, Gripen or F16.

    It is also very noisy and relatively large aircraft, making it very detectable at visual range.

    F35s shortcomings in BVR combat

    First, it is not stealthy at all. Stealth is measured against five signatures – infrared, sound, visual, and radar footprint as well as electronic emissions. Visual, by definition, is not important for BVR combat; but sound and infrared signature are impossible to lower enough for plane to be VLO, especially when supersonic. While it is not a shortcoming by itself, legacy fighters not even making any effort to lower it, it becomes one when coupled by its low numbers and maximum of two BVR missiles carried in VLO configuration – essentially necessitating use of 6 to 8 F35s to kill a single target (growth to four BVR missiles is planned, halving numbers given). On better note, F35 is equipped with IRST; however, it is optimized for ground attack.

    While F35s only hope to survive air combat is to "launch and leave", its maximum speed of Mach 1,6 means that most fighter planes in the world can easily overtake it and shoot it down. Also, it means that its BVR missiles won't have very good kinematic performance.

    Moreover, F35s stealth capability has been downgraded from VLO to LO, meaning its frontal RCS is roughly comparable to that of modern European 4,5 generation aircraft. Also, at ranges stealth is effective at, BVR missiles have already expended fuel and have extremely low Pk.

    F35 shortcomings in ground attack missions

    F35 is completely incapable of providing close air support. First, many major safety measures in regards to fire safety have been dropped due to increasing cost. Second, its high wing loading and high drag make it unable to slow down, and its lack of maneuverability, thin skin as well as fact that engine is literally surrounded by fuel – which is also used to cool down aircraft's skin – coupled with lack of fire safety measures, make it extremely vulnerable, and unable to go low enough and slow enough to provide effective close air support.

    Inability of fast jest to provide effective close support was graphically demonstrated when, in Afghanistan war, 2001, 30-man combined US/Afghan team was ambushed by 800 Talibans. Single B1B which was nearby tried to help, but couldn't fly low and slow enough to reliably identify targets. Two A10s were sent - as soon as they opened fire with cannons, Taliban attack ceased, and A10s covered team for next 6 hours. (Taliban also tried to negotiate a release of some captured ANA members if US team was to call off A10 support).

    As far as bombing is concerned, it can only carry two 907-kg bombs in its bomb bay – anything else, and it rapidly becomes non-stealthy.

    Comparasion with other planes

    F16

    F16 is far better fighter and bomber than F35. F16 does not carry weapons internally, allowing it to fire off shots quickly. Its cockpit visibility is far superior to that of F35; it has lower wing loading (431 vs 526 kg/m^2 loaded) and higher thrust-to-weight ratio (1,08 vs 0,87).

    Cost issue is completely in favor of F16. Whereas F35 has unit flyaway cost of over 200 million USD, F16s unit flyaway cost is 60 million USD for latest model, easily giving it 10:3 advantage in numbers.

    In Gulf War I, F16s flew 13 340 sorties, and had 3 confirmed losses to enemy action, 7 losses total; thus, loss rate was one plane per 4460 sorties for confirmed combat losses, or one plane per 1900 sorties for total losses – both far better than F117. In Kosovo war, one F16 was shot down out of 4500 sorties.

    F16 was also designed to be able to operate from straight stretches of motorway if airfields were to be destroyed.

    Moreover, while one F22 can fly only one sortie every three days, and F35 seems to be in similar vein, F16 managed to fly 7 – 9 sorties a day in Israeli service (in USAF one F16 usually flies 6 sorties per 5 days).

    F35 is also four times louder than F16, making it easier to detect by ground-based acoustic sensors, and presenting an environmental hazard.

    Whereas F-35s cost per hour of flight is 35 200 USD, F-16s is 4 600 USD.

    F18

    F18 is also better fighter and bomber than F35. Unlike F35, which can only carry two 900-kg bombs without becoming non-stealthy, F18 can carry a total of 6 200 kg of external ordnance and fuel. Also, it costs up to 57 million USD, enabling numerical advantage of 3,6 to 1, in essence being able to deliver 12 times more payload for same unit cost – and that without going into its superior sortie rate.

    Its wing loading of 441 kg/m^2 and thrust-to-weight ratio of 0,96 (both for loaded) are superior to these of F35. Also, its cockpit design allows for rear visibility, unlike F35.

    Saab Gripen

    Saab Gripen is probably the best dogfighter in the world – or it would be if it got F16-esque bubble canopy, although Saab tried to remedy the lack of rearward visibility by installing mirrors.

    Its wing loading is 283 kg/m2 loaded, and thrust-to-weight ratio is 0,97 – both better than F35s. Moreover, its close-coupled canards allow it to achieve and maintain high AoA, thus giving it even tighter turns at subsonic speeds than its wing loading would indicate. Usage of external missile carriage and revolver cannon allows it to use split-second opportunities, which F35 cannot. To top all that, its flyaway cost is between 40 and 60 million USD. Gripen NG will also have thrust-to-weight ratio of 1,08, and even lower wing loading, as well as IRST.

    A10

    In over 8 000 daytime missions in Gulf War One, A10 suffered 3 losses to IR missiles – in other three cases, plane was hit but returned to base safely. Meanwhile, 83 % of A10s that were hit made a safe landing. In Gulf War and Kosovo campaigns, A10s flew 12 400 sorties while suffering 4 losses – a one loss per 3100 sorties, far less than F117, which had 1 loss per 1300 sorties.

    In Afghanistan in 2001, 4-man US special ops team leading 26 ANA troops was ambushed by 800 Taliban. B1B bomber, sent to do "close support", failed to achieve any effect. Team leader, sgt. Osmon, asked for A10s. Two A10s were sent – after A10s opened fire with their cannons, Taliban ceased attack and dispersed. A10s escorted team during entirety of next 6 hours, a trip that would have normally taken 2 hours.

    This incident only serves to prove that F35 has no capacity whatsoever to perform Close Air Support missions – it is too vulnerable, so it cannot fly as low and as slow as CAS missions require it to fly; it does not have a required loiter time – inefficient aerodynamics, small wing and large weight necessitate both high speed and high fuel consumption for it to stay in the air; and it lacks armament required to perform such missions, such as specialized cannon like GAU-8 A-10 is equipped with. A10 is also slow enough, survivable enough and maneuverable enough to enable pilots to use binoculars and night vision googles to find and identify targets, often coupled with simple radio link to troops on ground, in keeping with KISS principle.

    Rafale

    Rafale has wing loading of 307 kg/m^2, and thrust-to-weight ratio of 1,1, loaded. Moreover, its close-coupled canards provide additional boost to its maneuverability, and it is equipped with advanced IRST and weapons systems. Its price – 90,5 million USD flyaway, 145,7 million USD unit program cost for most expensive variant – also mean that it is also far superior design from strategic standpoint, easily providing 2:1 advantage for same price. It's IRST has maximum range of 100 km against fighter-sized targets. Operating cost is 16 500 USD per hour.
    F117

    In Gulf War I, 42 F117s generated, at 0,7 sorties per day, less than 1300 sorties out of 33 000 flown, and made 2 000 laser-guided bomb attacks. Out of 15 SAM batteries in Baghdad reported attacked by F117s on first night, 13 continued to operate – these 15 strikes were also only strikes launched by F117s during war. In same night, 658 non-stealth aircraft also hit targets, with no losses whatsoever.

    While F117s did have zero losses in the war, as opposed to 2 F16s, and 4 A10s lost, night was a much safer combat environment than day, and the F-117 flew only at night. Two squadrons of A-10s flew at least as many night sorties as the F-117. Their losses were the same as the F-117’s: zero. F-111Fs also flew at night and also had no losses.

    The A-10s and the F-117s flew in both the first Gulf war and the next war in Kosovo in 1999. The day-flying A-10s suffered a total of four losses in both wars. The night-flying F-117s suffered two casualties, both to radar missiles in Kosovo. However, F117 suffered 1 loss per 1 300 sorties, as opposed to 1 loss per 3 100 sorties for A10 in Kosovo and First Gulf War (F117 has flown 2 600 sorties in both wars, compared to 12 400 for A10). Moreover, both F117s were hit by same SAM battery, whose commander was apparently only one to use the tactic of combining VHF radar with IR SAMs.

    In Kosovo war, Serbs launched 845 radar-guided SAMs – 2 F117s and one F16 were hit, for effectiveness rate of 0,36 %.

    B2

    F35 will be far less capable bomber than B2. Unlike B2, which was designed for nighttime low-level penetration and similarly low-level bombing, F35, being designed for daytime operations, and having far higher wing loading (446 vs 329 kg/m^2) cannot fly as low and slow, making it unable to reliably hit small targets. F35 is also far smaller, and has shape reminiscent of legacy fighters, making it more vulnerable to VHF radars. Compared to B2, which can carry 80 230-kg GPS-guided bombs, F35 will, in stealth configuration, carry two 910 kg (A and C models) or two 450 kg (B model) weapons, and unlike B2, it cannot carry long-range air-to-surface standoff weapons.

    While B2 is seven times as expensive as F35, it does not have to be built in so large numbers (necessitated by F35 being replacement for five different airframes) and is easily several times as effective as F35 in bombing role; its size and shape also make it, in theory, harder to detect by low frequency radars, albeit its RAM is useless against them. Downside of B2 is that it cannot defend itself if it is detected (by IRST, for example); and while F22s in service may be used to provide it, they will be detected by VHF radars.

    However, above theorizing is made noot by reports that B2 "has radar that cannot distinguish a rain cloud from a mountainside, has not passed most of its basic tests and may not be nearly as stealthy as advertised". While B2 is able to "hug" the ground to evade radar, legacy platforms can be equipped with same systems – and radar used for that type of flying can easily be detected (as proven in Vietnam, where several F111s were lost due to that radar). Also, like F22, it is vulnerable to rain – specifically, its stealth coating is.

    Moreover, B2 carries only 4 times more payload than F16 despite costing – at 2.2 billion FY 1995 USD per plane – or 3,17 billion in FY 2010 USD - 52 times more. It is also maintenance-demanding, requiring environment-controlled hangars which exist only at Whiteman AFB – if these are destroyed, maintenance of B2 will be rendered impossible. To add injury to an insult, during entire Kosovo war, 21-plane, 66-billion USD B2 fleet delivered a meager one sortie per day. 715 A10s, bought for cost of 4 B2s, were procured, and 132 A10s sent to First Gulf War managed to generate over 200 sorties per day.

    One more problem is that B2 has design lifespan of only 30 years – as such, it costs 8 300 USD per hour, regardless of whether it is flying or not.
    Su-27 variants

    All Su-27 variants are capable of defeating F35 in one-on-one combat, due to combination of IRST, RWR, and good maneuverability. Moreover, they are cheaper than F35 (Su-35 has estimated cost of 45 to 55 million USD, enabling them to outnumber it as much as four to one).
    MiG-21

    MiG-21PFM from first half of 1960-s has wing loading of 339 kg/m^2 and thrust-to-weight ratio of 0,79 at gross weight; MiG-21-93 has wing loading of 384 kg/m^2, and thrust-to-weight ratio of 0,8 at gross weight. As such, both fighters can outmaneuver F35, while F35 probably can outaccelerate them. However, both have advantage in that they don't require weapon bays' doors to open before firing a shot, and even ability of F35 to outaccelerate MiG-21 can be questioned, due to bad aerodynamical profile of former.

    Aircraft comparision table

    Thrust-to-weight ratio at 50% fuel:
    F35A: 1,07, F35B: 1,04, F35C: 0,91
    Typhoon: 1,35
    Rafale: 1,3

    Wing loading:
    F105: 452 kg/m2 @ takeoff weight
    F35A: 408 kg/m2 @ 50% fuel; 745 kg/m2 @ max takeoff weight
    F35B: 416 kg/m2 @ 50% fuel; 639 kg/m2 @ max takeoff weight
    F35C: 326 kg/m2 @ 50% fuel; 512 kg/m2 @ max takeoff weight
    Typhoon: 262 kg/m2 @ 50% fuel; 459 kg/m2 @ max takeoff weight
    Rafale C: 259 kg/m2 @ 50% fuel; 536 kg/m2 @ max takeoff weight
    Rafale B: 265 kg/m2 @ 50% fuel;
    Rafale M: 275 kg/m2 @ 50% fuel;

    Counter-stealth technologies

    Stealth versus classical radar

    Su-27s radar performance has doubled over past 8 years, and by 2020 Flanker family radars will be able to detect VLO targets at over 46 kilometers. Also, US stealth planes fly mission with same radar jamming escorts that accompany legacy platforms.

    During the Gulf War, the British Royal Navy infuriated the Pentagon by announcing that it had detected F-117 stealth fighters from 40 miles away with 1960s-era radar. The Iraqis used antiquated French ground radars during that conflict, and they, too, claimed to have detected F-117s. The General Accounting Office, Congress' watchdog agency, tried to verify the Iraqi claim, but the Pentagon refused to turn over relevant data to GAO investigators.

    Also, even modern VLO planes have to operate alongside jamming planes, such as EA-6B or EA-18, when performing ground attack, confirming that even legacy radars are far from useless against VLO planes.

    Main way to reduce plane's radar signature is shaping – stealth coating simply deals with last few percentages. Which means that F35 is going to blow its radar stealth as soon as it maneuvers; additionally, its stealth capability was far lower than that of F22 from get-go. Moreover, it was downrated from VLO to LO by US Defense Department (for reference, Eurofighter Typhoon and Dassault Rafale are LO from front).

    Moreover, target RCS is determined by 1) power transmitted in direction of target, 2) amount of power that impacts the target and is reflected back, 3) amount of reflected power intercepted by radar antenna, and 4) lenght of time radar is pointed at target. While normal procedure was to slave IR sensor to radar, advent of IRST makes it possible to slave radar to it.

    That is not only solution. In a series of tests at Edwards AFB in 2009, Lockheed Martin’s CATbird avionics testbed – a Boeing 737 that carries the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter’s entire avionics system – engaged a mixed force of F-22s and F-15s and was able to locate and jam F-22 radars, according to researchers. Raytheon X-band airborne AESA radar – in particular, those on upgraded F-15Cs stationed in Okinawa – can detect small, low-signature cruise missiles.

    VHF radar

    While VLO planes are optimized to defeat S- and X- -band radars, VHF radars offer a good counter-stealth characteristics.

    Simply put, RCS varies with the wavelenght because wavelength is one of inputs that determines RCS area.

    VHF radars have wavelengths in 1-3 meter range, meaning that key shapings of 19-meter-long, 13,5-meter-wide F22 are in heart of either resonance or Rayleigh scattering region. Same applies for F35.

    Rayleigh scattering region is region where wavelength is larger than shaping features of target or target itself. In that region, only thing that matters for RCS is actual physical size of target itself.

    Resonance occurs where shaping features are comparable in wavelength to radar, resulting in induced electrical charges over the skin of target, vastly increasing RCS.

    However, their low resolution and resultant large size means they are limited to ground-based systems.

    Russians and Chinese already have VHF radars, with resolution that may be good enough to send mid-flight update to SAMs. Also, it is physically impossible to design fighters that will be VLO in regards to both low power, high-frequency fighter radars, and high-power, low-frequency ground-based radars. Such radars can, according to some claims, detect fighter-sized VLO targets from distance of up to 330 kilometers (against bombers like B2, their performance will be worse, but such planes have their own shortcomings – namely, IR signature and sheer size). Manufacturers of Vostok E claim detection range against F117 as being 352 km in unjammed and 74 km in jammed environment.

    Also, RAM coatings used in many stealth planes are physically limited in their ability to absorb electromagnetic energy; one of ways RCS reduction is achieved is active cancellation – as signal reaches surface of RAM, part of it is deflected back; other part will be refracted into airframe, and then deflected from it in exact opposite phase of first half, and signals will cancel each other on way back. However, thickness of RAM coating must be exactly half of radar's frequency, meaning that it does not work against VHF radar for obvious reasons – no fighter plane in world can have skin over half a meter thick.

    There is one detail that apparently confirms this: in 1991, there was a deep penetrating raid directed at destruction of VHF radar near Baghdad; radar, which may have alerted Saddam at first wave of stealth bombers approaching capital. Before US stealth bombers started flying missions, radar was destroyed in a special mission by helicopters. Also, during fighting in Kosovo, Yugoslav anti-air gunners downed one F117 with Russian anti-air missile whose technology dates back to 1964, simply by operating radar at unusually long wavelengths, allowing it to guide missile close enough to aircraft so as to allow missile's IR targeting system to take over. Another F117 was hit and damaged same way, never to fly again.

    These radars, being agile frequency-hopping designs, are very hard to jam; however, bandwidth available is still limited.

    Also, while bombers like B2 may be able to accommodate complex absorbent structures, it is not so with fighters, which are simply too small.

    Another benefit is power – while capacity of all radars for detecting VLO objects increases with greater raw output, it is easier to increase output of VHF radars.

    It is also possible for VHF radar to track vortexes, wake and engine exhaust created by stealth planes.

    Another advantage of low-frequency radars is the fact that they present poor target for anti-radiation weapons, making them harder to destroy. Moreover, new VHF radars are mobile – Nebo SVU can stow or deploy in 45 minutes, while new Vostok-E can do it in eight minutes.

    IRST

    All Su-27 variants, as well as most modern Western fighters, carry IRST as a part of their sensory suite. Russian OLS-35 is capable of tracking typical fighter target from head-on distance of 50 km, 90 km tail-on, with azimuth coverage of +-90 degrees, and +60/-15 degree elevation coverage.

    Fighter supercruising at Mach 1,7 generates shock cone with stagnation temperature of 87 degrees Celsius, which will increase detection range to 55 km head-on. Not only that, but AMRAAM launch has large, unique thermal signature, which should allow detection of F22 and missile launch warning up to 93+ kilometers, while AMRAAM moving at Mach 4 could be detected at up to 83 kilometers. That is worsened by the fact that F35 cannot supercruise, therefore additionally increasing its IR signature by requiring afterburner.

    Integrating Quantum Well Infrared Photodetector technology greatly increases performance – Eurofighter Typhoon already has one with unclassified detection range for subsonic head-on airborne targets of 90 kilometers (with real range being potentially far greater).

    Infrared imaging systems (like Typhoon's or Rafale's) provide TV-like image of area being scanned, which translates into inherent ability to reject most false targets. Also, while older IRST systems had to be guided by the radar, newer ones can do initial detection themselves. Given that stealth planes themselves rely on passive detection in evading targets, using passive means in detecting them is logical response for fighter aircraft. Missiles themselves can use infrared imaging technology, locking on targets of appropriate shape.

    While there are materials that can supress IR signature of a plane, most of these are highly reflective in regards to radar waves, thus making them unusable for stealth planes, and other ways of reducing IR signature are not very effective.

    Moreover, these systems do not adress fact that air around aircraft is heating up too – whereas, as mentioned, shock cone created by supercruising aircraft is up to 87 degrees Celzius hot, air temperature outside is between 30 and 60 degrees Celzius below zero.

    Moreover, Russian Flankers use IRST together with laser rangefinder to provide gun firing solution – althought that is redundant, considering that any modern radar can achieve lock on F22 at gun-fighting ranges. Historically, Soviet MiG-25s have been able to lock on SR-71 Blackbird from ranges of over 100 kilometers by using IRST. Fortunately, order to attack was never given.

    IRST can also provide speed of target via Doppler shift detection – IR sensors used in astronomy can detect velocity of star down to 1 meter per second, whereas fighter travelling at Mach 1,1 moves at 374 meters per second. Laser ranger can also be used to determine range to target.

    While F35s IRST has tracked ballistic missiles to ranges of 800 kilometers, that claim is misleading as ballistic missiles are extremely large, extremely fast and make no effort to hide their IR signature. In similar vein, Typhoon's PIRATE has tracked planet Venus.

    Passive radar

    Passive radar does not send out signals, but only receive them. As such, it can use stealth plane's own radar to detect it, as well as its IFF, uplink and/or any radio traffic sent out by the plane.

    Also, it can (like Czech VERA-E) use radar, television, cellphone and other available signals of opportunity reflected off stealth craft to detect them. Since such signals are usually coming from all directions (except from above), stealth plane cannot control its position to present smallest return. EM noise in such bands is extensive enough for plane to leave a "hole" in data.

    However, simply analyzing and storing such amount of data would require extreme processing power as well as memory size, and it is prone to false alarms. It is also very short-range system, due to amount of noise patterns being required to detect, map and store.

    RWR

    Similar in principle to passive radar, two RWR-equipped aircraft could use uplink to share data and triangulate position of radiating enemy aircraft.

    Lidar

    Infrared doppler LIDAR (Light Detection And Ranging; doppler LIDAR senses doppler shift in frequency) may be able to detect high altitude wake vortices of stealth aircraft. While atmospheric aerosoils are not sufficient for technique to work, exhaust particles as well as contrail ice particles improve detectability to point that aircraft may be detected from range well beyond 100 km; exhaust particles themselves allow for detection of up to 80 km.

    Wake vortices are byproduct of generating lift, and are, as such, impossible to eliminate – aircraft wing uses more curved upper and less curved or straight lower surface to generate differences in speed between two airflows. As result, upper airflow is faster and as such generates lower pressure when compared to airflow below the wing, generating lift. That, however, has result of creating vortices behind the trailing edge of the wing.

    Background scanning

    In that mode, radar does not look for stealth plane itself; instead it looks for background behind stealth plane, in which case sensory return leaves a "hole" in data. However, that requires radar to be space-based; or, if stealth plane is forced to fly at very low altitude due to defence net, radar can be airborne too.

    Another possibility is using surface-based radio installations to scan the sky at high apertures and with high sensitivity, such as with radio telescopes.

    As it is known to radio-astronomers, radio signals reach surface uninterrupted even in daytime or bad weather; and since map of stars is well known, it can be assumed that any star not radiating is eclipsed by an object, such as stealth plane. And as with very sensitive radio-astronomical equipment, every part of sky is observed as being covered with stars. It is also doable by less sensitive detecting equipment, simply by serching for changes in intensity of stars.

    Over-the-horizon radar

    Over-the-horizon radars invariably operate in HF band, with frequencies around 10 Mhz and wavelengths of 30 meters, beacouse it is band in which atmospheric reflection is possible. Also, at that point, target will create some kind of resonance and shaping will be largely irrelevant, as will be RAM coating, as explained above.

    However, lowering frequency of radar means that size of radar aperture has to grow in proportion to radar wavelength to maintain narrow beam and adequate resolution; other problem is that these bands are already filled with communications traffic, meaning that such radars are usually found in early-warning role over the sea.

    Such systems are already in use by US, Australia (Jindalee), Russia and China.

    Bistatic / multistatic radar

    Since VLO characteristics are achieved primarly by shaping airframe to deflect radar waves in other direction than one they came from, and thus make it useless to classic systems. However, such signal can be picked by receiver in another position, and location of plane can be triangulated.

    While every radar pulse must be uniquely identifiable, that feature is already present in modern Doppler pulse radars. What is more difficult is turning data into accurate position estimate, since radar return may arrive to transmitter from variety of directions, due to anomalous atmospheric propagation, signal distortion due to interference etc.

    Acoustic detection

    Planes are noisy, engines in particular but also airflow over surface. In former case, bafflers are added, while in latter, noise is reduced by shaping plane so as to be more streamlined. However, internal weapons bays, when opened, create a great amount of noise.

    Ultra-wide band radar

    UWB radar works by transmitting several wavelengths at once, in short pulses. However, there are problems: 1) it is more effective to transmit power in one pulse, 2) UWB antenna must work over factor of ten or more in wavelength, 3) it would offer numerous false clutter targets. In short, if, for example, UH frequency and VH frequency were used, such radar would combine UHF's and VHF's advantages AND disadvantages.

    Also, it is very hard to make RAM that would be effective against multiple frequencies.

    Cell phone network

    Telephone calls between mobile phone masts can detect stealth planes with ease; mobile telephone calls bouncing between base stations produce a screen of radiation. When the aircraft fly through this screen they disrupt the phase pattern of the signals. The Roke Manor system uses receivers, shaped like television aerials, to detect distortions in the signals.

    A network of aerials large enough to cover a battlefield can be packed in a Land Rover.

    Using a laptop connected to the receiver network, soldiers on the ground can calculate the position of stealth aircraft with an accuracy of 10 metres with the aid of the GPS satellite navigation system.

    IR illumination

    IR illumination – famed "black light" of World War 2, used in Do 17Z-10 and Bf 110D-1/U1 night fighters – works on exact same principles as radar, with only difference being EM radiation's wavelenght, which is in IR range.

    Since it is active technique, it also betrays location of emitter, and thus cannot be relied on for regular use by combat aircraft – althought it can be fitted instead of radar - but can be used by air defense networks.

    Detecting LPI radar

    F35s, like F22s, radar uses frequency hopping to counter radar recievers. However, it can only use relatively low spread of frequencies, and can be detected by using spread-spectrum technology in RWRs.

    Another way to hide radar signal is to include spread-spectrum technology; it is intended to reduce signature of radar signal and blend it into background noise. However, such radar still emits a signal that is 1 million to 10 million times greater than real-world background noise. It is relatively simple to build spread-spectrum passive receiver that can detect such radar at distance four times greater than radar's own detection range.

    There are other ways of making radar LPI: 1) make a signal so weak that RWR cannot detect it, and increase processing power, 2) narrow the radar beam and 3) have radar with far higher processing gain than RWR. Option one is impractical, and is only viable for few years, until newer RWR's are avaliable, even assuming it is initially successfull. Option two does not affect target being "painted", and option 3, closely connected to option one, is only, again, viable for few years.

    Conclusion

    F35 is overweight, overpriced, underperforming and unnecessary aircraft, terrible at everything it is supposed to do, and extremely expensive to operate and maintain. All missions that F35 is supposed to perform can be done more effectively and at lower cost by legacy aircraft, and as such, it would be better for US to scrap F35 until separate, non VLO replacements for F16, F18 and Harrier can be developed.

    Entire programme has been riding on bribes, threats and unfullfilled promisses, literally stealing market away from far more capable, and far cheaper, competitors such as Eurofighter Typhoon.


    Additions

    RCS size vs detection range

    Target – RCS size in m2 – relative detection range
    Aircraft carrier – 100 000 – 1778
    Cruiser – 10 000 – 1000
    Large airliner or automobile – 100 – 1000
    Medium airliner or bomber – 40 – 251
    Large fighter – 6 – 157
    Small fighter – 2 – 119
    Man – 1 – 100
    Conventional cruise missile – 0,5 – 84
    Large bird – 0,05 – 47
    Large insect – 0,001 – 18
    Small bird – 0,00001 – 6
    Small insect – 0,000001 – 3
    F117 to VHF radar – 0,5 – 84

    Effective range is calculated by formula (RCS1/RCS2) = (R1/R2)^4, where RCS = radar cross section, while R=range.

    RAM coatings

    RAM coatings can be dielectric or magnetic. Dielectric works by addition of carbon products which change electric properties, and is bulky and fragile, while magnetic one uses iron ferrites which dissipate and absorb radar waves, and are good against UHF radars.

    Outside links
    1/5 DOCUMENTRY ON F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER - YouTube
    4/5 DOCUMENTRY ON F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER - YouTube
    3 people like this.
  2. smestarz
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    smestarz THINK TANK

    re: Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II : News & Discussions

    In my view, the best way to achieve simple stealth is Write on plane in contrasting colour to the "skin" colour.
    THIS IS A STEALTH PLANE AND IT IS INVISIBLE, IF YOU SEE BLIP ON RADAR, IGNORE IT PLEASE
    1 person likes this.
  3. smestarz
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    smestarz THINK TANK

    re: Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II : News & Discussions

    In my view, the best way to achieve simple stealth is Write on plane in contrasting colour to the "skin" colour.
    THIS IS A STEALTH PLANE AND IT IS INVISIBLE, IF YOU SEE BLIP ON RADAR, IGNORE IT PLEASE
    2 people like this.
  4. Picard
    Online

    Picard ELITE MEMBER

    re: Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II : News & Discussions

    Why did you quote my entire post?
    1 person likes this.
  5. Picard
    Online

    Picard ELITE MEMBER

    re: Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II : News & Discussions

    Pentagon Helps New Stealth Fighter Cheat on Key Performance Test | Danger Room | Wired.com

    Pentagon Helps New Stealth Fighter Cheat on Key Performance Test

    It seemed like a promising step for America’s next stealth fighter: The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter passed a key Pentagon test of its combat capability. But it turns out that the family of jets cleared the mid-February exam only because its proctor agreed to inflate its grade. In essence, the military helped the F-35 cheat on its midterms.

    The collusion between the Pentagon testing body, known as the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and the F-35 program — first reported by Inside Defense — confirmed that the U.S.’ most expensive warplane met previously established performance criteria. Specifically, the review was meant to show that the jet can fly as far and take off as quickly as combat commanders say they need it to.

    But the review council, which includes the vice chiefs of the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps, eased the standard flying profile of the Air Force’s F-35A model — thereby giving it a range boost of 30 miles. And it tacked an additional 50 feet onto the required takeoff distance for the Marines’ F-35B version, which Defense Secretary Leon Panetta just took off budgetary probation.

    The grade inflation comes at a critical time for the new warplane. The military’s new five-year budgeting blueprint, also released in February, cut more than 100 existing Air Force fighters while leaving intact plans to produce nearly 2,500 F-35s — essentially doubling down on the new plane despite a recent report listing 13 serious design flaws. The total cost to buy and fly the full fleet of F-35s over 50 years is estimated at around $1 trillion, once inflation is factored in, making it the costliest defense program in human history.


    In fairness, it’s not unknown for capability standards, also known as “Key Performance Parameters,†to shift during a weapon’s development. But the shifts usually reflect the evolving needs of the military or some change in the operational environment, such as a likely enemy tweaking its own defense plans. In this case, the JROC gave the F-35 a pass that was apparently designed so the over-weight, over-budget, long-delayed stealth fighter could avoid yet another embarrassing scandal.

    Citing earlier efforts to boost the Joint Strike Fighter’s image, defense analyst Winslow Wheeler accused the Pentagon of “putting lipstick on the pig.†That’s an apt characterization of recent moves by the Pentagon’s F-35 boosters.

    Last month, the Marine Corps held a lavish ceremony marking the arrival of two F-35 training models at the main Joint Strike Fighter “schoolhouse†in Florida. “It’s a significant jump in technology,†said Marine Lt. Col. David Berke, who neglected to mention that the training jets were not even cleared to fly locally. That clearance came a couple of weeks later, but again with an asterisk: Only specially qualified test pilots would be permitted to fly the jets, for now.

    Increasingly, it seems the F-35 only passes tests when the tests are rigged. The good news for the fighter program typically comes with buried caveats. In response to Wheeler’s criticism, Stephen O’Bryan, then a vice president for stealth-fighter contractor Lockheed Martin, insisted that “the F-35 is meeting or exceeding every single one of the Key Performance Parameters that the services have mandated.†Of course, it’s easy to ace a test when the teacher’s already decided you passed.

    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------

    So, forget all the bullshit about F-35 "meeting performance goals". IT IS NOT!
  6. Picard
    Online

    Picard ELITE MEMBER

    On F-35 export "success"

    (from my blog)

    I have often seen F-35′s export successes being used as a proof of aircraft’s quality. Is it really so? I decided to check situation.

    It is known that United States have often used diplomatic pressure – even threats of military invasion – to secure arms contracts. That also seems to be case here. And it is not only a matter of US politicians and generals – who themselves are often led by political concerns – praising F-35.

    US State Department memos have revealed that Norway has been persuaded through diplomatic channels to buy F-35. In 2010, Canada has announced decision to buy 65 F-35s for 9 billion USD. In fact, influence of Military-Industrial Complex in United States are such that US embassies lobby for F-35.

    In Norway’s case, diplomatic notes have been revealed (excerpts brought by therecord.com):
    “We needed to avoid any appearance of undue pressuring … but we couldn’t let stand the view that the choice didn’t matter for the relationship,â€
    While public US position was that buying F-35 would “maximise†Norway’s relations with United States
    “In private, we were much more forceful,â€
    When F-35s sale to Norway was in danger of being cancelled, US diplomats in Norway have warned that
    “High-level Washington advocacy on this issue is needed to help reverse this trend,â€

    On September 22, 2008, US Embassy in Norway has asked United States to warn Norway that future US-Norway relations may be harmed if Norway does not select F-35.

    After winning Norwegian deal, same memo has praised US diplomatic involvement.

    While official Canadian position was that F-35 has been chosen due to its capabilities, that must be brought into question, since after Norwegian success, United States have compiled a list of lessons that can be used to help secure future F-35 exports:
     active involvement of local US embassy, including Ambassador
     co-ordinating sales strategy with Lockheed Martin
     creating opportunities to praise aircraft – meetings by people of importance, often on lunches organized by US Embassy in respective country.

    Even more damning, US diplomat – Kevin Johnson – who pushed F-35 on Norway is now based in Canada. His name also appears on document which lists lessons mentioned in paragraph above. In the same document, it was noted that SAAB has offered superior benefits for Norwegian industry compared to F-35, and price tag half of F-35s. Moreover, Gripen was also far better choice politically, playing on card of Norwegian neutrality and being a national corporation based in Norway’s neighbour, Sweden. Explaining decision, Norway has scorned Gripen’s performance, something never done by, and in opposing experiences of, other operators of the aircraft.

    Later, it has been revealed that pressure has also been made by delaying export lincense for Gripen’s radar until after Norwegian decision.

    Canadian politicians have engaged themselves in promoting the F-35. Canadian Department of National Defense has spent over 130 000 USD on tour designed to improve F-35s public image, and Industry Canada additional 55 000. (figures for 2011). There have also been visits by US politicians, as well as attempts to influence public opinion by articles – one, “The truth about those jetsâ€, being written by retired General Paul Manson – also an ex-president of Lockheed Martin Canada. Canadian decision was, officially, based on competition held between 1997 and 2001. While it is true, competition in question was US 2001 competition which determined company to build F-35s. F-35 was also chosen before Canadian military has defined its requirements.

    Many Canadian officials responsible for Canada’s decision to join Joint Strike Fighter programme are now lobbysts for Lockheed Martin. Also, over 70 Canadian firms have contracts signed with Lockheed Martin – and Lockheed Martin has said that it will not deal with these firms in future unless Canada buys F-35.

    Canada needs to replace F-18s by 2016, yet F-35 will only be finishing its development phase that year.

    Japan and Korea, meanwhile, have very strong political and military ties to the United States, and depend on US support in case of invasion by China. Korea has also been subject to pressure by United States: its request for upgrading F-16s radar has been denied.

    While Korea has budgeted 120 million USD per aircraft, Air Force version of F-35 now costs at least 199 million USD in flyaway cost; cost difference will be covered by US taxpayers, and later presumably paid by increased maintenance costs.

    Japan, meanwhile, has selected F-35 despite Eurofighter offering far better terms – 95 % of work was to be done in Japan, compared to 20 % for Lockheed Martin’s F-35 and 80 % for Boeing’s Super Hornet.

    Wikileaks documents have shown that pressure by US diplomacy was important in securing F-35 deals in Turkey and Italy.

    That hardly reveales decisions brought purely on basis of military concerns. Actually, since all F-35s export customers have close ties to United States (especially Israel), and many are not likely to see any situation where they might need it, not a single F-35 export order was made on basis of performance.

    However, even traditional US allies – such as Japan and Korea – are saying that they might cancel F-35 order if costs rise further. F-35′s export costs are, as seen before, actually already below its actual flyaway cost, with difference being covered by US taxpayers. Even then, cost might turn out to be too high for Korea. Canada and Netherlands are also thinking about cancelling F-35 buys, and UK is looking at Naval Typhoon for their carrier, an aircraft that will be superior to F-35 by all possible measures.

    As for F-35′s performance, it is nothing to praise. It is large, heavy, has high wing loading and low thrust-to-weight ratio – and that despite its huge engine. A such, it is sluggish in both turn and acceleration, and very easily spotted by modern-day IRSTs such as PIRATE, at distances of 100 kilometers or larger – even from front, where its IR signature will be smallest.

    Decade into programme, only 21 percent of developmental testing has been completed – and even in full testing plan, many factors will remain untested. Ben Freeman has rightly called the Joint Strike Fighter programme a “phenomenal idiocyâ€. Even now, F-35s built are basically prototypes. Only 4 % of systems required to run airplane are a final version; and depending on wether F-35′s issues with helmet mounted display are solved, and what is causing them, it might end up without high off-bore capability; a sitting duck for almost any other fighter out there.

    Low cost promise – an utter oxymoron when it comes to stealth aircraft – has relied on large US orders. United States, however, will be forced to reduce their order due to mounting costs. If US reduce quantity substantially – they already have and they will reduce it even more in future – per-aircraft costs are going to increase, calling in question export orders.

    Only good thing for the West that may have come from programme is that Typhoons and Rafales will have easy time dealing with at least some Chinese aircraft, as Chinese stealth fighters will have similar problems as US stealth aircraft: large size, high weight, high cost and low sortie rate, as well as limited payload.

    It isn’t just F-35 exports that are being pushed via threats. In 2003, Poland chose US F-16 deal over Eurofighter and BAE bids due to US threats of blocking Poland’s participation in NATO, EU and its relations with US.

    Reasons for situation described above are multifold. First, large F-35 exports will harm competition, particularly European firms (Eurofighter, Dassault, SAAB) which are offering cheaper and more capable aircraft. Second is, as already explained, long-term profit; while F-35 sales will cause a short-term losses to US (but not to Lockheed Martin) due to US Government subsidizing cost difference, in long term it will provide profits – United States are unwilling to share detailed knowledge of the system required for maintaining it, which means that aircraft have to be shipped to United States for upgrades and maintenance.
    2 people like this.
  7. Skull and Bones
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    Skull and Bones ADMINISTRATOR Staff Member

    Re: On F-35 export "success"

    5-6 years down the line, IN may look forward to buy 30-40 F-35Bs for LHDs.
  8. Marqueur
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    Marqueur Mod Staff Member

    Country Flag:
    India
    Re: On F-35 export "success"

    5-6 yrs down the line ... we should develop tech to shoot down f35's ... that will be cheaper ...

    :artillery::artillery::artillery:
    4 people like this.
  9. Vik
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    Vik REGISTERED

    Re: On F-35 export "success"

    Indian navy will never look forward to acquire F 35 because of the following reasons:-

    1. Thrust to weight ratio of F-35 is 0.87 for air force version and probably be close to 0.82 for naval version which is way to less.

    2. F-35's maneuverability is far less compared to other fighters available.

    3. Naval version of F-35 will cost more than $ 250 mn per aircraft.

    4. F-35 if ever, will be operated from IAC-2, which will not get completed before 2027-2028, and by that time our own N-AMCA will also be available.

    5. And most importantly, there is a design flaw in F-35 because of which it fails to land on AC as cable wire fail to get attached to the aircraft and which need major modification in structure which will only escalate the price further and the resultant will be a compromise on it's stealth feature.
    2 people like this.
  10. Marqueur
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    Marqueur Mod Staff Member

    Country Flag:
    India
    Re: On F-35 export "success"


    Case Closed :LMAO: ... we r not buying F35's of any type ...
  11. Skull and Bones
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    Skull and Bones ADMINISTRATOR Staff Member

    Re: On F-35 export "success"

    IN has valid reasons to go for F-35s are as follows.

    1. To get significant know how of superior American stealth technology, which can't be provided by Russia.

    2. LHDs with helicopter lacks the area of influence, with a VTOL aircraft this range can be increased significantly. After Harriers, F-35s are the only VTOL aircraft for sale.

    3. I'm advocating F-35s not for air warfare, but for SEAD and Strike role, which naval helicopters lacks.

    4. 5-6 years later, production model will cost much less than this predictive pricing. Even our $140 million for Rafale isn't justified.

    5. Read my statement carefully, i said LHDs, with length ranging from 200m for Mistral to 240 for Spanish Juan Carlos, no conventional aircraft can operate within that range other than F-35s.
  12. Skull and Bones
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    Skull and Bones ADMINISTRATOR Staff Member

    Re: On F-35 export "success"

    Stealth is offensive technology, stealth killing technologies are on the defensive. It's upto you, you want to be on the offensive or defensive side.
  13. Firemaster
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    Firemaster STAR MEMBER

    Re: On F-35 export "success"

    IMO Few squadrons of F-18SH alongwith a handful of growlers would be better for IN than costly F-35.
  14. Skull and Bones
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    Skull and Bones ADMINISTRATOR Staff Member

    Re: On F-35 export "success"

    I was talking about LHDs you trolls. :fuu:

    For conventional carriers, IN should look no further than Mig-29K and Rafale M.
  15. WMD
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    WMD SENIOR MEMBER

    Re: On F-35 export "success"


    does the IN has any plan to acquire LHDs?

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