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Radar & Defence: the cat-and-mouse game.

Discussion in 'Tactical Hardware' started by nair, Aug 1, 2017.

  1. nair

    nair Die hard Romeo IDF NewBie

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    An interesting Read.... Thanks @Hellfire

    Radar & Defence: the cat-and-mouse game.

    E
    lectronic countermeasures and counter-countermeasures maintain their quick evolution, as electronic warfare, optical warfare, and cyber warfare blend into a new discipline called spectrum warfare. Since the introduction of stealth during the Gulf war, new counter stealth technologies have been designed involving multiple radars and very long over the horizon (OTH) radar antennas working in different wavelength, and combining active and passive detection systems, creating a sensor fusion of multiple data (different sensors detect and track the same target, the track and identification data are merged automatically) which targets stealth platforms. New processing technologies include “multiple hypothesis” tracking in which weak returns are analyzed over time and either declared as tracks or discarded based on their behavior.

    New digital adaptive cognitive electronic warfare (EW) system technologies use machine-learning algorithms to protect aircrafts against communications jammers, by measuring a variety of data — the power level, frequency and bandwidth of radio signals; and adopt different never-before-seen frequencies, signal characteristics and waveform to avoid being jammed. Essentially, the military’s approach has been to study enemy systems for vulnerabilities, figure out ways of disrupting them and then building a “playbook” filled with different EW tactics.

    NATO intelligence specialists discovered that the Russian warplanes were using stealth technique they had used before. This involved having warplanes with their transponders turned off fly close to a larger transport that kept its transponder on. By flying close to the transport the usual air traffic control radar would not show enough detail to reveal several aircraft but because the radar could see that something was there and there was a transponder signal coming from that blip on the screen all that was recorded was one transport.

    The bulk of Western IRST experience is held by Selex-ES, which is the lead contractor on the Typhoon’s Pirate IRST and the supplier of the Skyward-G for Gripen. In the past year, Selex has claimed openly that its IRSTs have been able to detect and track low-RCS targets at subsonic speeds, due to skin friction, heat radiating through the skin from the engine, and the exhaust plume. The U.S. Navy’s Greenert underscored this point in Washington in early February, saying that “if something moves fast through the air, disrupts molecules and puts out heat . . . it’s going to be detectable.”

    IR has limited range, the fact is that for a solid lock a lot goes on within the processing unit of a radar missile or IRST. For a valid lock on a target the signals need to be above the mean noise level, little irregularity between these signals and lots of strong pulsed returns for a solid lock. 'Noise' being applicable to back ground clutter for IR signals or radar. 200 miles out the background clutter spectrum may overwhelm the signals given off by the presence of a target. For a solid lock you need a constant, above the clutter rejection threshold, regular and strong signal or else the signal that you get off the target will be dismissed as noise into the clutter. A fighter 200 miles out will give a small return, the return would be irregular, could be below the noise level.

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    INDRA II 2D Doppler mobile surveillance Local Warning Radar (LOWARD)

    It is a variant of INDRA-I radar for ground controlled interception of targets for the Indian Air Force. Its a 2D mobile surveillance radar for low-level Air Defence Weapon Control System. The radar uses pulse compression for detection of low flying aircraft in heavy ground clutter with high range resolution and ECCM capabilities. Some of the main features are automated Track While Scan (TWS), integrated IFF and high scan rate for high speed target detection. The radar is produced by Bharat Electronics Limited and inducted into service. The INDRA-I was a landmark project for the DRDO, as it was the first large radar system designed by the organization and produced in number for the defence forces.


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    Nebo M (Mobile) Multiband AESAs with 3D capability radar system

    Radars are costly machines and have a maximum life limit and they require a high level of maintenance and overhauling. It is hence not so easy for them to be operational 24/7. In other words they have a relatively short Mean Times Between Failure (MTBF). A multi-static radar system can be much effective for situations which require more vigilance.

    Radar (Radio Detection and Ranging) systems involve devices or instruments that use radio waves to detect the position, speed, range, altitude, movement and direction of objects outside the visible range. Radar transmits electromagnetic signals in air at different wavelengths. The signals strike against any object in the path and get reflected. The receiver part of the radar listens to the reflected signals from which the distance, speed and other parameters pertaining to the object are estimated. Increasing the frequency of a wave decreases its wavelength (the distance between its peaks). The shorter the wavelength, the more detailed the return and the better the resolution.

    Volume search radars (VSRs) are long-range air search radars. There is a misconception that such systems are operated round-the-clock as a matter of course. In reality, this is rarely the case. Getting VSRs, especially the legacy systems presently in Indian Air Force (IAF) service, to operate continuously is not only very expensive, but also very challenging. They consume copious amounts of power: the normal operating power of the THD-1955, the primary VSR in Indian service, is 2 MW; its peak operating power is 20 MW. The fuel to operate the generators supplying electricity to VSRs and other supporting systems on the A&N Islands has to be shipped from the Indian mainland at great cost. Moreover, these radars have heavy mechanically scanned antennae. That involves moving parts. And moving parts -- especially those that operate under heavy loads for long durations -- tend to experience failure at a rate that is directly proportional to their operating hours. The wear-and-tear is only accelerated by the harsh environment these radars are exposed to -- wind storms, rain, salt spray, and so on. They require constant maintenance and a steady supply of spares to keep working as desired, both of which are always in short supply on a remote island chain.

    Coming to the allocation of equipment itself, it should be remembered that military assets are deployed on the basis of known/projected threat scenarios. Given limited budgets, it is impossible for defences to be strong everywhere. So military staffs have to allocate resources carefully, making defences strong in some sectors and leaving them relatively weak in others. For the A&N Command's given role, maintaining round-the-clock coverage would be overkill, and indicative of a more aggressive military posture in the region. On the other hand, intermittent radar coverage, combined with data from passive electronic sensors, satellite imagery, and naval vessels, would serve to build a reasonably complete picture of the threats and military deployments in the region while allowing the armed forces to maintain acceptable levels of training and readiness.

    These arguments would obviously lead one question the validity of this approach in a world where terrorists and non-state-actors pose a significant threat. It needs to be pointed out that such strikes are by nature highly unpredictable, completely unexpected, and often carried out where defences are the weakest. While counter-terrorism strategies are beyond the scope of this discussion, it is well understood that the path to reducing risk lies in improved intelligence gathering and analysis of available information.


    The discovery of reflection of radio waves from solid objects was studied by Heinrich Hertz in 1886; subsequently Huelsmeyer in 1904 was the first to patent a detector (“Telemobiloscope”) which could detect metallic objects at a distance using radio waves. In 1922, Taylor and Young showed that range and bearing of ships can be determined using radio waves even in low visibility and darkness, but the US Navy did not accept their novel idea. Many patents were granted and work carried out in secrecy in a number of countries during the ensuing period till in 1934 the British decided to use it very effectively to detect and thereafter shoot down hostile German aircraft by using prototype radar made by Watson Watts. Automatic tracking of aircraft in azimuth and bearing and subsequently in range was also accomplished during the WWII itself.

    Joe Rochefort, the unsung hero of the Battle of Midway, was able to crack the JN-25 code otherwise the Japanese Navy’s plan at Midway might very well have succeeded and Hawaii occupied by Japanese troops. The United States might have lost aircraft carriers Enterprise and Hornet in addition to Yorktown, instead of sinking Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, and Hiryu, turning the tide of the war in the Pacific. That one battle halted Japanese advances in the Pacific.

    Post WWII, a major improvement was to introduce moving target indicator (MTI) function by using Doppler Effect, by which it was possible to discriminate between a stationary and a moving target. This was followed by the phased array antenna technology, which involved dynamic beam forming by combined operation of a number of individual transmitting elements. Strides in digital signal processing led to development of the synthetic aperture radar and consequently to high-resolution imagery.
    India's Instrumentation Radar System (capable of measuring low RCS values) at the test range is co-developed by Bose Institute, Kolkata and Sikkim Manipal Institute of Technology (Rangpo), Sikkim.

    The Electronics and Radar Development Establishment (LRDE) was born as the Inspectorate of Scientific Stores at Rawalpindi, now in Pakistan, in 1939. It was moved to Dehradun in 1946, and renamed Technical Development Establishment (Instruments and Electronics). In 1958, the electronics activity was bifurcated into inspection and R&D. The Electronics Research & Development Establishment was formed in Bangalore. It moved to the present location in 1986.
    Higher frequency radars – on their own — can tell when a low observable or stealth aircraft is in its range but do not have the fidelity to lock weapons. Russia and China both are perfecting lower band radar that could successfully target low-observable aircraft working in conjunction with an HF early warning system. The radars could also provide information to Chinese fighters a general idea where to intercept.


    "By the late 1990s, the Defence Research & Development Organisation’s (DRDO) Hyderabad-based Defence R & D laboratory (DRDL), under the auspices of Project Sangraha, had succeeded in developing the Ajanta family of combined ESM/ELINT systems (comprising the Mk1, Mk2 and Mk3 variants), while the Bangalore-based Advanced Systems Integration and Evaluation Organisation (ASIEO) had developed a high-power radar reflector antenna designed specifically to jam the active radars of inbound anti-ship cruise missiles. Two such antennae are mounted port and starboard in the main mast just below the topmast-mounted Ajanta. When integrated with a bigger ECM system (housed inside the main mast) and offboard countermeasures dispensers like the Russia-supplied PK-10 or Elbit Systems’ Desceaver), the ECM section came to be known as Ellora. The twin high-power radar reflector antennae can be clearly seen on board the Project 15 Delhi-class guided-missile destroyer (DDG) just above the Orekh illuminating radars, and on the main masts of the Project 16A FFG (INS Betwa). The Project 25 and Project 25A guided-missile corvettes and all five Kashin II-class DDGs are equipped with the Ajanta ESM/ELINT intercept system integrated with PK-10 countermeasures dispensers and Nettuno ECM-4000 system, while each of the three Project 17 Shivalik-class FFGs and three Project 15A Kolkata-class DDGs will each have on board the Ajanta Mk3 ESM/ELINT section, while the ECM section will comprise the twin high-power radar reflector antennae, as well as Elettronica Spa’s planar phased-array ECM section. This section is also housed within the main masts of the three Project 15 DDGs" : Prasun K. Sengupta



    Check out the link..... It has few more topics.....




    http://356007295890291112.weebly.com/military-hardware-tech/radar-defence
     
    Last edited by a moderator: Aug 1, 2017
  2. nair

    nair Die hard Romeo IDF NewBie

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  3. Hellfire

    Hellfire Devil's Advocate THINKER

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    Integrated Air Defence System

    Some say that the development of modern anti-access, area denial threats make an amphibious assault impossible. That has been said before and it was not true then and it is not true now. The challenge is to leverage the asymmetric advantages we have in functions like ISR, precision-first, and sea-basing. The challenge is to use the sea as a maneuver space in the context of the modern threat. We don’t need to give up on the capability. We need to think our way through the challenge.” - Maj. Gen. Robert Walsh.

    Heliborne Early Warning radar & Beyond/Over-the-horizon radar (OTH or BTH)

    The origins of predilection for VHS band search and acquisition radars fall without doubt into the late 1940s, when Soviet designers gained access to a large volume of captured German equipment. There can be no doubt that this booty included components and complete systems, including the VHF band GEMA Wasserman and GEMA Mammut phased array equipment.

    Through the 1950s and 1960s Soviet industry developed and manufactured a wide range of VHF band radars. By far the most numerous were of the Knife Rest and Spoon Rest series, deployed to support Frontal Aviation fighters, and as acquisition radars for the early S-75 Dvina / SA-2 Guideline Surface to Air Missile (SAM) system. The first to be deployed in strength were the P-8 Delfin / Knife Rest A and P-10 Knife Rest B, 2D radars using a now characteristic antenna arrangement with two rows of multiple element VHF Yagi antennas, attached to a rotating horizontal boom. These were soon followed by the more capable 180 kiloWatt peak power class P-12 Yenisei / Spoon Rest A, with an array of 12 Yagis.

    Typically, however, those lower-frequency radars do not provide what Pentagon officials call a “weapons quality” track needed to guide a missile onto a target. “Even if you can see an LO [low observable] strike aircraft with ATC radar, you can’t kill it without a fire control system”. The problem with VHF and UHF band radars is that with long wavelengths come large radar resolution cells. That means that contacts are not tracked with the required level of fidelity to guide a weapon onto a target. These limitations can be overcome with signal processing. Phased array radars—particularly active electronically scanned arrays (AESA).

    Stealth and electronic attack always have a synergistic relationship because detection is about the signal-to-noise ratio. Low observables reduce the signal, while electronic attack increases the noise.

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    China's JY-26 Skywatch-U mobile 3D phased array VHF/UHF long-range air surveillance radar turns into a giant interferometer increasing the probability of detection of low-RCS targets up to 85 km. It may complement or compete with China's YLC-8B Passive Direction-Finding And Locating Radar.


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    Russia's new Voronezh early warning UHF radar will replace older radars like Dnepr and Daryal radars. It has a range of 4,200 kms and consumes less power and requires fewer personnel.

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    Russia Murmansk-BN mobile electronic warfare (EW) system


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    China JY-27A 'Wide Mat' 3D long-range surveillance radar is more advanced than that used 20 years.

    China's DWL002 is a development of the YLC-20 Passive Direction-Finding And Locating Radar, a product of inspiration from two other passive detection systems: one of them being the Czech VERA-E and the other is Ukrainian Kolchuga. Voice of Russia says that DWL-002 is an improved version of China's Type-26 and Type JY-27A radars (however, they are too big to be installed on AEW&C aircraft). China claims it has a new passive detection “radar” capable of identifying stealth aircraft, including the more advanced F-22 Raptor fighter based at Andersen Air Force Base on Guam.

    KRTP-91 Tamara-M (NATO name: Trash Can) was the third gen Czechoslovak electronic support measures (ESM) system that was used to accurately detect and track airborne emitters. It has been succeeded by the VERA family of sensors. In 2004, the US blocked the sale of the Czech VERA-E passive detection systems to China, but the “Chinese had an opportunity to closely inspect the systems.” When China could not buy the VERA-E, they bought Ukrainian Kolchuga passive surveillance system.

    China’s modern radars DWL002 uses paired primary wide band apparatus. Features such as heat absorbing surface materials, smooth surfaces and hidden engines render stealth aircraft like F-22 Raptor undetectable by conventional radar. However, China’s DWL002 passive radar system (which consists of three stations) reads the electronic signals emitted by aircraft to detect their presence. It can allegedly detect fighter aircraft (including stealth) within 400 km.
    China's Type 348 C-band multifunction Active Phased Array Radar with 4 antenna arrays

    China originally imported this Ukrainian and later started domestic production after Ukraine provided the technologies to China. They also provided technical expertise in integrating the active phased array radar with ESM and the anti-stealth radar with Yagi antenna.


    U.S. AN/FPS-132 UHF-band Solid-state Phased Array radar for Ballistic Missile Early Warning.
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    Cobra Dane AN/FPS-108

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    Cape Cod Air Force Station

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    Countries that integrate this three-tier system – SAMs covering higher altitudes, AAA protecting the lower altitudes and air defence fighters patrolling the space in between – can significantly increase the costs for attacking air forces. The US had developed counter-measures and tactics which can blunt the savage effect SAMs. These tactics survive to this day and play an important part in air power doctrine. Counter-air is an air operation of a tactical air command conducted to attain and maintain a desired degree of air superiority by the destruction and neutralization of enemy forces.

    Suppression of Air Defences (SEAD) operations are military actions which suppresses and then destroys enemy SAMs and AAA sites, along with other air assets, giving friendly forces complete airspace superiority. By the mid-1960s aircraft like the two-seater F-100F were fitted with radar homing systems, which could detect and hone in on the radar signals emitted from an IFC. This was borne out of a projects called 'Wild Weasel' and "Iron Hand" aimed at developing counter-SAM technology and doctrine. The AGM-88 HARM missile in the 1980s, which can hit targets even if its radar is shutdown. The US and other western countries also started to rely more on stand-off weapons like cruise missiles.

    The SA-6 mobile SAM system was used to protect Egypt’s ground forces while they retook the Sinai region from Israeli forces by shooting down many of Israel’s strike aircraft. The Israel suffered major losses to the new SA-6 missiles at the time, and only when Egypt’s army moved beyond the SA-6s protection zone did Israel regain an advantage in the conflict by using its air force. Fire control elements turn on radars at the last minute to achieve surprise and to avoid exposing themselves to enemy electronic or physical attack (including anti-radiation missiles). Operator training stresses electronic counter-countermeasure skills and the use of radio and electronic silence where possible.

    Learning from the experience with the SA-6, Israel’s conflict with Syria in 1982 lead to new techniques using miniature air-launched drones carrying powerful new electronic counter like jamming equipment is used to interfere with radar signals from SAM sites. Those drones would have to be combined with stealthy long-range missiles. Both Gulf Wars in 1991 and 2003 and air operations over the Balkans, shows how effective this strategy can be. In the recent Libya campaign, the US and its allies did not lose a single aircraft to enemy fire - despite the Gaddafi regime fielding effective SAM technology.

    http://356007295890291112.weebly.com/military-hardware-tech/radar-defence
     
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  4. Hellfire

    Hellfire Devil's Advocate THINKER

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    [​IMG]

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    The Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX-1) is a floating, self-propelled, mobile active electronically scanned array radar station designed to operate in high winds and heavy seas. Missile Defense Agency officials chose not to add multiple X-band radars on land and opted instead for a single, seaborne version. It is part of the U.S. Defense Department Ballistic Missile Defense System. The radar is mounted on a fifth generation CS-50 twin-hulled semi-submersible drilling rig.

    SBX met standards for commercial ships — but agency officials had failed to take into account the Coast Guard’s stricter standards for vessels destined for the kind of hazardous conditions found in the Aleutians.To meet the requirements, the missile agency had to spend tens of millions of dollars to fortify SBX against the sustained 30-foot swells and fierce gales common at its intended home port in Adak, Alaska, known as the “birthplace of the winds.”

    SBX was supposed to be operational by 2005. Although it can powerfully magnify distant objects, its field of vision is so narrow that it would be of little use against what experts consider the likeliest attack: a stream of missiles interspersed with decoys. Because of Earth’s curvature, SBX would not be able to see missiles more than about 2,500 miles unless the missile was 870 or more miles above. That is about 200 miles higher than the expected maximum altitude of a long-range missile headed for the U.S. The radar’s field of vision is extremely narrow: 25 degrees, compared with 90 to 120 degrees for conventional radars. In the event of an attack, land-based early warning radars could, in theory, identify a specific point in the sky for SBX to focus on. But aiming and re-aiming the giant radar’s beam is a cumbersome manual exercise. In combat conditions, SBX could not be relied on to adjust quickly enough to track a stream of separate missiles.

    Its sensitive instrumentation is prone to corrosion at sea, and it needs millions of dollars in fuel to operate for even short periods. The solution: To address this vulnerability, the U.S. had installed one land-based X-band radar in Japan in 2006, and a second was added in 2014. The two radars are well positioned to detect launches from North Korea. Yet both would lose track of U.S.-bound missiles after about 930 miles because of Earth’s curvature. That to give rocket-interceptors enough time to knock out enemy missiles, U.S. radar would have to track the incoming weapons continuously after launch, “from cradle to grave.”

    The country’s defense against a massive missile strike by Russia or China still depends on deterrence: the Cold War notion that neither nuclear power would attack the U.S. for fear of a devastating response. GMD is intended to protect against a limited attack by a less-imposing adversary, such as North Korea or Iran, by destroying enemy warheads in flight, a supreme technical challenge.


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    Denmark's TERMA Scanter 6000 combined S band & X band coastal surveillance radar

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    Upgraded Indigenous Forward Observer Simulator (UIFOS)

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    coastal surveillance radar

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    The Kolchuga-M passive sensor is an ESM system developed from the KRTP-91 Tamara-M (NATO name: Trash Can), in the Soviet Union and manufactured in Ukraine. Frequently referred to as Kolchuga Radar, the system is not really a radar, but an ESM system comprising three or four receivers, deployed tens of kilometres apart, which detect and track aircraft by triangulation and multilateration of their RF emissions. Technically the power levels of these sources are likely to be so small, if at all, that there would be insufficient energy for Kolchuga to measure these effects at one site, let alone the two or more required for triangulation. They would also be almost impossible to distinguish for normal background RF noise and would not appear like the conventional emissions types Kolchuga is designed to receive and analyse.

    Iran has also bought the Ukrainian Kolchuga passive surveillance system.

    http://356007295890291112.weebly.com/military-hardware-tech/radar-defence
     
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  5. Hellfire

    Hellfire Devil's Advocate THINKER

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    History of Scud

    Project Devil was one of two early liquid-fueled missile projects developed by India, along with Project Valiant, in the 1970s. The goal of Project Devil was to reverse engineer the Soviet SA-2 Guideline missile.

    DLDR spent nearly half of the budget allocated on importing equipment and supplies; it also subcontracted some of its labor, hiring the Hindustan Aeronautics Limited and Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited to cast a 350 kg magnesium liquid-fuel engine frame and a solid-booster rocket respectively.

    Although discontinued in 1980 (after a review by ISRO) after achieving partial success (liquid propulsion was a failure), Project Devil components were subsequently modified and utilized as components in other systems and served as a precursors to the Prithvi missile developed in the 1980s.

    DRDL was successful in establishing a world class ecosystem in Hyderabad, for establishing research, development testing and manufacturing of various types of missile systems.
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    The successful launches of A-2 rockets shortly before Christmas 1934 became a vindication for Wernher von Braun and his rocketeers in Kummersdorf. Skeptics were shown that a liquid propellant rocket could fly far and high. Much more importantly for Von Braun's army sponsors, it was now clear that this novel technology could be used as a weapon of war, perhaps exceeding the capabilities of long-range artillery.

    At the time of the A-2 launches, a much more advanced rocket, the A-3, was already in advanced stage of design. However the development of the more powerful engine for the A-3 was beset by endless problems, which repeatedly delayed the project. The rocket's aerodynamic shape also went through three re-designs from July to September 1936, as wind tunnel tests revealed potential problems with its stability. Instead of a crude flywheel stabilization system, which kept the A-2 on course, the A-3 would sport a three-axis gyroscopic assembly, flight control jet rudders and rudder actuators.

    Original plans called for the A-3 to break the sound barrier, but ever-increasing mass of payloads pushed that task beyond reach. Only after the ill-fated A-3 launch campaign was over, were the rocket's gyroscopes ultimately suspected to be culprit. As it transpired, a number of associates to Johannes Boykow, late head of the gyroscope development team, had questioned some of his solutions previously. In the end, an entire new flight control system was proposed with an estimated development cycle of 18 months. To test the new control system and other advanced features, a new A-5 rocket was proposed, while, the designation A-4 remained reserved for a much larger rocket, which had been conceived before the A-3 started flying.


    The A-1 was the grandfather of most modern rockets. The engine, designed by Arthur Rudolph, used a pressure-fed propellant system burning alcohol and liquid oxygen, and produced 300 kgf of thrust for 16 seconds. Since the design was thought to be unstable, no further attempts were made, and efforts moved to the A2 design.


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    V-2 (Vergeltungswaffe or "retaliation weapon" 2) surrounded by not Germans, but Americans in this photo taken after the war. The liquid-propellant rocket was the world's first long-range combat-ballistic missile and first known human artifact to enter outer space.

    The Aggregate series was a set of rocket designs developed in 1933–1945 by a research program of Nazi Germany's army. Its greatest success was the Aggregat-4 (A4), more commonly known as the V-2. The German word Aggregat refers to a group of machines working together.he German word Aggregat refers to a group of machines working together.

    The V-2 was the most expensive development project of the Third Reich. Facing a worker shortage, the Nazis would turn to slave labor to continue production, mostly using prison camp inmates. It is estimated that 20,000 these slave laborers died in the production of the V-2.

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    Scud Evolution & Derivatives

    The Scud is a mobile, Russian-made, short-range, tactical ballistic surface-to-surface (hence the nomenclature abbreviation SS) missile system. The SCUD-series guided missiles are single-stage, short-range ballistic missiles using storable liquid propellants. The Scud is derived from the World War II-era German V-2 rocket. Unlike the FROG series of unguided missiles, the SCUDs have movable fins.

    The V-2 was the first ballistic missile used in warfare and a significant advancement in rocket technology. Also known as the A4, it was developed by Nazi Germany during World War II and used against the Allies, primarily as a terror weapon. Because it was so inaccurate (it could barely hit a city-size target). Adolf Hitler named it his "Vengeance Weapon 2"or "V-2" because it wreaked vengeance upon a helpless population. (The "Vengeance Weapon 1," or "V-1", was a cruise missile.)

    Despite its relative inaccuracy, the V-2 incorporated several major technological advances in rocketry. Its engine was 17 times more powerful than the largest rocket motor constructed up to that time; it flew at five times the speed of sound; and it could still fly relatively accurately to targets nearly 190 miles (306 kilometers) away.

    While the names of most ballistic missiles are obscure, the Scud has become almost a household name. The SS-1A 'Scud' was designed a short time after the end of World War II by captured German scientists and is based upon the Nazi V-2 rocket which was used against London in the second World War. In essence, the 'Scud' is the AK-47 of the missile world: reliable, simple and ubiquitous. The missile was produced in huge quantities and not even the Russians know exactly how many they built, let alone the number copied by foreign companies. Developed as a tactical ballistic missile by the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the SS-1 SCUD was exported to many other countries. Unlike the V-2, the Scud can be stored for years. It can be transported fully fuelled and set up and fired in 90 minutes.

    ("Mushak" short-range surface-to-surface primitive solid-fuel missile is comparable to the unguided Soviet Frog missile and to the Pakistani as Hatf 1 missile, which flies about 80 km. The first Mushak, also known as the Iran-130, was test-fired in early 1988, and was designed to fly to a maximum range of 130 km. By March 1988, five Mushak missiles had been fired at Iraq during the War of the Cities. And by August 1988, Tehran had test-fired a 160 km-range Mushak and announced that mass production would soon follow. Iran claimed that the Mushak was designed and produced without foreign support, but Chinese assistance was suspected.)

    The SS-1B or R-11 Zemlya (Scud A) was soon replaced with the SS-1C or R-17 Elbrus (Scud B), also designated R-300 during the 1970s. The new missile had the advantage of being compatible with MAZ-543 transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) and could thus be deployed into position quickly and covertly. The launch sequence for each SS-1 SCUB-B can be conducted onsite, but was usually done from a command vehicle from a different location. The SCUD-B can carry nuclear, chemical, conventional or fragmentation warheads. By 1965, the new 'Scud B' missile was operational in many European and Middle Eastern counties. SCUD-B replacement system was 9K714 Oka (SS-23 Spider). This system was phased out in compliance with the INF Treaty in the late 1980s.

    North Korea's Hwasong-5 was a derivative. North Korea obtained its first R-17 missiles from Egypt in 1979 or 1980, in return for assistance during the Yom Kippur War. Iran's ballistic missile program began during the Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988), when Iraq's air superiority prevented Iran from striking from ranges greater than 150km. In response, Iran acquired the Soviet R-17 (R-300; NATO: Scud-B) from Libya, resulting in the War of the Cities. The Shahab 1 (Meteor 1) is based off of the Hwasong-5 ‘Scud B’ platform. Since the late 1980s Tehran has actively sought to develop an indigenous missile program, relying heavily on missile components imported from North Korea in the 1980s and 1990s to establish this capability.

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    No-dong-A is a liquid-fuelled single-stage ballistic missile of North Korean origin. It was inducted into service as Hatf-V Ghauri-1 in 2003 under Pakistan's 47th Missile Group.

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    Shahab-3 / BM25 Musudan / Mirim / Hwasong-10 or No-dong-B (or Taepodong X, Rodong-B): It is a medium-range weapon derived from Russian submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) technology. North Koreans have modified or reverse engineered it using heavier but simpler materials. But most importantly, the missile itself has never been flown.

    It became apparent in 1994 that North Korea had not only received the technology transfer from the Makeyev OKB, of the former Soviet Union but had also received the blueprint for the volatile R-27 Zyb (NATO: SS-N-6 Serb or SS-NX-13). One possible source for North Korea’s submarine-launched missile program is China, given its habit of assisting North Korea to obtain earlier generation strategic weapons. (China had covertly provided missile assistance in the past to North Korea with the KN-08 long-range missile, specifically the transfer of Chinese-made transporter-erector launchers.)

    Russian officials, in talks with U.S. officials, denying any SS-N-6 missiles were sold to North Korea, claiming all were destroyed as part of the 1987 Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces treaty. On October 15, 1992, the Russian, Security Ministry's officers stopped 64 Russian missile specialists from Miass with their family members at Moscow's Sheremetyevo-2 airport where they were preparing to leave on a flight to North Korea. Again on November 5, 1992 the Russian, Security Ministry personnel stopped 60 Russian missile specialists 40 of which were missile specialist from Miass while the remaining 10-20 were nuclear specialists at Moscow's Sheremetyevo-2 airport where they were preparing to leave on a flight to North Korea. Yet again on December 8, 1992, 36 nuclear specialists were stopped by the Russian Security Ministry personnel. Ultimately at least 17-20 missile specialist and 9 nuclear specialists made it to North Korea via China and are believed to have remained there. It turned out that these technical personnel were from the Miass, V.P. Makayev OKB, the submarine-launched ballistic missile design bureau.

    North Korea has fielded a new intermediate-range ballistic missile with a range of 1,800 miles, according to South Korea’s Defense Ministry. It reportedly used Russian SS-N-6 submarine-launched ballistic missile technology for the mobile, land-based missile. It is believed to be liquid-fueled with one or two stages. Some reports say North Korea put the new missile on display during a 2007 military parade.

    North Korea has cooperated with Iran on submarine training. In November 2007, U.S. Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced that North Korea had sold Iran a missile with a range of 2,500 kilometers. This appeared to confirm earlier press reports that Iran had acquired the BM-25, a modified version of the Soviet SS-N-6, which is a single-stage, liquid-fueled, submarine-launched ballistic missile with a range of 2,400 to 3,000 km and the ability to carry a nuclear warhead.

    SCUD D: Single stage, liquid-fueled missile with a range of up to 500 miles. Known in North Korea by the name Hwasong, the SCUD B and SCUD C can reach only South Korea, but the SCUD D could target Japan. Accuracy is extremely poor. Ballistic missile programs in Pakistan and Iran were built on SCUD technology, which originated in the Soviet Union.

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    In October 2005, Russia launched Iran's first satellite, the Sina-1, on a Russian rocket. From that point, Iran began to pursue the technology needed to launch a satellite into space on its own. February 2008 saw the inauguration of an Iranian space center in Semnan Province, marked by the test launch of Iran's Kavoshgar 1 two-staged liquid-propellant-driven rocket, probably a derivative of the Shahab-3.


    SCUD-C or Rodong / Nodong: Nodong is almost identical to Iran’s Shahab-3 and Pakistan’s Ghauri II (Hatf VI), the strongest evidence of the countries’ collaboration and of North Korea’s sale of technology and missile equipment to others. All three countries continue to refine the design.

    They are single-stage, liquid-fuel missiles on mobile launchers. Estimated range of around 900 kms and maximum payload of 2,200 pounds. The Shahab-3, like the North Korean No-Dong missile from which it is derived, is a scaled-up version of the Scud B and Scud C missiles, and shares the Scud's weaknesses. Most have fairly poor accuracy, though some may have been fitted with warhead separation and more modern guidance systems. The Scud B is only accurate to within about a kilometer of its target at a range of 300 km. Japan is the likely target of this short-range missile.

    Out of Shahab-3 came the Ghadr (Qadr) -110 (“Ghadr” the Persian word for “Intensity”) whose range extends to 1,800-2,000 km. Ghadr’s are much easier to field than the liquid-fuel Shahabs. Iran claims that these variants have a greater range (up to 2,000 km) and throw weight (750 – 1,000 kg), as well as improved accuracy.


    http://356007295890291112.weebly.com/military-hardware-tech/radar-defence


     
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  6. Hellfire

    Hellfire Devil's Advocate THINKER

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    The U-2 incident of May 1960, in which an American CIA U-2 spy plane was shot down over the USSR, stunned the United States government. The incident showed that Russia had developed a surface-to-air missile that could reach aircraft above 60,000 feet.

    The U.S. Navy developed an anti-radiation missile (ARM) to counter Soviet-built surface-to-air missiles' radars. SAMs were ineffective against low-flying aircraft, and interceptor aircraft did not have as large a speed advantage at low-level. If they dared to switch on their radars and track U.S. aircraft, SAM operators ran the very real risk of having a Shrike or Standard ARM, not to mention cluster or iron bombs, crashing into their compounds.

    The US SEAD/DEAD campaign in Vietnam, what is abundantly clear is that the combination of jamming and lethal attacks against missile batteries and supporting radars worked. The Soviet reaction to the IADS debacle in Vietnam, and the not entirely convincing performance during the Yom Kippur conflict, and the subsequent Syrian debacle in 1982, was to develop a new generation of SAMs and radars, with more range, better jam resistance, and importantly much better mobility. The distinguishing features of this late Cold War generation of IADS systems were in very high mobility, all three of these systems being capable of firing five minutes after coming to a halt, and being capable of departing a location within 5 minutes of completing a missile engagement. The S-300PS/PM and S-300V both employed high power, and for that period, exceptionally long ranging phased array engagement radars, much more difficult to jam than the engagement radars in the SA-2, SA-3 and SA-6 deployed and used during the 1960s and 1970s, and much more difficult to target with anti-radiation missiles. Importantly, the SA-10, SA-11 and SA-12 employed radio frequency data-links, which allowed the battery command posts, engagement radars and missile launch vehicles considerable flexibility in how the battery was deployed geographically.

    Iraqi deployment doctrine of that period paid little attention to mobility, with SAM batteries nearly always fixed in location. The overwhelming and indeed crushing defeat of Saddam’s Soviet and French supplied IADS in 1991 was the result of a concentrated, coordinated and sustained effort using aerial decoys, SEAD/DEAD assets, jammers against IADS radars, and the F-117A against key hardened command posts. To achieve the intended effect against this legacy IADS, the US expended hundreds of drones, and importantly, around 2,000 AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles.

    The next significant air campaign was the 1999 Operation Allied Force effort against Serbia. The Serbian SAMs and radars were largely of the same vintage and subtypes, as those used by the Iraqis and Syrians but disciplined “shoot and scoot” tactics by the Serbian defenders, intended to keep missile batteries alive, resulted in a persistent threat of sniping attacks which kept much of the NATO force of F-16CJs, EA-6Bs and Tornado ECRs occupied chasing SAM systems, largely to no avail. The Serbians did execute one particularly successful ambush, killing an F-117A stealth fighter using a legacy SA-3 missile battery. NATO forces launched 743 AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missile rounds for very little damage effect – around one third of the number used to cripple Iraq’s much larger air defence system in 1991.

    A single SA-3 battery, commanded by then LtCol Zoltan Dani, downed an F-117A and an F-16C, and damaged another F-117A. Prior to the conflict, Dani worked his crew for weeks in the simulator, driving up proficiency and crew teamwork. During the conflict, he relocated his battery as frequently as possible, and exercised strict emission control. His battery survived and inflicted the single most embarrassing combat loss the US has suffered for decades.

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    F-4C Wild Weasel IV, the SAM hunter-killer using anti-radiation missiles

    While Russian SAMs did not perform well either in the Bekaa Valley air battles of 1982 or the Libyan air strikes of 1986, the USSR has confronted its difficulties with a proven strategy of vastly increasing concentration and reducing critical maintenance difficulties. Alternate firing positions, defensive ambush attacks, regular repositioning of mobile SAMs to confuse enemy intelligence, emission control and the clever emplacement of decoy SAM sites are fundamental considerations for the effective deployment and survivability of ground-based air defences.

    All recent Russian & Chinese SAM systems are mobile. It can “shoot and scoot” in 5 minutes and can redeploy inside 15 minutes. Their engagement and acquisition radars are automatic pseudorandom frequency hoppers, many in fact “fast” frequency hoppers with pulse-to-pulse hopping capability to resist jamming. If some of the emitters are destroyed by the ARM, the system’s adaptive algorithms make the changes needed to allow the remaining emitters to continue protecting the radar.

    The preference for L-band and VHF-band (lower bands) is intended to defeat stealth shaping and coatings optimised for S-band and X-band threats, but also electronic warfare self protection systems most of which cannot jam below the S-band due to antenna size limitations. VHF radar can't do fire-control, but they can see you. With low-frequency radars, they can tell which way to look.

    Phased Array Antenna Technology (AESA) provide agile beam steering, adaptive jammer nulling, adaptive allocation of transmit power, in addition to very low sidelobe emissions to frustrate emitter locating systems and anti-radiation missile seekers. They also permit high update rate angle and range tracking of multiple targets.

    Non Cooperative Target Recognition (NCTR) & Space Time Adaptive Processing (STAP) techniques based on target return fine structure are now appearing in Russian radar designs. Track fusion algorithms, which are the basis of the US Navy Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) system, are now available in at least one Russian design, the Salyut Poima E .

    Countermeasures suites on SAM systems include Radio frequency emitting and visual decoys, smoke generator to defeat laser and television guided smart weapons, flare dispenser to defeat infra-red and imaging infra-red guided smart weapons, and a chaff dispenser.

    Low Probability of Intercept (LPI) techniques involve the use of exceptional frequency agility, noise-like waveforms, and controlled emission patterns, to make the interception of radar or data-link transmissions exceptionally difficult.

    With the exception of a handful of technologies, such as advanced low observables, high density chip design, and X-band active phased array (AESA) modules, Russian industry has closed the gap in most key areas of IADS related technology.

    Greater power requires a larger radar antenna and/or a more powerful transmitter, but up goes the size, weight and cost of the radar, and down goes its transportability. Unfortunately, it you are going for a vehicle-mounted surveillance radar, you are inevitable facing the opposite trend – the need for a smaller antenna and limitations in transmitter power. High speed missiles close the distance significantly. Stealth aircrafts further reduces the coverage of each radar, creating large gaps within enemy airspace through which the attacker can fly with impunity. Advanced ARMs combine a passive anti-radiation homing head with a second channel able to lock & “remember” the threat emitter, even after the latter has shut down or loiter over the battlefield as anti-radar drones. Airborne laser targeting is another example.


    [​IMG]

    AGM-88 HARM anti-radiation missiles are used against SAM to clear a path for a strike force. The AGM-88E was developed jointly by U.S. and Italian firms. The original 1960s anti-radiation missile (ARM) quickly evolved into the HARM. Currently, AGM-88E/Fs are used by the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps, Italy, and Germany.

    BAe-Matra's Armat (enhanced AS-37 MArTel) is a heavy anti-radiation missile which carries a large warhead is used by the Indian Air Force. It was built in the 1980s and was to be carried by the F/RF-111C, the F/A-18 and the P-3C but the UK deployed it on the Buccaneer S.2B, primarily as maritime anti-ship weapons. The French deployed only the AS-37 MArTel missiles on the Mirage and on the Jaguar.

    With its high launch weight, heavyweight warhead and long range, the Armat is primarily an offensive strategic ARM designed to destroy Early Warning and Ground Control Intercept radars. This is where it differs fundamentally from the HARM and the ALARM, which are built to also perform as defensive ARMs carried as part of a mixed weapon load.

    The Indian Air Force wants the AGM-88E which weighs 361 kg (794 pounds) and can detect and attack targets more than 150 kilometers away while travelling at a speed of 2,450 kilometers per hour.

    http://356007295890291112.weebly.com/military-hardware-tech/radar-defence
     
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  7. Hellfire

    Hellfire Devil's Advocate THINKER

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    [​IMG]

    China's ground launched CH-10 / CJ-10 Long Sword (CJ stands for Changjian, literally means "long-sword") land attack cruise missiles is a strategic cruise missile modelled on the United States BGM-109G GLCM and Soviet RK-55 Relief, the latter both scrapped under treaty obligations. The CJ-10 was initially identified as the DH-10.

    KH-55SM Granat also known as RKV-500A and RKV-500B (NATO name: AS-15A & AS-15B Kent) air-launched strategic cruise missile. The Kh-55 family of cruise missiles owes its origins to a series of internal studies at the Raduga OKB during the early 1970s. Raduga’s early work on these weapons was opposed by many Russian experts who were deeply sceptical of the viability of such a complex new weapon, but this changed as public knowledge of the US Air Launched Cruise Missile program became better known in the Soviet Union. The cancellation of the ambitious Kh-90 ramjet missile due to INF treaty in 1987 led to a renewed emphasis on improving the accuracy of the Kh-55. The X-55SM modification provided for increased range with the installation of expendable conformal external fuel tanks, giving it an estimated range of 3,000 kilometers (1,860 miles).

    The Kh-55 family of weapons most closely resemble the early US BGM-109 Tomahawk in concept. The most visible difference between the Tomahawk and Kh-55 families of missiles is the engine installation.

    Unlike contemporary US weapons which use complex anti-tamper techniques in the software and integrated hardware, the Kh-55 predates this model by a generation. As such the electronics in the guidance system can be readily reversed engineered using commercial components, and the structure and engine use commodity materials technologies. The only components in the design which could present difficulties for a new player are the engine turbine and combustors. It is powered by a single 400 kgf Ukrainian-made, Motor Sich JSC R95-300 turbofan engine, with pop-out wings for cruising efficiency. It can be launched from both high and low altitudes, and flies at subsonic speeds at low levels. Current-production versions are equipped with the increased power of 450 kgf Russian-made NPO Saturn TRDD-50A engine.

    A 1995 Russian document suggested a complete production facility had been transferred to Shanghai, for the development of a nuclear-armed cruise missile. At the end of 1999 there were 575 cruise missiles of air basing X-55 and X-55SM delivered from Ukraine to Russia by rail transport on account of liquidation of debt for the deliveries of gas. China illegally acquired six Kh-55SM missiles in April 2000, samples from the Ukraine, who then permit the development of a cloned variant. To date indigenous Chinese cruise missiles have not matched the range performance of the Kh-55 series.

    CH-10 / CJ-10 was developed from the X-600 subsonic cruise missile, the new design incorporates elements of the Soviet Kh-55 cruise missiles. China may also have acquired several American Tomahawk missiles from Pakistan and Afghanistan, after the missiles were fired in a failed attack on the Al Qaeda in 1998. The knowledge from these missiles may have been used in the CJ-10/YJ-62 project.

    Besides the land attack variant, a possible shore to ship variant has also been rumored to be in Chinese service. Many Taiwan and Hong Kong media sources believe that the weapon has been developed to counter the US Navy's Carrier battle groups, with the aim of a land-based carrier destruction capability.

    Iran's Soumar air-launched strategic cruise missile. DPRK acquiring cruise missile technology from Iran who got six Kh-55SM in June 2001 from Ukraine. Given the well documented earlier collaboration between Iran and the DPRK on IRBM development and production, an analogous play using reverse engineered Kh-55s is entirely credible. Also the entire Kh-55SM/Korshun smuggling operation (from late 1997 to August 2001) was bankrolled by Iran, Tehran in early 1998 staked its claim for leading the R&D effort aimed at producing the Korshun into a ground/sea-launched LACM with industrial help from China and Pakistan.

    The Kh-65 missile is a tactical modification of the strategic Kh-55. The reduced range is a product of compliance with the SALT-2 treaty. The Kh-65SE is a derivative of Kh-65 cruise missile intended as a long range, aircraft-launched, sea-skimming anti-ship missile. It features an active radar seeker added to the Kh-55 navigation system for the terminal phase of the flight engagement.

    The Kh-SD may be an improved version of the Kh-65 precision-attack cruise missile, which was promoted by the Russians in the early 1990s, along with a "Kh-65E" antiship variant. The Kh-SD is reportedly a smaller version of the Kh-101 but may have an active radar seeker. It is described as the short range tactical version of the Kh-101.

    36MT small-sized turbofan engine is designed for small, low-flying means, especially for anti-ship cruise missile. The engine was developed by NPO Saturn, using the experience of the previous project "Izdělije 36". The engine is similar to US F107-WR-400, and has about 20 to 30% higher thrust. Engine development began after the collapse of the USSR, where the manufacturer has hitherto used R95 engine remained outside Russia, with Ukraine.

    Structurally, the motor consists of a single-stage blower with wide blades, compressor, annular combustor, single-stage, single-stage low-pressure and high-pressure turbine, part of the engine there is a power generator 4 kW. The motor is controlled by an electro-hydraulic system. 36MT engine with low fuel consumption, resistance sucked dirt and adverse weather conditions, and the ability to self-destruction surge.


    http://356007295890291112.weebly.com/military-hardware-tech/radar-defence
     
  8. Hellfire

    Hellfire Devil's Advocate THINKER

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    [​IMG]
    Zhuk-AE FGA-35 radars modified with AESA


    [​IMG]
    L-band is for long-range air-search, S-band is for medium-range surface-search & X-band is for target engagement/target illumination.

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    Chinese fighter radars

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    X-band is for target engagement/target illumination.

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    S-Band 3DELRR solution (S-band is for medium-range surface-search)

    [​IMG]

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    Scalable Agile Beam Radar (SABR)

    [​IMG]


    [​IMG]
    SMART-L (L-band) is a naval long-range search 3D multi-beam radar from Thales Nederland, formerly Hollandse Signaalapparaten. (L-band is for long-range air-search)

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    Dual Band Radar (DBR) simultaneously operates over two frequency ranges (S-band and X-band), combines the functionality of the X-band AN/SPY-3 Multifunction Radar and the S-band Volume Surveillance Radar (VSR)

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    AN-SPY-6V radar

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    AN-SPY-6V ship radar

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    Type 346 phased-array radar developed by Ukraine for Type 052C Luyang-class Guided-Missile Destroyer

    [​IMG]

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    Atlas Elektronik's hull-mounted, cylindrical, medium-frequency, active sonar

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    Saab's CARABAS radar can penetrate densely forested or foliage areas and detect mines and Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) buried underground


    http://356007295890291112.weebly.com/military-hardware-tech/radar-defence
     
    Last edited: Aug 2, 2017
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  9. Hellfire

    Hellfire Devil's Advocate THINKER

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    Russian Mineral-ME Shipborne Surface Radar provides passive over-the-horizon detection of surface targets, intended for medium and large displacement surface fighting ships. This radar system has been selected to detect surface targets onboard Project 21956 Russian fourth generation destroyer.

    China's Type 517 radar for sea transmission signals is believed to be similar to the Russian P-8 Delfin / Knife Rest radar which China manufactures and deploys for the HQ-2 Surface to Air Missile (SAM) system complex. Some countries which deploy early versions of the V-75 SA-2 use the older ground-mounted P-8 Knife Rest radar series instead of the Spoon Rest series.

    The Type 517 radar is an VHF (A-band) air search radar widely deployed on PLA-N surface vessels with 4 antennas in two crossed-brace supported pairs, one above the other, mounted in pairs on each side of a single tubular support carried on the turning gear. These A-band radars have an operating range of about 150-200 km. It has an added Yagi-Uda "beam antenna" antenna, commonly known simply as a Yagi antenna, which is a directional antenna which achieves a very substantial increase in the antenna's directionality. China's Type 517M (successor to Type 517H long-range 2D air search radar) is a VHF search radar designed to detect and track stealth targets such as the US Air Force F/A-22A Raptor and the F-35 Lightning II. The Type 517M radar is based upon Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) technology and has been installed on the newer warships Type 052C and Type 052D destroyers. Seems like Chinese navy really likes the anti-stealth quality of this radar vs the possible benefits of a more modern volume search radar like S1850M.

    The antenna was invented in 1926 by Shintaro Uda of Tohoku Imperial University, Japan, with a lesser role played by his colleague Hidetsugu Yagi. This appears to have been due to Yagi filing a patent on the idea in Japan without Uda's name in it, and later transferring the patent to the Marconi Company in the UK. Yagi antennas were first widely used during World War II in radar systems by the British, US and Germans. After the war they saw extensive development as home television antennas.

    By the early 1960s the basic P-12 was replaced by the improved P-12M, followed by the P-12MP. Later variants such as the P-12MA and P-12NA introduced the characteristic two van arrangement, and included sidelobe cancellers to deal with clutter and US jamming equipment, a facility for strobed or short burst emissions to defeat US anti-radiation missiles, as well as a remote operator station allowing the radar crew to be located 1,500 ft from the radar head.

    By the late 1970s, Soviet air defence commanders sought a more capable mobile 2D VHF radar, and development of the 1L13 Nebo SV / Box Spring was initiated in 1981. The 1L13 Nebo SV / Box Spring was accepted into service in 1986, and widely deployed with Soviet PVO-SV, V-PVO and Frontal Aviation VVS units. The system can be deployed or stowed in 40 minutes. A separate IFF interrogator is carried by trailer, and linked to the 1L13 control van. Less known is the fact that the much larger 55Zh6UE Nebo U/UE 3D semi-mobile radar shares a large number of components with the 1L13 series, as both were designed concurrently.

    The Nebo SVU departs from the Nebo SV in many respects. It is a solid state phased array with electronic beamsteering in azimuth and elevation, it is considerably more accurate, it has much better mobility. It retains the VHF element design, but uses vertical polarisation. Deployed as a target acquisition radar for a modern SAM system like the S-300PMU1/2 / SA-20 Gargoyle or S-400 / SA-21 Growler it will significantly complicate engagement tactics for users of VLO/LO fighters, as it can not only deny surprise engagement of the missile battery, but it is accurate enough to provide midcourse guidance data for both Surface-Air Missile shots and Air-Air Missile shots.

    These lacked an integral height finding capability and relied wholly on integration with external, typically S-band, nodding heightfinders. Confronted with the shock of Saddam's air defence system being utterly impotent against the F-117A.

    The choice of vertical polarisation is unusual for a VHF design intended to track aerial targets, and is best explained by the dual role use of the radar for ballistic missile defence purposes, as the shape of ballistic missile targets presents a higher RCS in the vertical polarisation. Russian literature covering the 1L119 describes it as capable of detecting and tracking aircraft and ballistic missile class targets. For a VHF DMTI the issue is rejection of ground clutter, but also other unwanted effects such as Doppler shifted chaff and weather.

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