Dismiss Notice
Welcome to IDF- Indian Defence Forum , register for free to join this friendly community of defence enthusiastic from around the world. Make your opinion heard and appreciated.

Real face of Pakistan's Economy

Discussion in 'South Asia & SAARC' started by chachachoudhary, Oct 8, 2010.

Thread Status:
Not open for further replies.
  1. chachachoudhary

    chachachoudhary Captain SENIOR MEMBER

    Joined:
    Apr 14, 2010
    Messages:
    1,137
    Likes Received:
    460
    The Hindu : Opinion / Leader Page Articles : Military Inc. — it's big business in Pakistan

    Military Inc. — it's big business in Pakistan

    Nirupama Subramanian

    Pakistan's military has built up a huge commercial empire, which will only make it more difficult to dislodge from power.

    AS ELECTIONS in Pakistan draw closer, and the agitation over the removal of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhary widens, and talk of a deal between Benazir Bhutto and President Pervez Musharraf picks up, there is intense speculation about whether the General — who certainly wants another term in office — will shed his military uniform and go civilian.

    That he must step down as army chief if he wants to contest the presidential election for another term is one point on which the entire Opposition, including Ms. Bhutto, is united. The Opposition suspects that a continuing standoff between militant Islamists in an Islamabad mosque and the government has been orchestrated by the regime to convey to its western backers that Pakistan needs a ruler in uniform to keep extremist elements tamped down.

    General Musharraf may or may not make the transition to plain Mr. Musharraf. But a new book by a Pakistani writer argues that irrespective of whether it is a civilian or a general at the helm, so deep has the military sunk roots in the national economy, and so vast are its business dealings, that in order to protect this empire and its associated vested interests, the army, especially, will continue to have an important say in how Pakistan is run. Military Inc. — Inside Pakistan's Military Economy by Ayesha Siddiqa (Pluto Press, London; Oxford University Press, Pakistan) is a detailed exposition of the business and commercial empire run by the armed forces.

    The author is a well-known strategic affairs analyst. The central argument of her book is that `Milbus' (combining the words military and business) perpetuates the military's political predatory style. Its good health is dependent on the military's influence over state and society. In other words, profit is directly proportionate to power. And, that this is both a cause and effect of a non-democratic political system.

    Ms. Siddiqa defines `Milbus' as military capital used for the personal benefit of the military fraternity. It refers to all activities that transfer resources from the state to an individual or a group within the military. These activities do not figure in the defence budget nor are they subject to the normal accountability procedures of the state. They are either directly controlled by the military or enjoy its implicit or explicit patronage.

    The beneficiaries are primarily officers, both serving and retired, but the author says the `Milbus' harvest is reaped by a wider circle of civilian businessmen and politicians who have decided in their own interests to play the game. And in this, says Ms. Siddiqa, lies the key to Pakistan's story of repeated military rule. Civilian `clients' are bound in predatory partnerships with the military, in turn strengthening it institutionally and increasing its appetite for power and profit.

    In Pakistan, `Milbus' is present in all three sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, and services. And it operates at three levels: as an institution, through its subsidiaries, and through individuals.

    At the level of the institution, for instance, the military runs National Logistic Cell, the biggest freight transportation company in Pakistan. Its fleet of 1,689 vehicles is one of the largest in public sector transportation in Asia. The company is also engaged in construction of roads, bridges, and wheat storage facilities. The NLC is technically a department of the Ministry of Planning and Development but its ground operations are run by the army, and it is staffed by serving army officials. The net worth of NLC in 2000-01 was an estimated $68.35 million.

    Then there is the Frontier Works Organisation, established in 1966 to construct the 805 km Karakoram Highway. It is now the biggest contractor in the country for constructing roads and collecting tolls. Staffed by army engineers, it comes under the administrative control of the Ministry of Defence. There are also cooperatives that carry out small- and medium-sized profit making activities and are handled at the level of the military commands. The businesses range from bakeries to poultry farms and markets, commercial plazas and gas stations.

    Ms. Siddiqa says the operations of the `subsidiaries' are the most transparent part of `Milbus.' She includes in this category Fauji Foundation, which is the most well known, the Army Welfare Trust, the Air Force's Shaheen Foundation, and the Navy's Bahria Foundation. All are controlled by senior officials of the respective services or officials of the Defence Ministry.

    Between them, they run about 100 different projects, including heavy manufacturing industries such as cement and fertilizer. One project makes cereal. Some of the foundations are involved in education, insurance, banking, and information technology. These concerns get a head start with the military playing a key role in obtaining public sector business contracts and in helping them secure financial and other industrial inputs. Once they are set up, they advertise their links to the military to project themselves as more efficient than similar civilian-run concerns. The importance of this is nowhere more apparent than in the real estate development ventures of the foundations. The prices of land shoot up because people believe that a development backed by the military can never go wrong, nor will it ever fall foul of the government.

    The tri-service Fauji Foundation, with its 25 projects, has declared assets of $169 million. It employs 6,000-7,000 retired military personnel and is run by a governing board dominated by the army. The Army Welfare Trust began in 1971 with slightly over $12,000. Its specific purpose was to generate jobs for disabled soldiers, army widows, orphans. Today the Trust boasts of five financial sector companies listed on the Karachi Stock Exchange, out of a total of 41 projects. It has assets worth $62.1 million, and employs 5,000 ex-servicemen.

    At the level of the individual, the military provides several benefits to its personnel. The boys always find jobs after retirement. The Musharraf regime has placed between 4,000-5,000 military officers through a system of preferential appointments.

    There are other `invisible' benefits, such as using contacts in the military to swing business opportunities. Defence contracts are the most common. Ms. Siddiqa cites the example of the former ISI boss Lt. Gen Hamid Gul's daughter running a private bus company, which was able to get preferential access to bus routes between Islamabad and Rawalpindi.

    But the biggest and the most visible perk is the rural and urban land given out to serving and retired officers. They also get subsidies and other benefits to develop the land. The estimated worth of the legally acquired assets of Pakistan's generals, says Ms. Siddiqa, is in the range of $ 2.59 million-$ 6.9 million, based primarily on the value of rural and urban properties of these new land barons. The Pakistan military, as a single group, owns more land than any other institution or group, amounting to about 12 per cent of total state land. And unlike other state institutions, the military can convert this land for private usage.

    Of the 11.58 million acres of land under its control, more than half is owned by individual members of the armed forces, mainly officers. Ms. Siddiqa argues that the "monopolisation" of land by the armed forces is aimed not just at increasing the financial worth of individuals or groups within the army, but also to increase its social and political worth. "The military owes it authority to change the usage of land to its phenomenal political clout. The land redistribution policy has an impact on the relationship between the powerful ruling elite in the country — of which the military is a part — and the masses."

    The military describes its commercial empire as "welfare" activities but the book questions this by pointing out that the main beneficiary is the officer cadre. Moreover, this is a type of welfare in which the civilian world is unable to impose any limits. What the military wants it takes. And it justifies this in terms of its role as the saviour of the nation, positing an external threat from India so great that over the years, "national security has developed into a dogma at par with religious ideology."

    The external threat is also used to include internal security matters. With their eyes on getting elected, politicians are loathe to challenge this national security agenda. Through acts of both commission and omission, they acknowledge and further the special status on the armed forces, to the point where the military dominates over all other stakeholders, and has "become the state itself."

    The military cannot be dislodged from its pre-eminent position in the politics, economy, and society of Pakistan unless political parties re-imagine themselves dramatically. Many advocate the much talked about "deal" between Ms. Bhutto and President Musharraf as the best political arrangement for Pakistan — a marriage of convenience between an "enlightened" military ruler, and the leader of a secular, democratic party. But it is by no means a step towards the marginalisation of the military, even if President Musharraf steps down as army chief.

    For observers of the India-Pakistan peace process, the book resurrects an old question: if the external threat on Pakistan's eastern border is so necessary for the military to maintain its internal supremacy, which includes its political and economic domination, would it ever allow or enable fully normal relations with India?
     
  2. chachachoudhary

    chachachoudhary Captain SENIOR MEMBER

    Joined:
    Apr 14, 2010
    Messages:
    1,137
    Likes Received:
    460
    [​IMG]

    Economic Growth, Clad in Military Garb

    By STEPHEN KOTKIN
    Published: November 4, 2007

    PAKISTAN’S recently re-elected leader, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, has indicated that he might finally heed the calls for him to step down as head of the army. But even if the general becomes a civilian president, that will not take the uniform off Pakistan’s economy.
    Skip to next paragraph

    A strategic country with nuclear weapons and suicide bombers, Pakistan also merits attention for economic lessons. From 1950 to 2000, its per capita income tripled, making it something of a middle-income country. But social indicators like infant mortality and literacy remain at the world’s lower end. A few hundred intertwined families, many rooted in the military, maintain an anti-development chokehold on the country’s wealth and political system.

    “Why some militaries become key players in a country’s power politics is an issue that has puzzled many,” writes the Pakistani analyst Ayesha Siddiqa in “Military Inc.” (Pluto, $35). Her answer is that the brass is protecting its gold.

    A military industrial complex can form a part of a regular economy, as in the United States or Britain, she says, but in some places, like Indonesia or Pakistan, military business operates in the shadows, broadly distorting values. Ms. Siddiqa uses the term “Milbus” to refer to “military capital that is used for the personal benefit of the military fraternity, especially the officer cadre, but is neither recorded nor part of the defense budget.”

    Her book, while dense and full of jargon, offers a detailed and powerful case study of a global phenomenon: hollow economic growth.

    Ms. Siddiqa’s empirical riches on Milbus were not easy to come by. Some were extracted by Pakistan’s parliamentary opposition after 2002; some she culled from official reports. (President Musharraf, she writes, has disclosed more than $10 million in real estate assets.) She also conducted interviews and has relied on Pakistani journalists’ muckraking.

    Even if her “rough figure” for the overall scale of Milbus (about £10 billion, or $20.7 billion) and her accounts of specific examples prove in need of revision, Ms. Siddiqa has dared to illuminate Pakistan’s military as an oppressive holding company possessing not just security-related businesses, but also hotels, shopping malls, insurance companies, banks, farms and an airline.

    How did Pakistan’s armed forces end up dominating the economy? Awarding land grants to soldiers dates back to the aftermath of the 1857 mutiny against British colonial rule. After 1947, when Britain departed and Pakistan separated bloodily from India, the perceived external threat from India, and the dispute over the province of Kashmir (left unresolved by the British), kept the military front and center in Pakistan.

    Distrustful military men sought to ensure their institution’s financial autonomy, Ms. Siddiqa argues; then they sought direct control over policy making. In the bargain, they enriched themselves.

    Post-independence expansion of Milbus occurred most prominently via welfare foundations, under the guise of providing for the needs of the troops and their families, whether with bakeries or beauty parlors. In addition, land grants, pensions five times the civilian level and post-retirement jobs — “the most significant group involved in Milbus are retired personnel” — were designed to make service attractive. But Ms. Siddiqa writes that “out of the 46 housing schemes directly built by the armed forces, none is for ordinary soldiers.” Milbus acts like an upward funnel.

    Milbus justifies its commercial empire by disparaging civilians as incompetent and corrupt and insisting that the military alone promote national development. Just such a developmental apology for Pakistan’s military rule was echoed in American academic and policy circles throughout the cold war.

    To refute these claims, which endure among Pakistan’s officer corps, Ms. Siddiqa tallies the bailouts for military-run businesses. When Milbus earns profits, Ms. Siddiqa writes, they often derive from insider access to resources and contracts. A number of top military companies, she shows, were granted outright monopolies, which wiped out competitive civilian companies. Milbus displays all the inefficiencies of crony capitalism, worsened by the military hierarchy.

    Economic predation by the Pakistani military, she writes, finds an enabler in the nation’s alliance with Washington, lately in the name of the war on terror. But she directs her deepest ire at Pakistan’s civilian politicians, many of whom, she writes, have colluded in Milbus, profiting politically and commercially.

    She writes about what she views as appeasement of Milbus in actions of two rival civilian prime ministers. Later, they were exiled. One, Nawaz Sharif, was recently deported when he tried to return to Pakistan, and the other, Benazir Bhutto, was just allowed back in a tenuous deal.

    By way of possible remedy, Ms. Siddiqa calls for the unity of Pakistan’s opposition parties, long a chimerical pursuit, and for a mass mobilization to democratize the political system. In fact, she writes that the military might be viewed as Pakistan’s largest political party, an all-volunteer force recruited primarily from the lower middle class. And she also notes that in China from the late 1990s, it was not democratic mobilization, but the autocratic Communist Party leadership that compelled the Chinese military to divest much of its vast economic holdings.

    Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the leader of the Muslim League in British India, helped establish Pakistan as a separate state for Muslims (not an Islamic state). He insisted that “the future of our state will and must depend greatly on the type of education we give to our children.” He was right. But education in Pakistan turned out to be elitist to an extreme, and steeped in national security demonologies, which helped deliver the nation into military hands. The upshot has been not just political instability, but also economic growth without development.
     
  3. Zaki

    Zaki FULL MEMBER

    Joined:
    Oct 5, 2010
    Messages:
    67
    Likes Received:
    38
    lol this guy is still living in 2007 :rofl:

    Wake up Sir, its 08 October 2010 today

    General Parvez Musharraf is no longer re-elected once again.... he is already gone
     
  4. chachachoudhary

    chachachoudhary Captain SENIOR MEMBER

    Joined:
    Apr 14, 2010
    Messages:
    1,137
    Likes Received:
    460
    Does that change the facts? Prove it. Stop crying. Wait for many more facts. Coming soon......
     
  5. Zaki

    Zaki FULL MEMBER

    Joined:
    Oct 5, 2010
    Messages:
    67
    Likes Received:
    38
    Yes it does
    the source is outdated and there is nothing much we can talk about......whatever i read from both article was outdated and no need to be dragged again

    Oh yeah feel free to share anything you want...... but the sane person always check the date before posting :)

    Would you like if i start similar threads on Indian economy dating 2003 :rofl:
     
    1 person likes this.
  6. chachachoudhary

    chachachoudhary Captain SENIOR MEMBER

    Joined:
    Apr 14, 2010
    Messages:
    1,137
    Likes Received:
    460
    Pakistan is slowly drifting towards greater political and social fragmentation. Most threats to its future are internal because of the sharpening multiple faultlines, a weak and dispirited civilian leadership, an overconfident superior judiciary bent on establishing its superiority over the elected executive and legislature, and the threat of religious extremism and militancy. The society is more fragmented than ever before, and the economy is unable to internally develop enough resources to sustain the state system. If these trends continue, Pakistan may lose efficacy and become a non-performing state in most sectors of society. Today, with a population of some 180 million, Pakistan has a population with a median age of 18 years. Hence, it has some 90 million youth who need to be fed, educated, and given gainful employment lest it risks losing them to the lure of militancy that already exists in the country. This socio economic factor alone has the portents of generating enough centrifugal force for the society to disintegrate.

    Then there are the pressures of a growing demographic explosion threatening Pakistan’s struggle for its meager resources. According to one project report, another 80 million persons will be added to the urban rolls between 2005 and2030, a 140 per cent increase over the 2005 baseline. A fact that underscores various power centres developing around already overcrowded population centres.

    Resultantly, the Pakistan society appears to have collapsed down the middle by a disillusioned youth with a diabolic Political Islam being thrust upon them. These trends are indicative of growing incoherence, divisiveness and fragmentation in the society which threatens the prospects of democracy and political stability. Pakistan’s current security and political profile begs understanding and application of necessary corrections to its downward trajectory. It needs to learn to live in peace with itself and improve its relations with India and Afghanistan for its own good.

    The long conflict with India has achieved nothing beyond creating a militarised security state which uses force as its first resort. Attempts to resolve the Kashmir dispute militarily have bled the country and left it dependent on foreign aid. Pakistan must begin to redefine the Army’s role so that it is limited to defending the country’s frontiers.

    A serious discussion of what constitutes the basic security of Pakistan will also have to include a regional dimension—looking at the role of India in the region and Pakistan’s obsession with its neighbors viz Afghanistan and China. A Chinese assessment, shared by most analysts in India, is that as long Pakistan military remains focused and disciplined, Pakistan may continue to exist as a nation. And as long as this institution is there, Pakistan is a relatively low cost hedge for China against a rising India. A fact that Pakistan Army draws its strength from: to remain relevant against India at the peril of Pakistan’s fabric.

    Pakistan today needs independence from its feudal political structure, economic justice, a secular social contract, a viable education system, communication infrastructure and everything else that a society needs except terror and export of terror. This is a struggle that Pakistan needs to own and define. The future of militancy, sectarian violence and radical extremism will depend much on the government structures being able to define the problems it is up against, and the willingness to change these underlying problems. Geopolitically, USA, China and India will remain in their places to guard their own national interests in the long run. But in its quest to keep pace with Indian armed threat Pakistan has denied its minions the right to exist.

    Therefore, most important Pakistan needs to look inwards to stabilise the failing parameters of governance. The international community can only help to avoid Pakistan commit hara-kiri but if it insists – no one can help.


    Pakistan?s Viability ? The Bellagio Papers | iNewp.com
     
  7. chachachoudhary

    chachachoudhary Captain SENIOR MEMBER

    Joined:
    Apr 14, 2010
    Messages:
    1,137
    Likes Received:
    460
    Go ahead.:lol:
     
  8. chachachoudhary

    chachachoudhary Captain SENIOR MEMBER

    Joined:
    Apr 14, 2010
    Messages:
    1,137
    Likes Received:
    460
    Pakistan's terror economy---india's biggest headache

    Terror financing and counterfeit currency have been a constant headache for Indian security agencies. Vicky Nanjappa looks at the latest developments in India's fight against this 'dirty money'.

    India has decided to take the issue of money laundering in terror operations on a world stage and the latest inputs suggest that it has managed to piece together the size and scope of the menace.

    Investigations conducted by the Financial Wing of the Indian intelligence agencies show that nearly $24 billion (about Rs 110,400 crore) has made its way into the Indian market and this amount has been specifically used for terrorism. The number of illegal transactions, used to fund terror operations has gone up to nearly 6,000 in 2009-10, in comparison to 367 such instances between 2005 and 2007.

    A report that has been prepared to this effect has been handed over to the Financial Action Task Force (an inter-governmental body set up to combat money laundering and terrorist financing) on the recommendation of the United States of America, which had told India to work along with this wing in order to curb terror financing. India also saw the need to work alongside the FATF since terror financing is an international issue.

    However, the Intelligence Bureau, which has worked as per the directives of the finance ministry, has found that there are several high profile personalities are involved in this racket. They are mules who are being used to legalise the money trail. The IB also claimed to have seized Rs 150 crore in cash from a couple of people after they found out that these funds were to be used to finance terror activities in the country.

    The IB says that Mumbai blasts accused and fugitive gangster Dawood Ibrahim :mamba: continues to be the biggest financer of terror in India and the report submitted to the FATF mentions this. His network has being growing very rapidly and since the past few months, their transactions have gone up considerably, the IB pointed out.

    Counterfeiting used to be Dawood's main method to raise money for terror financing, but new security measures which have been put in place have thwarted this option. The IB believes that the D-gang are attempting to work around the new security pattern but haven't had much success.

    However, there has been a steady rise in the narcotics trade which itself amounts to billions of dollars. The D-Gang has struck a 60:40 deal with the ISI-sponsored groups in Pakistan. This would mean that the D-gang would have to part with 40 per cent of the income that it generates from the sale of narcotics, which the ISI then uses to finance terror.

    The IB said that a lot of work needed to be done to cut such financing at its source. "We are sure that a lot of this money is being pumped into the Indian market through film producers and businessmen. These persons hold the money for these terror groups, which is later picked up by the terrorist's point man," said an IB officer.

    The FATF report has plenty of references to Pakistan. The IB feels that the international community should pressure Pakistan to clean up this mess. "We can clean up our house, but to get something done in Pakistan, there has to be international intervention," said a source in the IB.

    The money is bought in to India through the UAE, Bangladesh Nepal, Malaysia, Thailand and Sri Lanka [ Images ]. The ISI has set up point men who collect the money in these countries and then deliver it into India. In India it usually lands up with respectable individuals who hold the money for a certain period of time, until they are instructed to hand it over.


    IB's terror financing report indicts Pakistan: Rediff.com India News
     
  9. prototype

    prototype Major SENIOR MEMBER

    Joined:
    May 31, 2010
    Messages:
    2,050
    Likes Received:
    300
    well nobody can deny that military means big business in Pakistan

    I remember sometime ago i read an article(dont remember the source)than Pakistani military controls of business around $ 20 billion both direct and indirect modelling it around the same way the Revolutionary guard's do,mixing the heady cocktail of power and money
     
  10. 4Aces

    4Aces Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

    Joined:
    Aug 25, 2010
    Messages:
    633
    Likes Received:
    178
    Most countries have an army, in Pakistan it is the army that has a country!

    Man alive, I'm so glad I don't live in Pakistan :)
     
    1 person likes this.
  11. True_Indian

    True_Indian 2nd Lieutant FULL MEMBER

    Joined:
    Sep 13, 2010
    Messages:
    396
    Likes Received:
    71
    that was a good statement..your own or borrowed ?
     
  12. Naren1987

    Naren1987 Captain SENIOR MEMBER

    Joined:
    May 30, 2010
    Messages:
    1,647
    Likes Received:
    273
    These 'NIGGERS' have a better literacy rate than ur country, a better HDI,
    Keep the fair skin of the raping and marauding central asian invaders.
     
  13. Long Live Pakistan

    Long Live Pakistan FULL MEMBER

    Joined:
    Oct 14, 2010
    Messages:
    4
    Likes Received:
    0
    again with barathi propaganda. with 1.5 billion people and a population that is more poor than all of africa's poor you have a better literacy rate?

    lets see here.

    A look at Pakistan’s current literacy rate | The Pakistani Spectator

    9 percent higher than Pakistan. Wow you people are so SMART.
     
  14. Naren1987

    Naren1987 Captain SENIOR MEMBER

    Joined:
    May 30, 2010
    Messages:
    1,647
    Likes Received:
    273
    It's 1.2 Billion, you should stop referring to Wiki Jihad as a credible source.
    The youth literacy,also check the youth literacy, it's a good 30 per cent better than yours.
     
  15. Guynextdoor

    Guynextdoor Lt. Colonel SENIOR MEMBER

    Joined:
    Aug 24, 2010
    Messages:
    4,855
    Likes Received:
    1,740
    Now I get it. You are MOIN ANSARI trolling around the internet under the name 'Long Live Pakistan'. GET OFF THE FORUM BALDY
     
Thread Status:
Not open for further replies.

Share This Page