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The Flying White Elephant

Discussion in 'The Americas' started by Picdelamirand-oil, Feb 13, 2013.

  1. BON PLAN

    BON PLAN Major SENIOR MEMBER

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    only 70 ? :fighting1:
     
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  2. BON PLAN

    BON PLAN Major SENIOR MEMBER

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    WHY STEALTH HAS NO REAL FUTUR

    http://www.opex360.com/2017/09/01/l...n-radar-capable-de-suivre-les-avions-furtifs/

    [​IMG]


    For the moment, the principle for detecting so-called stealth aircraft is based on the principle of "passive" radar, whose specificity, says Thales, who developed the MSPR (Muti-static Silent Primary Radar), is " it is content" to listen to the reflections of the radio or television waves (low frequency) on the objects using the very many existing sources, in particular radio transmitters with frequency modulation. "
    He adds: "Passive radar has the ability to detect stealth planes, designed to be invisible to conventional radars. Opportunity transmitters emit radio waves at low frequency and illuminate the targets in three dimensions. The probability of detection of a stealth aircraft using a passive radar thus becomes very important and thus constitutes a very efficient solution. "
     
  3. Averageamerican

    Averageamerican Colonel ELITE MEMBER

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    Passive detection may detect that there is something out there but it will never located it or much less direct a missile to its location. Also can be easily defeated by counter measures.

    Low-bandwidth radars are more effective at detecting stealth aircraft. These are typically used by ground installations and ships, but also found on specialized aerial platforms such as the E-2D. However, they come with a major limitation: they can reveal only the general location of a stealth fighter and are too imprecise to be used to target missiles—though they can indicate to an X-Band radar where to look.


    To recap: stealth technology is more effective at a distance. Although there are a number of methods to detect stealth fighters at long range, they generally don’t permit weapons to lock on to them.

    In return, nothing prevents the stealth aircraft from firing at its opponents.
     
    Last edited: Sep 4, 2017
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  4. Averageamerican

    Averageamerican Colonel ELITE MEMBER

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    [​IMG]



    Uncategorized February 7, 2016 David Axe 75

    F-155 F-2214 F-3530 John Stillion1
    The U.S. military is considering developing a so-called “arsenal plane” to accompany stealth fighters into combat, hauling large numbers of munitions in order to... [​IMG]
    The U.S. military is considering developing a so-called “arsenal plane” to accompany stealth fighters into combat, hauling large numbers of munitions in order to significantly boost the stealthy planes’ firepower.

    The arsenal-plane concept, announced by Defense Secretary Ashton Carter in a Feb. 2 speech previewing the Pentagon’s 2017 budget proposal, could help solve one of the U.S. military’s most intractable military problems — its lack of “magazine depth” compared to more numerous Chinese forces in various Pacific war scenarios.


    [​IMG]



    The arsenal plane, under development by the Defense Department’s new Strategic Capabilities Office, “takes one of our oldest aircraft platform and turns it into a flying launchpad for all sorts of different conventional payloads,” Carter said.

    “In practice, the arsenal plane will function as a very large airborne magazine, networked to fifth-generation aircraft that act as forward sensor and targeting nodes, essentially combining different systems already in our inventory to create whole new capabilities,” Carter continued.

    [​IMG][​IMG]A Pentagon official told Aviation Week that the Strategic Capabilities Office, a kind of incubator for new weapons ideas that Carter established in 2012 during his tenure as deputy defense secretary, is considering adapting the B-1 or the B-52 — or both — for the arsenal role. In the jet age, there have been many proposals to arm bombers with air-to-air weapons.

    Apparently startled by the findings, the Pentagon has moved to improve the magazine depth of its stealth fighters. Lockheed Martin is reportedly developing a smaller air-to-air missile that F-22s and F-35s could carry in greater numbers.




    The Air Force is reportedly interested in adopting the Boeing upgrade, and in the meantime has also developed a new datalink pod for the F-15 that allows the older fighter to receive targeting data from the F-22. In theory, non-stealthy F-15s could fly behind F-22s and F-35s during an air battle, firing missiles at targets that the stealth fighters detect while evading detection themselves.

    [​IMG]Above — B-1s. At top — a B-52. Air Force photos
    Carter’s arsenal-plane concept is consistent with years of study and technology-development pointing toward a two-tier air-combat force for the near future, one in which stealth fighters act as forward sensors, designating targets for non-stealthy aircraft — F-15s and bombers — carrying much larger payloads.

    Perhaps not coincidentally, both the B-52 and B-1 fleets are undergoing extensive upgrades that include new datalinks.

    To be clear, neither Carter nor Aviation Week‘s source specified whether the arsenal plane would carry air-to-air missiles. It’s possible the Pentagon is mostly interested in adding air-to-ground munitions to its stealth strike force.

    But technologically speaking, there’s no reason why the arsenal plane couldn’t add aerial firepower to America’s stealth fighter fleet. Right now the arsenal plane is just a concept, rather than a formal program with a budget line. But the need is obvious and the hardware already exists. With funding and official approval, in a few years’ time the F-22 and F-35 could fly into an air-to-air battle with heavily-armed bombers backing them
     
    Last edited: Sep 4, 2017
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  5. Averageamerican

    Averageamerican Colonel ELITE MEMBER

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    If I am not mistaken the US arsenal planes already exist the same modifications that were made to hold up to 212 GBU39 Glide bombs will also hold up to 212 AIM120X missiles.
     
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  6. Picdelamirand-oil

    Picdelamirand-oil Lt. Colonel MILITARY STRATEGIST

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    The U.S. Military's Biggest Secret Is Out: How to Kill an F-35
    [​IMG]
    Dave Majumdar
    June 14, 2017


    With a missile warhead large enough, the range resolution does not have to be precise. For example, the now antiquated S-75 Dvina—known in NATO parlance as the SA-2 Guideline—has a 440-pound warhead with a lethal radius of more than 100 feet. Thus, a notional twenty-microsecond compressed pulse with a range resolution of 150 feet should have the range resolution to get the warhead close enough—according to Pietrucha’s theory.

    The United States has poured ten of billions of dollars into developing fifth-generation stealth fighters such as the Lockheed Martin F-22 Raptor and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. However, relatively simple signal processing enhancements, combined with a missile with a large warhead and its own terminal guidance system, could potentially allow low-frequency radars and such weapons systems to target and fire on the latest generation U.S. aircraft.

    It is a well-known fact within Pentagon and industry circles that low-frequency radars operating in the VHF and UHF bands can detect and track low-observable aircraft. It has generally been held that such radars can’t guide a missile onto a target—i.e. generate a “weapons quality” track. But that is not exactly correct—there are ways to get around the problem according to some experts.

    Traditionally, guiding weapons with low frequency radars has been limited by two factors. One factor is the width of the radar beam, while the second is the width of the radar pulse—but both limitations can be overcome with signal processing.

    The width of the beam is directly related to the design of the antenna—which is necessarily large because of the low frequencies involved. Early low-frequency radars like the Soviet-built P-14 Tall King VHF-band radars was enormous in size and used a semi-parabolic shape to limit the width of the beam. Later radars like the P-18 Spoon Rest used a Yagi-Uda array—which were lighter and somewhat smaller. But these early low frequency radars had some serious limitations in determining the range and the precise direction of a contact. Furthermore, they could not determine altitude because the radar beams produced by these systems are several degrees wide in azimuth and tens of degrees wide in elevation.

    Another traditional limitation of VHF and UHF-band radars is that their pulse width is long and they have a low pulse repetition frequency [PRF]—which means such systems are poor at accurately determining range. As Mike Pietrucha, a former Air Force an electronic warfare officer who flew on the McDonnell Douglas F-4G Wild Weasel and Boeing F-15E Strike Eagle once described to me, a pulse width of twenty microseconds yields a pulse that is roughly 19,600 ft long—range resolution is half the length of that pulse. That means that range can’t be determined accurately within 10,000 feet. Furthermore, two targets near one another can’t be distinguished as separate contacts.

    Signal processing partially solved the range resolution problem as early as in the 1970s. The key is a process called frequency modulation on pulse, which is used to compress a radar pulse. The advantage of using pulse compression is that with a twenty-microsecond pulse, the range resolution is reduced to about 180 feet or so. There are also several other techniques that can be used to compress a radar pulse such as phase shift keying. Indeed, according to Pietrucha, the technology for pulse compression is decades old and was taught to Air Force electronic warfare officers during the 1980s. The computer processing power required for this is negligible by current standards, Pietrucha said.

    Engineers solved the problem of directional or azimuth resolution by using phased array radar designs, which dispensed with the need for a parabolic array. Unlike older mechanically scanned arrays, phased array radars steer their radar beams electronically. Such radars can generate multiple beams and can shape those beams for width, sweep rate and other characteristics. The necessary computing power to accomplish that task was available in the late 1970s for what eventually became the Navy’s Aegis combat system found on the Ticonderoga-class cruisers and Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. An active electronically scanned array is better still, being even more precise.

    With a missile warhead large enough, the range resolution does not have to be precise. For example, the now antiquated S-75 Dvina—known in NATO parlance as the SA-2 Guideline—has a 440-pound warhead with a lethal radius of more than 100 feet. Thus, a notional twenty-microsecond compressed pulse with a range resolution of 150 feet should have the range resolution to get the warhead close enough—according to Pietrucha’s theory.

    The directional and elevation resolution would have to be similar with an angular resolution of roughly 0.3 degrees for a target at thirty nautical miles because the launching radar is the only system guiding the SA-2. For example, a missile equipped with its own sensor—perhaps an infrared sensor with a scan volume of a cubic kilometer—would be an even more dangerous foe against an F-22 or F-35.

    http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-us-militarys-biggest-secret-out-how-kill-f-35-21163
     
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  7. BON PLAN

    BON PLAN Major SENIOR MEMBER

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    Hopefully for USAF, North Korea will be among the latest country to be equipped.
    So there is a window of few years to attack NK with F35.
     
  8. BON PLAN

    BON PLAN Major SENIOR MEMBER

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    The British politicians have been told that each Joint Strike Fighter will cost between £77 million and £100 million. Thanks to research work by Deborah Haynes, the defence editor of The Times, the British learned that the cost of the aircraft was actually more than £150 million.

    Naturally, all the usual suspects said the journalist was wrong. But the British National Audit Office has had a good look at the real JSF costs. They estimate that by March 2021, the UK will have outlaid £5.8 billion on 21 JSF aircraft — a total of £276 million per aircraft.

    But then there are extras which take the total cost to £7 billion for the 21 JSF or a total cost per aircraft of £333 million — that’s more than $US400 million and about twice The Times’ estimate, which did not include all the ancillary requirements.

    And of course the British National Audit Office calculations made complete rubbish of the official statements to the British Parliament. Like the British parliament, the Australian parliament has also been misled with ridiculously low estimates that don’t cover the total costs.
     
  9. Averageamerican

    Averageamerican Colonel ELITE MEMBER

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    Sounds like the the author believes the planes and missles are floating by like ships in the ocean rather then two bullets speeding by in the middle of the night and that the F35 and the F22 are unable to maneuver or defend them selves. Also that all these complicated radar systems are going to evolve over night with out the USA knowing of their existence or how to counter them if they ever exist. One thing you can depend on is the USA knows what it is doing and it will do it very well. The kill ratio of US Planes to Enemy planes in the last generation is a 100 to 1.
     
  10. BON PLAN

    BON PLAN Major SENIOR MEMBER

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    the same type of reasoning led to the suppression of the canon in 1960 era....
     
  11. Picdelamirand-oil

    Picdelamirand-oil Lt. Colonel MILITARY STRATEGIST

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    Let’s Talk About The USAF's Claim Of 'Fully Combat Capable' F-35s
    The service is making this assertion despite the jet not having even started independent operational testing and evaluation.
    BY JOSEPH TREVITHICKSEPTEMBER 6, 2017

    [​IMG]

    Of all the issues surrounding the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, perhaps the most hotly contested is the criteria the U.S. Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy are using to judge when the jets will be ready for combat andwhether certain milestones accurately reflect the stealth fighter’s capabilities. The Air Force has now reignited this debate by stating that it will have "fully combat capable" F-35As by the end of September 2017 even though the jet hasn't even started independent operational test and evaluation trials.

    On Aug. 25, 2017, Aviation Week reported that the Air Force would begin receiving A model aircraft able to “employ its full suite of air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons,” including its internal 25mm cannon. To achieve this milestone, the new aircraft would come with a critical new software update, which the service referred to simply as Block 3F. In September 2016, the service announced this would occur by the beginning of the 2018 fiscal year, which starts on Oct. 1, 2017.

    LOCKHEED MADE A THREE MINUTE LONG CARTOON JUST TO EXPLAIN F-35'S ALISBy Joseph TrevithickPosted in THE WAR ZONE
    NOW THAT THE F-35A IS ALSO HAVING OXYGEN ISSUES A SOLUTION IS MORE LIKELYBy Tyler RogowayPosted in THE WAR ZONE
    NAVY PRESENTS REVEALING F-35 HELMET DISPLAY VIDEOS AND FLIGHT TEST DANGERS By Tyler RogowayPosted in THE WAR ZONE
    MINIATURE SMART BOMBS COULD HELP GIVE THE F-35 FIREPOWER IT DESPERATELY NEEDSBy Joseph TrevithickPosted in THE WAR ZONE
    THE U.S. AIR FORCE ONLY HAS ONE UPGRADED EJECTION SEAT FOR ITS F-35A FLEETBy Joseph TrevithickPosted in THE WAR ZONE
    “We now just passed 100,000 flying hours with the F-35, and it is doing very well,” Secretary of the Air Force Heather Wilson told reporters during a press conference, also on Aug. 25, 2017. “In any contingency, if there were a problem, they’re ready to go – ready to go to combat.”

    Wilson was responding in part to questions about Air Force capabilities to respond to heightened tensions on the Korean Peninsula, where North Korea continues to test advanced ballistic missiles and has now claims to have a functional hydrogen bomb. On Aug. 31, 2017, Marine Corps F-35Bs, which the service has forward deployed to Japan, joined a show of force over both Japan and South Korea for the first time.

    [​IMG]
    USAF
    An F-35A drops a training version of a GBU-31/B JDAM during an exercise.

    As we at The War Zone have noted before, low observable aircraft such as the F-35 would be an important component of any actual strike on North Korea, owing to the country’s dense, if dated air defense network. A fully-combat capable Joint Strike Fighter would give Air Force commanders in the Pacific, as well as other hot spots around the world, additional flexibility to respond to crises.

    The 34th Fighter Squadron at Hill Air Force Base in Utah, a combat coded unit, is slated to receive the jets with the Block 3F software first, according to Aviation Week. The three training squadrons at Luke Air Force Base in Arizona – the 61st, 62nd, and 63rd Fighter Squadrons – will then start getting the updated aircraft.

    [​IMG]
    USAF
    An F-35A drops a practice GBU-12/B laser guided bomb during an exercise.

    Still, it’s not entirely clear how the Air Force is defining “fully combat capable” in this case. None of the three F-35 variants have even begun the mandatory testing process run by the Pentagon's Office of the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E), which is independent of the individual services.

    What is clear is that this is not the same, nor is the service claiming it is, as a formal declaration of “full operational capability,” or FOC. The Pentagon-standard definition for FOC is when every unit that is supposed to receive a certain weapon system has gotten that piece of equipment and can both operate and maintain it. This announcement is generally only supposed to come after the system passes DOT&E's rigorous independent testing regime.

    The Air Force had already added confusion to this process by declaring initial operational capability (IOC), which is supposed to reflect a basic operational capability, for the F-35A before the end of developmental testing and without any operational evaluations. The service seems to be again obfuscating the situation, intentionally or unintentionally, by using a term that sounds similar to FOC, but isn't, which has already led to confusion in the media about what this new announcement realistically means.

    "This may very well be an effort to undermine the operational testing process," Dan Grazier, the Jack Shanahan Fellow at the Project On Government Oversight, a non-partisan watchdog that has been highly critical of the F-35 program, told The War Zone by Email. "All the services have been hostile to the idea of having an outside testing official evaluating their work. I see this as an attempt to marginalize DOT&E's role in the acquisition process."

    [​IMG]
    USAF
    Of the three services purchasing F-35 variants, the U.S. Navy is the only one that has not declared IOC with its jets, continuing to link that milestone to the successful completion of operational testing. The U.S. Marine Corps and the Air Force say they have achieved this with their F-35s and now the Air Force curiously says it plans to declare IOC for the Block 3F software itself once the code begins reaching operational and training units.

    “Declaring ‘initial operational capability’ after each of the program's steps rather diminishes the pronouncement,” Grazier added. “I'm sure most people are really only interested in ‘full operational capability’ as that is what we are paying for.”

    Beyond that, based on the publicly available information, it’s hard to say whether or not the Block 3F software package will provide a truly complete suite of combat capabilities. We have no reason to doubt the new code will finally allow F-35A pilots to employ the fuller range of existing operational weapons the Air Force wants the aircraft to carry by the end of the ongoing developmental testing process.

    As of 2015, this list of planned weapon options was relatively short, includingthe AIM-9X and AIM-120C air-to-air missiles, GBU-12/B 500-pound class laser-guided bombs, GBU-31/B 2,000-pound class GPS-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) bombs, the GBU-39/B Small Diameter Bomb (SDB), and theGAU-22/A 25mm cannon. There are now plans to integrate 500- and 1,000-pound class JDAMs and the GBU-49/B dual-mode version of the GBU-12.

    [​IMG]
    F-35 JPO
    The F-35As can only carry some of these weapons, such as the AIM-9X, on external pylons that severely degrade the aircraft’s low-observable characteristics. The Air Force hopes its final, full operational capability Joint Strike Fighters – running the still notional Block 4 software – will be able to carry dual-mode Laser JDAMs and the still-in-development SDB II, as well.

    That being said, there’s no guarantee that the Block 3F software will allow F-35A pilots to effectively employ some or all of these weapons. We don’t even know for sure what specific version of it the Air Force will distribute for its software "IOC."

    As of December 2016, the service had already gone through six different revisions of the update. According to DOT&E's annual report on the program for 2016, the central joint service F-35 program office initially planned for this latest code, known as Block 3FR6, to be ready in February 2016, but it only arrived 10 months behind schedule.

    In 2016, “DOT&E reported there were 270 high-priority deficiencies in the Block 3F software for each variant [of the F-35],” Grazier noted. “The Air Force's own test pilots rated the Block 3F as ‘red’ or not ready for operational testing, not to mention actual combat, in all mission areas.”

    It is important to note that what specifically the Air Force had negatively rated was two subversions of the earlier Block 3FR5 software, 3FR5.03 and 3FR5.05. It is possible that the present edition of Revision 6 has fixed most, if not all of the issues.

    However, it’s hard to give the service the benefit of the doubt that this has been the case. As with the Block 3FR5 software, Air Force itself determined the Block 3i package for the IOC jets was unacceptable for actual combat operations, according to DOT&E’s review of the program. This prompts serious questions about the validity of Air Force Secretary Wilson’s comments in August 2017, as well as the IOC decision itself and what we can expect from the new 3FR6 code.

    [​IMG]
    LOCKHEED MARTIN
    An F-35A fires an AIM-120C missile during a test.

    This is further compounded by the fact that the Air Force says it alreadyexpects to deliver a string of Block 3F updates as continued testing exposes more problems despite its insistence that they will have "full combat capability." This is actually something DOT&E recommended the F-35 program as a whole do after developmental phase ended, but as part of the subsequent operational evaluation process and before any service even considered deploying the jets on operational missions or training exercises – something both the Air Force and Marine Corps have now been doing for months.

    "Several essential capabilities – including aimed gunshots and Air-to-Air Range Infrastructure – had not yet been flight tested or did not yet work properly when Block 3FR6 was released," according to DOT&E's review. "The services [Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy] ... designated 276 deficiencies in combat performance as 'critical to correct' in Block 3F, but less than half of the critical deficiencies were addressed with attempted corrections in 3FR6."

    On top of that, DOT&E said that the delays with Revision 6, coupled with funding problems, had forced the F-35 program office to scrap its own existing plans for two follow-on software blocks, 3FR7 and 3FR8. At this point, it seems almost impossible to assess the true capabilities of any “Block 3F” code, positively or negatively, based on public descriptions, especially given the sheer number of major revisions and minor changes.

    But most significantly, thanks to the Freedom of Information Act, we do know that the service already deliberately watered down its capability criteria to meet its own, self-imposed schedule for declaring IOC with the F-35A in August 2016. This was mainly out of fear that delaying the milestone any further would become a political and public relations nightmare that could've potentially impacted Congressional support and foreign sales.

    [​IMG]
    USAF VIA FOIA
    In June 2010, the official schedule was to have a final version of the Block 3 software pass the independent operational test and evaluation process no later than October 2016 and then make the IOC announcement. By May 2013, this had changed to having an aircraft ready with any block of software that would allow pilots a limited capability to destroy enemy air defenses and perform basic close air support, with no mention whatsoever of air-to-air combat. At present, the Air Force does not have a firm date of when the jets will be ready for the more rigorous operational testing and evaluations.

    It is entirely possible we’re seeing this situation crop up again. The Air Force’s statements came ahead of the Labor Day holiday weekend and before Congress returned to continue work on, among other things, the defense budget for the 2018 fiscal year.

    “The Senate version [of the annual National Defense Authorization Act] would have the American taxpayers purchase 94 F-35s, 24 more than the president requested,” Grazier noted. “I am sure this move is an effort to make people believe the program is worth the investment.”

    This argument would help explain why the U.S. Marine Corps made a similar declaration shortly after the Air Force announcement. The service said that their F-35Bs in Japan would also be getting some version of the Block 3F software, gaining a similar full combat capability to the Air Force models.

    [​IMG]
    USN
    A US Marine Corps F-35B.

    None of this is to say that the ultimate version of the Block 3F software won't perform as required and provide the services with an F-35 that is highly capable, one that is even ready for combat in an emergency. The concern is that the rush to get the jets into service could put pilots in the seat of a jet that just isn't ready yet, exposing them to unnecessary risks, which is why the operational test and evaluation process exists in the first place.

    This does means the F-35 program isn’t necessarily progressing forward and meeting its goals, either. However, as we at The War Zone have noted before, it can be difficult to judge official statements regarding the Joint Strike Fighter, which often seem to rely on obtuse and “technically correct” claims that confuse the obvious and significant issues that project continues to face, often serving to diminish any actual positive news that emerges.

    Back in July 2017, Tyler Rogoway noted this after the Navy released some of the most candid and useful official information to date about test of the Marine Corps’ F-35B, writing:

    After watching this video, it's hard not feel that if the F-35 program would have just consistently published this type of information as the program advanced, for better or worse, it probably would have gone a long way to help – not hurt – the controversial aircraft's plight.

    One of the major criticisms of the F-35 program has been the fog surrounding its delayed development. Massive swathes of issues would periodically emerge through leaks, congressional hearings, and watchdog or pentagon test and evaluation reports. At the same time, straight answers from the aircraft's manufacturer or the F-35 program office were seemingly few and far between. Instead, we got glitzy videos with idealized snippets of the jet in action and those involved with the program singing its praises, which seemed totally tone deaf, especially as the aircraft's development was clearly headed towards the edge of the abyss.

    One has to wonder whether the Air Force and the Marines Corps are now making the same mistake by trying to drum up support for the aircraft with this largely undefined claim, which is undoubtedly technically accurate based on the services’ internal criteria, of fielding fully combat capable F-35s before the independent operational test and evaluation process has even begun.

    http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zon...the-usafs-plan-for-fully-combat-capable-f-35s
     
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  12. Picdelamirand-oil

    Picdelamirand-oil Lt. Colonel MILITARY STRATEGIST

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    Air Force pilot killed in crash 100 miles northwest of Nellis base

    An Air Force pilot died when his plane crashed during a training mission Tuesday northwest of Nellis Air Force Base, officials confirmed Friday.

    Specific information on the aircraft involved in the crash is classified and not available for release, said Maj. Christina Sukach, a Nellis spokeswoman.

    The base announced that an Air Force aircraft crashed about 6 p.m. Tuesday during a training mission on the Nevada Test and Training Range, about 100 miles northwest of Nellis. The crash was the first in two consecutive days of training-related crashes at the Nellis range. On Wednesday, two fighter jets crashed during a routine training mission, the base announced.

    Base spokesman Tech. Sgt. Siuta Ika said Lt. Col. Eric Schultz was piloting the aircraft when it crashed. Ika said it was unknown whether other people were on board at the time of the crash.

    It was unclear whether Schultz died at the crash site, Sukach said. She said he was supporting training at the site.

    The base announced the aircraft was part of the Air Force Materiel Command, which develops and tests weapons.

    On Wednesday, two pilots ejected safely from A-10C Thunderbolt II jets about 8 p.m. and were evaluated by medical staff on base. They were later released with survivable injuries, spokeswoman Lt. Marie Ortiz later said.

    Ortiz said the fighter jets were each worth $18.8 million.

    Both crashes and their causes are under investigation. When asked why the information release from Wednesday’s crash came before information from Tuesday’s fatal crash, Ika said efforts after the deadly incident focused on search and recovery as well as next-of-kin notification.

    It was unclear why the pilots in the fighter jet crash flew the day after Tuesday’s fatal crash.

    The Capital Gazette of Annapolis, Maryland, reported Schultz graduated from Annapolis High School in 1991. His mother and father traveled to Nevada on Wednesday to join his wife and other family members, the newspaper reported.

    The newspaper said Schultz was a former civilian test pilot who held multiple graduate degrees. He joined the Air Force in 2001, according to the Capital Gazette, and became a flight training officer. He joined rarefied air when he qualified to fly the F-35 fighter jet in 2011, the newspaper reported.

    Attempts to reach his family Friday afternoon were unsuccessful.

     
  13. sunstersun

    sunstersun Lieutenant FULL MEMBER

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  14. BON PLAN

    BON PLAN Major SENIOR MEMBER

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    Air Force pilot killed in crash 100 miles northwest of Nellis base

    [​IMG]
    [​IMG]

    ???
     
  15. Picdelamirand-oil

    Picdelamirand-oil Lt. Colonel MILITARY STRATEGIST

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    The F-35 Case Study

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    (Photo: Samuel King Jr. / US Air Force)

    The F-35 was conceived to be a multi-mission aircraft that would meet the very different requirements of three separate services. Add to that the needs of eight partner countries and various foreign military sales customers, and no one should be surprised by the results. In attempting to be all things to all people, the F-35 can’t perform any single mission particularly well, and the entire thing ends up costing a fortune.

    The problems with creating a one-size-fits-all aircraft should have been well known to the decision-makers at the time. The Pentagon tried to do the same thing in the 1960s with the F-111 program, when then-Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara converted the Air Force’s single mission F-111 nuclear bomber project into a multi-mission, multi-Service aircraft for the Air Force and Navy (note that McNamara never conceived the F-111, just as SecDef Les Aspin didn’t conceive the F-35 in 1993—he simply approved turning it into a multi-Service plane). The results pleased no one and the Navy dropped out of the program entirely before it went into production. The Air Force cut short the number of F-111s it bought and quickly initiated a single mission air-to-air fighter that became the F-15 program.

    The technical shortcomings of the F-111 were secondary to the main shortcoming of the program: the leadership’s decision to build a one-size-fits-all aircraft. When they came up with the idea, at least those in charge then might not have known better because they did not have a glaring historical failure staring them down as they made their decision; the DoD political appointees and the general officers in charge of acquisition at the inception of the F-35 have no such cover. They had the clear example of the F-111 that most of them had lived through (specifically, Les Aspin and all the generals and admirals), but they chose to push ahead with an acquisition concept they should have known was flawed, anyway.

    Leadership, or the lack thereof, is the most serious factor in what is perhaps the most pervasive and expensive of all flawed acquisition strategies, concurrency. This is the term for the deliberate overlap of development, testing, and production. The F-35 will likely go down in history as one of the most egregious examples of this form of “acquisition malpractice.” At the current rate, the services will likely have nearly 800 deficiency-laden F-35s in production before the fixes have been completed and fully tested.

    Senior leaders knew this was a bad idea.

    Concurrency, as a RAND Corporation analyst explained in testimony before the House Committee on Government Reform on May 10, 2000, is rooted “in the politics of the acquisition process.” This practice serves to limit the available political options for restructuring programs experiencing significant test failures or cost overruns. When the Pentagon makes substantial procurement commitments well before development or testing is complete, it severely increases the political costs of cancelling the program due to all the money already invested and all the jobs already created.

    What makes this even worse is that these production commitments are made at the point in the process when the programs are most likely to need revision or restructuring due to unanticipated technical problems. During the phase of the development process when prototypes are being tested, “the data almost always is going to contradict the optimism of early assessments.” This means the airplane, tank, ship, or other weapon system may well not be performing up to the level promised when votes were being solicited to get the program off the ground. And it is precisely at this point that Congress and the taxpayer are stymied from exercising the reasonable options of either cancelling the buy or slowing down the program to implement fixes. Instead, they are forced to continue buying the early production units of the airplane or tank or ship, exactly the ones that invariably have the highest price tags. As Air Force cost analyst and whistleblower A. Ernest Fitzgerald often bemoaned, “It’s either too early to tell, or too late to do anything about it.”
     
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